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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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USSR'S COSTS, GAINS IN AFGHAN 'VIETNAM' COMPARED

Rome IL BORGHESE in Italian 11 Jan 81 pp 88, 90

[Article by Adriano Bolzoni: "Moscow Is Preparing an Annexation"]

[Text] Afghan guerrilla fighters always wear a turban and often have the picturesque bandolier over one shoulder across the breast and a curved dagger in their belt, but, in general, their weapons are no longer the ones they had in January 1980.

A year has passed since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The freedom fighters no longer have only the old Lee-Enfield rifle and the anachronistic 1899 model Saint Etienne. Modern weapons from 10 different countries are being seen more and more frequently in the hands of the Afghan patriots. Egyptian and Chinese equipment (China imitates rather well all that the Czechoslovaks and the Soviets produce with regard to mortars and machineguns), Western equipment coming from Iran, especially "weapons taken from the enemy," from the invaders and deserters. Not numerous, but consistently, the freedom fighters are armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, Simonov carbines, even dual and quadruple ZPU heavy machineguns.

The USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 with three armored, mechanized divisions and a fourth airborne division. Immediately, three more divisions (the 66th, 357th and 16th) were sent as reinforcement. At present, the field headquarters of the Soviet occupation forces, at first set up at Termez, a Russian village close to the Afghan border, is on the Bagram Air Base, 30 kilometers north of Kabul. It is commanded by Marshal Sokolov, vice minister of defense of the USSR. There are seven organic divisions involved, plus four autonomous brigades, about 96,000 men, 2,500 armored vehicles, 2,800 troop transport vehicles, combat vehicles (AFV [Armored Fighting Vehicle]), much artillery. With regard to aircraft, the best instrument for fighting against the guerrilla forces consists of about 80 Mil-24 HIND attack helicopters.

In spite of this impressive force, the Red Army controls only the cities in the Afghan Vietnam. The balance-sheet of the first year of Soviet occupation is very heavy. The following are some figures that seem to be entirely unknown to our mass media, press and radio-television: 1 million Afghans killed, over 1 million refugees in Pakistan, over 400,000 in Iran. The Soviets have lost from 20,000 to 25,000 men in a year. With the arrival of another winter, controlling means of communication, Soviet activity takes place primarily in the three air bases of Bagram, Mazar I Sharif in the north and Chindand between the towns of Herat and Kandahar, that have become huge entrenched camps. Marshal Borisov and the five generals under his

command believe that at least 350,000 men are needed for exercising stricter control over the invaded territory, strengthening, at the same time, the deployment along the Soviet-Iranian border in the Caucasus military district.

Afghanistan is an enormously heavy burden on the USSR. Soviet military dispositions, extending from Angola to Mozambique, from Ethiopia to South Yemen, from Aden to Syria (not to mention Poland and all the territories of the European satellites), are having a fierce effect on the economic crisis and the food shortage in the communist world. When we read, and we often read, that Syrian artillery forces "have bombarded objectives in South Lebanon for an hour" firing 2,000 rounds, we know that one single 155-millimeter gun shell costs something like 1.14 million Italian lire. By firing 2,000 rounds for an hour, the Syrians have "burned up" almost 2.5 billion lire. The shells, like the guns, come from the USSR. Syria will never pay. Damascus will simply have to be resupplied again. Let us think of Afghanistan. A year of guerrilla warfare has swallowed up unbelievable amounts. And this is multiplied by all the "theaters" in which the colossal, very powerful army of a country in which, for the first time since Lenin's time, foodstuffs like milk, meat, white cheeses and other food products widely consumed by the people can no longer be found. Sugar and flour disappear from the state stores very early in the morning.

Millions of dollars a day are being pulverized by the huge military-repressive complex of the Soviet empire. Over 3 billion Italian lire a day merely to enable Fidel Castro to deliver interminable speeches irregularly on an island in the Caribbean.

The balance-sheet in a year of Afghan Vietnam is very heavy. Although it is true that Afghan resistance tends, in the east, to turn every skirmish into a "great battle"; although it is true that in Islamabad and Peshawar, in Pakistan, the freedom fighters have not yet found their De Gaulle (the deposed king, Mohammed Shah, seems to have received an invitation to head all the guerrilla movements); although it is true that, although greatly improved, the situation of weapons, provisions, resupplies and ammunition of the patriots has not yet been solved and that there are enormous difficulties for doing this, it is also true that the Red Army has not yet solved a single one of its problems in the invaded country. There is someone who traveled "far and wide for 35 days in five provinces of the country without seeing one single Soviet soldier outside of his helicopter or of his tank" (Jean Christophe Victor, EXPRESS). Today, Karmal's Afghan Army, which was over 100,000 men strong in 1979, counts on (or, rather, does not count on) less than 35,000 draftees.

Weak against the great power of the "chouravis, of the Russians, of the infidel kafirs, the Afghan guerrilla fighters strike only unhesitatingly. They salvage all that they can from the bodies of the enemy. They continue action wherever possible, day and night. The thousands and thousands of little victories at any moment are what make guerrilla warfare: assaults, mines, explosives, ambushes, sabotage. No prisoners. "What can we do with prisoners?" freedom fighters ask.

If we interpret correctly the news and reports coming to us on Red Army activities in Afghanistan, the Kremlin has probably decided to modify the line the the eastern border and to annex the entire Wakhan Province and part of Badakhistan Province to the USSR. It is an appendage of Afghanistan 250 kilometers in a transverse line from west to east and 60 kilometers deep. This territory isolates the USSR from direct contact with Pakistan and enables Afghanistan to have a border with China. The strategic value of this territory that Moscow is probably preparing to absorb

and annex permanently is enormous. Not only nothing more could flow into Afghanistan from China, but also Soviet tanks would face the Pakistan plain in the direction of Kashmir.

If this should happen, it would simply mean that, with the operation of invasion of Afghanistan, the Red Army has probably decided to thrust forward to an extremely dangerous "point of no return."

10,042

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## AFGHANISTAN

CP ORGAN: DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALI KESHTMAND TELLS REGIME'S GOALS

Oslo FRIHETEN in Norwegian 8 Jan 81 pp 6-7

[Article by Kare Andre Nilsen]

[Text] A year has gone by since the second phase of the April revolution in Afghanistan was begun on 27 December 1979.

A year of agitation against the Afghan revolution--a year in which the imperialists have tried to intensify international tensions against the background of the events in this land of 16 million inhabitants.

Anyone capable of thinking even somewhat realistically knows that Afghanistan was just an excuse for the United States, an excuse used to whip up a war psychosis, an excuse to set in motion widescale arms escalation programs that were planned long before 27 December 1979.

But in Afghanistan developments have proceeded. Even though much of the efforts of the revolutionary government have had to go into creating security for the people by fighting the counterrevolutionary forces and foreign intervention there has also been a social and economic development in the country.

One of the people occupying a key post in this context is Deputy Prime Minister Soltan Ali Keshtmand. He is also vice president of the Revolutionary Council and must be regarded as "Number 2" in Afghanistan today.

Like Babrak Karmal, Soltan Ali Keshtmand is one of those people who have been "killed" several times during the last year. According to western news agencies, that is. This occurred most recently at the end of February when UPI/NTB [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL/NORWEGIAN PRESS AGENCY] and all the others reported that the planning minister had been killed "in an exchange of gunfire during a meeting of the Revolutionary Council." As usual this turned out to be a complete fabrication.

Actually the 44-year-old Keshtmand could have lost his life a few months before that. He was one of the most prominent prisoners during Amin's reign of terror. He was subjected to brutal torture while spending 16 months in the infamous Puli Charki prison during the Taraki/Amin period. He was kept in total isolation.

"For 3 1/2 months I lived under the death sentence," he told us. Incidentally he had been in jail once before, in 1965-66. That was under King Shahir Shah.

On 27 December Soltan Ali Keshtmand was the very first of the political prisoners to be released. Soon afterward he was back as planning minister, the same post he held in the first few months after the April revolution in 1978.

How does he view the situation now compared with the period just after Amin was ousted a year ago?

"In general we can say that the situation now is almost back to normal. People are working normally in all areas. The big terrorist bands coming in from Pakistan have been virtually wiped out even though some minority groups are still active and continue their destruction of property and their murder of children and innocent people. They are still destroying schools, hospitals and mosques, but all in all one can say that they are retreating. Our policy has gained great influence among the people," said Soltan Ali Keshtmand who himself comes from the people in the true meaning of the word.

#### From Poor Farm Family

He grew up in a very poor small farm family in the vicinity of Kabul. Purely by chance he had an opportunity to get an education. "Contrary to the normal course of events" he ended up as a student of economics at Kabul University. After completing his studies he worked as an official in various ministries--and in revolutionary political activities.

Both his parents still live in the village outside the capital but they are still illiterate, Keshtmand said.

#### Long Friendship with Karmal

One of the major factors in bringing the young economist into politics was his meeting with the approximately 8-year older Barbrak Karmal. The result was that he was one of the founders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1965. He became a member of the first PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] Central Committee. When the split occurred in 1967 (a split that lasted until 1977) Keshtmand became a professional party worker in the Parcham Party which was led by Karmal. He was responsible for the party's educational activity and the party's international contacts.

"Karmal and I have always worked well together and we are close friends," said Keshtmand. "He has always had a great influence on his comrades. He has functioned as a teacher as far as I'm concerned.

#### Large Sums in Aid from One Side

"We have had many problems with party unity," he said, "but now we are seeing a positive development. Unity is being consolidated while at the same time the social and political steps we take are acquiring an increasingly broader basis.



This is especially due to the fact that we have taken very concrete steps to improve the economic situation and the people's standard of living.

"The year in Afghanistan runs from 22 March to 22 March. My report for the first half year showed that we have made some progress. This is in spite of the fact that all the western lands have tried to destroy our economy by stopping all our credit. However we are fortunate because to compensate for this we have received help from the socialist world system led by the Soviet Union. We are getting large amounts in aid, a fact that has contributed to the normalization of the nation's economic life.

#### **Economy Totally Destroyed a Year Ago**

"In the economic area," Keshtmand said, "we had to contend with a bleak inheritance from the Amin period. In reality the economy had been destroyed. The financial situation was not in order. The government had borrowed double the real income from the central bank. That of course leads to serious inflation. But this year we proposed a really balanced budget. After 7 months it is balanced in spite of all the problems. There have been no price increases. We have taken care of the inflation. Foreign trade is 56 percent better than it was last year. Exports are larger than imports but our imports from western countries are higher than our exports there. That is a privilege for the western countries but we have allowed it to happen.

#### **People Must Learn Revolution Gives Them Something**

"Even though agriculture has been subjected to destruction, agricultural production rose anyway. The second phase of land reform is going well. The farmers now feel sure that they can work on the land. The cooperatives are becoming a movement under a separate leadership. This movement is part of the national patriotic front.

"With regard to the working class we have carried out new laws based on their working conditions. A commission has been set up to recommend wage increases for all industrial and mine workers. Wages will be raised an average of 20 percent. To raise the people's living standard we are placing great emphasis on light industry, consumer industry. People must learn from their own experience that the revolution is giving them something. However this does not mean that we are neglecting heavy industry.

#### **Sabotage Attempts--Similar to Chile**

"During our last delegation visit to the Soviet Union we reached an agreement on new credits, they will give us unilateral economic aid for carrying out big projects. And when it comes to consumer goods we have received large gifts from the socialist countries, a shipment of clothing and shoes worth \$150 million (100 million rubles) which we have distributed to the people as gifts. The same is true of grain and various agricultural tools which we have handed over to farmers. This year alone we have been given 140,000 tons of wheat, 20,000 tons of rice and 8000 tons of sugar as out-and-out gifts.

"At this very moment," said the planning minister, "we are establishing a government-operated transportation system. As they have in Chile we in Afghanistan have experienced sabotage in the private area of this sector. Now we are setting up a strong state sector side by side with the private one. We are getting more than 2000 heavy trucks from the Soviet Union for nothing and over 600 cheap trucks from Czechoslovakia."

Will Afghanistan remain a country largely characterized by its agriculture for a long time to come? Keshtmand answered:

"No. Afghanistan will not remain a predominately agricultural land. We have a program for industrializing the country and we are following it. Already more than 50 percent of government investments go to industrial development, with 25 percent going to agriculture, 12 percent to transportation and communications. The rest goes to social areas, health, education and so forth. We want to achieve a relatively rapid industrial development. Without that real development will be impossible," Keshtmand said.

#### Improvement--But People Have Hard Days

What about unemployment?

"Most people have some kind of work," he said. "There aren't really that many people who are totally unemployed. We are constantly trying to develop something, to create new jobs. But the foreign terrorists have created many problems for us. The security of the people has been the main thing all last year. This has tied up a lot of money and other resources. But we have really tried to achieve a tangible improvement in the standard of living. The people are not starving. They have something to eat, even though they continue to have hard days to get through. But all this is getting better and better, at any rate," Keshtmand said.

His description tallies with FRIHETEN's own observations. In February it was winter and there was snow and there were quite a few people sitting or lying on the sidewalk and rooftops. In the fall one can still run into beggars but there are fewer of them. It is quite noticeable.

#### Public and Private Side by Side

"We would have come much farther in our economic and social development without the criminal acts perpetrated against our country by the United States, China and Pakistan.

"But not even their activity has succeeded in stopping the process of social and economic reforms," Keshtmand said.

What role will the private sector of the economy actually play in the future compared with the cooperative and state-owned forms?

"We have no restrictions on the private sector but the big industrial sector will be concentrated in the hands of the state and the government. The same thing is



true of transportation and agriculture. With regard to foreign trade, 60 percent is in private hands. We will expand the state sector here too but not in order to eliminate the private sector.

#### **Non-Capitalist Course Toward Socialism**

"We are going slowly and carefully forward in Afghanistan today," said Keshtmand. "We are pursuing a non-capitalist course of development in the direction of socialism. But the construction of socialism requires a material foundation, you know. But one thing is certain, as long as power is in the hands of the working class and the working people through the People's Democratic Party one can be quite sure that the Afghan revolution will have a socialist orientation and will march in the direction of socialism. That is the class struggle, a political battle against counterrevolution.

#### **Must Win and Build a New Society**

"We will win because we have the support of the people and because we have help and support from all the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, and all other revolutionary and democratic forces in the world. We will build a new society in Afghanistan," he said.

Soltan Ali Keshtmand was the PDPA representative earlier this fall at a big international conference in Berlin attended by representatives of 116 Communist and Labor parties as well as liberation movements around the world. What did he think of it?

"Of these 116 organizations, only four took a passive attitude toward our cause," said Keshtmand. "The applause that followed my own speech is something I will never forget. Such a reaction is a source of inspiration and also gives a feeling of very strong moral support for our struggle to build up Afghanistan and make it into a new society," said the Afghan vice president and deputy prime minister.

6578

CSO: 3108

## FLN PARTY DOCTRINE CONSIDERED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26-27 Dec 80 p 4

[Article by Raichou Boudjemaa: "Putting in Order FLN [National Liberation Front] Constituent Elements"]

[Text] On the eve of the FLN Party Central Committee session, we deem it timely to raise some organic problems inherent in the party's life. The transcendent nature of this study crosses both events and people, while the FLN is engaged in starting the Fifth Plan, and the way in which the party, through its structures, intends to establish the strictness which will imbue all economic, social, and cultural activities. The purpose of this study is not only to inaugurate a fundamental debate from top to bottom but, above all, to describe the different structural links which condition and underline the country's political life.

It is quite evident that this strictly organic viewpoint encompasses a full set of problems related to whatever action may be taken. By virtue of the fact that it triggers a cause and effect process, this set of problems represents a modulation of the interactions within the party structures. The nuances felt in the functioning of the apparatus and antagonisms triggered by the molding conditions of its mass organizations in terms of the domination and the political-ideological framing of the social forces of the revolution call for taking more into consideration the organic structure of the party holding the power. This is one of the reasons which urges us to reach the very bottom of the structures in order to study the various breakdown phenomena created by the various visions within a single conceptual entity. The thus-experienced organic climate has had as its consequence the splintering of the monolithic body of the party, a splintering whose repercussions are being felt down to the deepest strata of our economy.

The disintegration problems created by a declining production and productivity trend, and the devaluation of working time in all the sectors involved in economic activities are the factual result of the absence of strictness, discipline and a clear vision on the part of the party concerning its mass organizations, on the one hand, and the making of a political decision in favor of the adoption of an ideological clarification, on the other.

It is from this viewpoint that the examination of the relation between the party and the mass organizations should be considered, viewed from the angle of homogeneity, in order to shed a light on the basic step which becomes necessary in the managing of any political enterprise on the part of the FLN as the revolutionary and socialist vanguard.

As the forger of national independence, the FLN assumed the great historical mission of mobilizing the Algerian people in the struggle against colonialism. The meaning of this action or the good based on this struggle were expressed in the adoption of the political-organizational system which put an end to the contradictions and rivalries among parties which were unable to take a coherent step through unity of action for the benefit of the total liberation of the country which was then under colonial rule. This maturing in the course of the struggle included the resolve to put an end to the internal struggles within the national movement and represents a page written in gold in the Algerian political-ideological process. "It is thus that the national movement, overwhelmed by long years of idleness and poorly oriented routine, deprived of the indispensable support of public opinion, and outstripped by events, progressively broke down to the great satisfaction of colonialism which believed itself to have won its greatest victory against the 'Algerian vanguard'." At that point the time came for extracting the national movement from the impasse in which it had found itself as a result of personality and influence struggles, in order to plunge into the true revolutionary struggle.

Putting the supreme interests of the nation above all other considerations of individuals or prestige, the Algerian patriots, whatever their social stratum or purely Algerian parties or movements, became involved, going beyond all basic party affiliation, within the single framework of the struggle, in a renovation movement which took the name of National Liberation Front.

By setting it back on the real tracks of the struggle, the FLN impressed upon the revolutionary movement a dynamic nature which excluded all vestiges of feudalism or alienation, while retaining the democratic and Arab-Islamic foundations which characterize the specific genius of the Algerian people.

It was as of then that the FLN applied the strictness of a revolutionary and vanguard party. In rejecting the sectarianism of the leaders of nationalistic political parties, aggravated by internal divisions, and, occasionally, even the ideas of some politicians blindly supporting foreign ideologies, the FLN put an end to the permanent climate of intrigues, uncertainties, compromises, and divisions engendered by the nationalist movement. At that point the FLN was progressively promoting the unity among the supporters of the national cause, silencing the careerists belonging to political parties and organizations dominated by foreign parties. Discipline, self-denial and a lofty sense of duty played a decisive role in the strengthening of the militant base of the FLN which, henceforth, became a party for struggle and social progress, rather than a "front."

#### A Time For Unity With All Which This Implies

Transcending contingencies and secondary difference, the struggle within the only party must be reduced to its proper size, that of the proper appreciation of the struggle which we must wage against obsolete behaviors in terms of the main national independence targets.

That is why the FLN party could not remain a true vanguard party should it find itself in a state of super-conservatism and irrationality of basic activities conducted through its structures. Its purpose being to enhance the creative power of the people, it should consist of tried members only. This would imply a structure, a type of functioning which should espouse both the outlines of a national morality and a

clear vision of the targets to be reached in the course of the historical path taken by the Algerian people, within the framework of the ideology of the National Charter which is its sole ideology.

The FLN will be able to meet the profound aspirations of the broad masses of the people full of hope and determined to participate in the national constructive effort by plunging deeply and organizedly within the vast revolutionary movement, going beyond subjective contradictions, calling for unity of thought and action and proceeding to the improvement of its structures.

Even though safeguarding their specific prerogatives, by working for the strengthening of the FLN Party the mass organizations could not develop vertical structures which would lead to a fundamental and doctrinal split. It is in this sense that Article 120 of the party statutes recommends that officials who have reached a certain level must be FLN members. This could establish an umbilical tie between the party and its natural extension--the mass organizations. It is this that would contribute to their strengthening, for they cannot remain a side without the risk of betraying the present and compromising the future. It is through such a massive and integral involvement that the party will be able to develop an army of builders of socialism with a human face and without dogma, of an austere and just Islam within the thrust of national solidarity.

It is only thus that the party members can be mobilized on the basis of a common ideal which would go beyond individual situations and eventually lead the mass organizations, seal around the FLN their unity of ideological action and speed up the conversion to Algerian-type socialism.

#### Unity of Thought And Exercise of Democracy

If it is to be truthful and lead to stimulating conclusions, the study of any phenomenon should take into consideration the controversial currents of thought which make themselves be felt. This means a refusal to be dragged into polemics.

##### a. The Exercise of Democracy

The process of struggle is a positive one, despite the persistence of regressive and marginal forces created by structures within the party. In fact, every problem must be considered in depth and its solution must be based on a clear concept of the practice and the observance of its rules and principles.

Any dialogue or discussion within the structures in which internal democracy is absent, i. e., where the view of the majority is not respected, would result in a confusion of ideas and in anarchy in actions, which would be the real cause of anti-democracy.

This means that the extremely sensitive stage in the organic life of the party until its fourth congress, resulted in the involvement in the organization of the congress of the mass organizations in which the minority within the party structures showed up with a report which opposed democratic centralism. It is easy to hold a meeting lacking a basic foundation and to claim that a congress has taken place. The consequence of such tricks is a structural split which is potentially nefarious, for it is not based on the practice of true democracy. The corollary of this situation was a



weakening in the party's organic life and a substantial split between the thinking at the top and the reality at the bottom.

Nothing in these various thoughts seems to raise, by its very nature, a question. This is because the obstacle is within ourselves. It consists of the contradictions which underline the structures of the dialectical progress of the FLN Party, the vanguard of the Algerian revolution.

Whereas consensus is the means for maintaining the balance, the political moment requires the finding of an alternative which goes beyond loyalties.

A clear political will is needed to assert ideologically the nature of the FLN as the only organisation of the revolution regardless of the fragility of its structures and their inconsistency. The development within a party does not follow a straight line and cannot be conceived either simplistically or on the basis of an outdated appreciation. It must be conceived in its entire complexity, including occasionally contradictory phenomena and situations which may appear paradoxically in the case of certain historically determined circumstances.

The objective entity with which a party identifies itself represents the very foundation of its thoughts and doctrine, revealed through the examination of all the principles governing its monolithic structure. In order to discover this identity within the web of events, one should determine the basic component on which its organic-ideological thinking rests. The entire problem lies here, for the strength of a political structure is not made by the number of members or the possession of a membership card but the quality of the members who accept the party's discipline and continually develop the party's ideology, while giving an unquestionable example to the people through their behavior. The party is, more than anything else, a program. To serve the party means to defend its program and to popularize all party ideas very profoundly and extensively.

The result of the organization of a party and of its mass organizations should lead to the emergence of a militant vanguard which obeys the internal laws of revolutionary democracy, being the basic cadre through which criticism and self-criticism insure the dynamics of organic life.

Not to conceal difficulties, errors, and failures, and not to believe in easy victories or appearances is the equivalent of revolutionary practice in the application of socialist democracy.

To be a member of the FLN requires a sustained struggle against opportunism, against the toleration of errors, and against the practice of demagoguery. The internal democracy of a party gives everyone the possibility the questions which promote the progress of the revolution. The practice of democracy demands actions consistent with the realities of the party and the strengthening of its dynamics. The practice of democracy, which is the result of daily struggles, rejects the adoption of a marginal waiting stance.

Socialist democracy is the affirmation of the unity of thought and action within a party, excluding any dogmatic structural plan which would lead to the pursuit of specific targets unrelated to the life of the FLN Party. The organic integration with the FLN does not mean the existence of a structural diversity on the doctrinal level.

Ideological unity within organic diversity is conceived to the extent to which each mass organization formulates a specific plan for action with the sole condition that it benefit the line of the FLN, the only party.

The failure to recognize this is the equivalent of setting up a multitude of vertical structures. This would imply the lack of unity of concepts. Unity of action by itself cannot promote integration.

Should we look for the type of correlation between unity of thought and action which would guarantee the integrity of the party structure within the extensive transformation movement caused by the strategic imperatives of the revolution?

Ties among structures are necessary if we are to coordinate the actions to be undertaken by insuring the real integration of all categories, whatever specifics their organizations may have, while preventing any type of rigidity to take place within the organic unity of the FLN Party.

#### b. Dialectical Analysis of Renovation

Regardless of all its insufficiencies, the existing structure of the FLN has made it possible to concretize a number of activities to promote a mass awareness and a mass structure. The dialectical study of forms of mobilization and the review of its action methodology demand, considering the objective conditions of the struggle, the existence of a party whose essence would be national and democratic, open to the ideas of progress, a party in which the harmonized interests of its members would not be subordinated to precepts alien to the people's ideology.

The views specifically applicable to the operational mechanisms should be such as to allow the growing development of political, cultural, and social education. On the same occasion, such a view would enable the FLN to free creative energies and remove obstacles in order to increase the number of initiatives which could intensify the mobilization for the implementation of national construction targets. Such a step which would give the mass organizations scope within the action program can be taken within the framework of conceptual unity of the FLN Party only if the mass organizations act as active instruments for the dissemination of its ideologies.

As of that point the question of the future would be not only to give support to the effort to organize but, above all, to promote an orientation with a view to establishing a sifting process which would promote the right line followed by the FLN as a vanguard party.

Without weakening the capacity for initiative by its mass organizations, and while providing impetus and control, the FLN Party cannot substitute for its organizations for it has to meet its revolutionary calling. Hence the immediate imperative facing the leadership of the mass organizations above a certain hierarchic level, to behave as active party members. This is a feeling shared by all those united by the concept of fatherland and socialism.

It is because of this that the FLN stops being a "front" and becomes the catalytic party of the masses, the indefatigable promoter of ideological work within the united social forces of the revolution.

The success of such an undertaking of organic development and transformation demands a right political line and clear perspectives. The choice of those who are called upon to implement this action will have a crucial impact on results, as the National Charter emphasizes.

"At the current stage, therefore, the choice of people acquires a decisive, strategic importance. The members and, particularly, the leaders either act as an obstruction to all development efforts or, conversely, become the motor force of the revolution. It is through them that the masses judge of the moral and political health of the revolutionary movement."

What is meant by the renovation of the FLN is the monolithic unification of thought and action within a unified ideological concept which would restore both faith and discipline. It is also a repeat of the line of the truth which leads to the further broadening of democracy whose elaborate development takes into consideration acquired experience, changes, current possibilities, and future tasks.

It is in this spirit that we would avoid the risk of the development of dangerous deviations which could drain the FLN from its popular, national, and democratic meaning.

This requires the removal of anyone who violates the principles of the organic law of integrity of this vanguard party. It also calls for blocking the admission or retention of elements which do not meet the criteria of honesty and of the intrinsic values of the Arab-Islamic personality, of people whose socialist morality is doubtful, thus weakening the authority of the party and even faith of the masses in the party, while altering the militancy of its member. This is because a socialist ideology requires a permanent theoretical development which becomes enriched through daily practice.

Such is the reason for which the FLN should get rid of the theoretical screens which conceal designs alien to its own.

It is only thus that the renovation of the party may meet with the response of the members which are sincerely promoting the national cause and, consequently, find a wide audience among the masses.

Therefore, in the lens of our revolution, the organization of a powerful vanguard party should call for a real, qualitative mobilization, accepting the fullness of the socialist ideal and the noble values of our national personality. The renovated FLN Party will provide a framework for all sincere, honest, and socialistic patriots who are striving to serve, first and foremost, the fatherland and the well-being of the people, united by historical, religious, and doctrinal ties within the single ideology of the FLN, the ideology of the National Charter, which is the theoretical instrument for the evaluation of any one of our actions.

The building of a vanguard party is a major project. A party such as the FLN, which was born in the fire of revolutionary action, should never allow itself to lose the trust of the masses. Regardless of historical twists, the FLN should remain the framework within which right and ideological crops whose "color" can be only that of a free nation, independent in its national thinking, supporting the ideas of justice, progress, and peace.

The re-alignment of these constituent elements, in accordance with the rules of a basic harmonized, cleared, and purified concept, would give the FLN the theoretical clothing which would enable it to control its own body which has been dismembered through an ideological erosion harmful to its condition. This constant will lead to the rebirth of a type of FLN Party which will be on the level of the ambitions of the Algerian people whose beliefs call for a powerful party which would defy any nostalgia for thoughts different from those of the people.

That is why the time has come to inject a new flow which would be potentially able to consolidate the ideological unity of views within the organic dynamism of the FLN Party. The time to make a choice has arrived. The time has come to clarify the stand to be taken. Is the revolution powerful enough to give its party the green light for improvement or else, should the timing be bad, to opt for repeated compromises? One does not know the possible limit for such compromising within the historical cycle of the FLN. The dialectical study leads us to claim that the FLN Party shaken up by innumerable organic tremors will find its real way within the fullness of the socialist ideal and the moral values of Islamic, socialist, modern, and anti-imperialist Algeria.

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## ALGERIA

### INTERVIEW WITH PARTICIPANT IN ARAB CONFERENCES IN UNITED STATES

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Dec 80 p 13

[Interview with Nouredine Aba Algerian writer and poet, conducted by E. M.:  
"Today U.S. Public Opinion Is Showing a Great Interest in Algeria"]

[Text] The North American Association For Middle Eastern Studies and The Center For Contemporary Arab Studies of Georgetown University held their 14th annual congress last November in Washington. Noted specialists in Arab-Islamic and Palestinian problems from all countries came to expose their viewpoints. Two weeks later the 13th annual convention of Arab-American University Alumni was held in Boston where the same problems were discussed. Nouredine Aba, the Algerian writer and poet, who was invited by both organizations, participated in the meetings. We asked him to define the objectives of these two major events in which Islam and the Palestinian problem have always been at the core of the debates.

[Question] Let us speak of the first colloquium in Washington: what were the objectives of the congress and in what capacity were you invited to attend?

[Answer] In what capacity? It so happens that I have had the opportunity of having my works translated into English. On the other hand, last year, responding to the invitation of the African Literature Association, which enjoys high prestige in the United States, I gave a cycle of lectures on our literature at seven American universities. That is why I am known among the university circles which invited me. Coming back to the importance of the two meetings, let me cite a figure which will give you a certain idea. Both in Washington and in Boston, over 240 speakers took the floor and it has been estimated that each of the meetings was attended by over 5,000 people in the course of the proceedings which lasted three days. Aside from this, it is not merely a question of making public opinion aware of the Arab world. Both colloquia, in Washington and in Boston, are international meetings of specialists, professors, and writers, who discuss their special fields or their research on one or another topic. Naturally, the public is invited. Here again, however, this is a public interested in such subjects, consisting almost always of university graduates. In Washington the emphasis was on Islam, its history and its civilization, whereas in Boston the debates centered mainly on the Palestinian problem which remains the open wound of the Arab world.

[Question] Did you speak on this subject?

[Answer] Initially, I registered for participation in the debates on Islamic scholarly writings in Africa. However, the developments were such that I had to speak on the Palestinian problem which is an area I am well familiar with, as well as on the Jewish and Nazi problems, which, strange though this might seem, are quite closely related. Therefore, finally, I spoke twice: the first time on Islam which was a preface for the subsequent debates, and, finally, on the Palestinian liberation movement conducted through the cultural struggle. I did not choose the subject fortuitously. The North American Association For Middle Eastern Studies is, first of all, a cultural one. Naturally, here and there political subjects pertaining to the Palestinian problem are discussed. Even pro-Arab Americans always proceed with an analysis which does not recognize the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and consider that the problem has a humanitarian solution. This is a view precisely opposite to the one we hold.

[Question] Could you describe briefly the foundation on which your arguments were based in your paper?

[Answer] It is based on the following fact: ever since the founding of the State of Israel and the exodus of the Palestinian people, there have been throughout the world men of culture, whether Arabs, even Jews, French or English who have denounced the abuse, the deception of a state which was created from the outside "with the help of gold and blood," to cite the expression of a Jewish professor, and there has been no shortage of novelists and poets to help the Palestinians in the pursuit of their struggle. I reviewed the ideas of these men of culture who had waged an unequal fight against the huge Zionist propaganda machinery and I asked the audience to consider the violated right of the Palestinian people.

[Question] Still within this framework, you met with Arab and American personalities in the United Nations.

[Answer] At this point I must pay homage to the initiative of the ambassadors of the Arab League who, through this gesture, honored Algerian culture of which I am a modest representative. In effect, I attended the reception at the United Nations enhanced by the presence of Mohamed Bedjaoui. I would like to point out, however, that the discussion among the writers, professors, artists, and members of the missions of other Arab countries mainly centered on Algeria toward which, incidentally, I noted a feeling of sincere sympathy and very great curiosity. It is a currently noted fact that among all Third World countries Algeria is the one in which the United States is most interested.

[Question] You also gave a talk on Algerian literature. In what university was that and how was it received by the public?

[Answer] I gave this speech at New York University, Department of Arts and Sciences. I reviewed our literature which, as you know, has two branches: one in the national language and the other in French. Both of them are characterized by a permanent quest for identity. Here, as elsewhere, the public, again consisting of university personnel, was quite surprised by the tremendous creative power of the Algerians. Many of them would like to become better acquainted with our literature and to have it translated into English. In New York, like last year, in the course of the

lectures I gave in Bloomington, Chicago and Ada, Ohio, I was pleasantly surprised to see among the audience Algerian students who, incidentally, would like such events to become more frequent.

[Question] After New York you spoke in Boston. What were the circumstances?

[Answer] They were the best possible, since, together with Mahmoud Darwich, the great Palestinian poet, I was the guest of honor. This kind of convention is held annually in a big American city. Arabs from the United States, the South, Canada, from everywhere, attend them. You know that America has a big Arab diaspora of Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese origin, a diaspora which, morally, has not cut off its ties with its origins and which, intellectually, includes first-rate personalities such as university professors, architects, lawyers, writers, and physicians. Some of them enjoy a high reputation in their fields. Every year, therefore, this diaspora meets and discusses the problems concerning the Arab world, problems which are both cultural and political. At the Boston convention, unlike the meeting of the Association For Middle Eastern Studies, politics far outstrips cultural problems. This is the reason I submitted another paper in which I described the Zionist plan for the extermination of the Palestinians and drew a parallel between Zionist ideology and Nazi ethics which are quite similar, so similar, in fact, that it is impossible to know which of them gave birth to the other.

[Question] What was it that impressed you the most in this convention?

[Answer] The very fraternal atmosphere. Something happened, something which matters to a writer and which I shall never forget. At the end of the congress, at the closing banquet, after the speeches of Edouard Saïd, a writer who is famous in America, and of General Chazly, who is against Sadat, the ambassador of the Arab League announced that a surprise was to follow and, linking words to actions, asked Mahmoud Darwich and me to come to the rostrum and read some of our poems on Palestine. As my name was mentioned, someone in the hall shouted in Arabic, "Long live Algeria." I was so touched and overwhelmed that I asked a Palestinian brother to read my poems. He read excerpts from "Montjoie Palestine," which has been translated into English and is even taught in some universities. After that, three Algerian students congratulated me with great enthusiasm; they had come from Miami for the sole purpose of attending the congress and, like most of the others, actually, to make a pilgrimage to the sources, i.e., to find themselves among Arabs. To me this was an exceptionally emotion-charged moment. It was the justification of a stand I have held for the 35 years that I have been writing and publishing; I have always held my country and its greatness in very high esteem. I am even terribly possessive of it and I am happy never to have separated the writer from the militant. I am happy to be able to contribute to the image I have of my country and share it with the type of warmth and sincerity which, I hope, touched those who have given me the honor of listening to me.

[Question] Was your tour a trip of consecration?

[Answer] I am glad that you asked this question. I do not want any doubt to exist on this subject; I personally have considered all these considerations and honors not as an homage paid to the writer or the poet, but rather as a message of friendship on the part of the intellectuals I met, with myself as a modest vehicle, addressed to all men of culture of our country.

INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT REPORTED, COMMENTED ON

Commentary, Summary

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 21 Dec 80 p 1

[Text] Algiers (APS)--Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Republic and secretary general of the party, granted an interview to Fouad Matar, the editor-in-chief of the journal EL IQTISSADI EL ARABI and special correspondent for the journal EL MDUSTAKBAL, which published the interview in its issue of yesterday, Saturday.

In his answers the president of the Republic mentioned a number of problems, among them the situation in the El-Asnam region, the measures that have been taken for a return to normal life in the disaster-stricken areas, emphasizing that the magnitude of the catastrophe far exceeded the amount of help the country has received.

The chief of state also touched upon other problems of Arab and Islamic concern, stressing in particular the efforts of Algeria to arrive at an Arab consensus on the matter of the summit conference.

"The disagreements that exist between Arabs are well-known to our enemies. Why hide them from our peoples?", President Chadli Bendjedid said, and he continued:

"We are an integral part of the Arab nation, we share its trials. We also have faith in joining Arab action, based on objective study of the Arab reality and the imperatives of the fight against the enemy, far removed from all violence and with no intention of giving up."

Concerning the Islamic summit conference scheduled for next month, the president of the Republic indicated that the Muslim world represents on human and material levels a considerable potential in the power struggles going on in the world. "It is important that it be used for the benefit of our peoples, in the service of our national objectives and for the protection of peace in the world."

Finally, after expressing his profound resentment of the Iran-Iraq conflict, President Chadli Bendjedid stated:

"We are part of the Arab nation and the Muslim world, and the Arab-Islamic civilization is a homogeneous entity to us. It is also a contribution, the components of which cannot be separated from each other... As Arabs and Muslims we have the firm conviction that the blood that is being spilled is ours. It is important that Arab-Islamic blood stop flowing and the fire be contained before it sets our regions ablaze."



## Text of Interview

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Dec 80 p 3

[Interview with Chadli Benjedid, president of the Republic, secretary general of the party, by Fouad Matar; date and location of interview not given]

[Text] Algiers (APS)--Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Republic and secretary general of the party, granted an interview to Fouad Matar, the editor-in-chief of the journal EL IQTISSADI EL ARABI and a special correspondent for EL MOUSTAQBAL. The interview was held in the Arab language; we print the entire text below (see our edition of Sunday 21 December 1980).

[Question] The first question concerned the El Asnam earthquake.

[Answer] In the face of the El Asnam disaster, one can only bow before divine will with the faith of the Muslim, who accepts his destiny--not, however, sitting idly by and watching the distressing consequences of that natural catastrophe.

The Algerians have proved, even before this drama, that they know how to confront trials with stoicism.

In the first hours after the earthquake, national solidarity was spontaneously expressed and citizens were busy bringing help to their brothers in the disaster-stricken regions. I acknowledge that this spontaneous rush engendered a certain disorder in the first days.

After the first shocks we decreed practical measures to meet the situation. The region was placed under military command, which is quite natural, considering the dimensions of the disaster and the magnitude of its impact. Those who were responsible for rescue and help, with the National People's Army in charge, fully discharged their duty.

The whole world expressed its sympathy and we received help from many countries. I told of this, by the way, last month in my state-of-the-nation message. That speech was an opportunity to express our thanks to all the brother countries and friends who stood beside Algeria in her harsh ordeal.

In reality, the magnitude of the drama far exceeded the amount of help, which was pointed out by an international press agency; it said that the help received represented an infinitesimal part of the needs.

There seems at present to be a shortage of tents in the world, which prevented us from filling all the needs. Some of the tents used did not meet the requirements for cold regions.

Besides the temporary dwellings that had to be provided for the disaster victims, it was necessary to respond to sanitary prevention and medical care needs, to provide for the distribution of supplies, to dispense education to the children in the disaster areas.

These are the problems we have been working away at lately. Actually, all the aid has turned out to be inadequate for the needs.

Naturally, the Algerian communications media fulfilled their role by keeping the citizen up to date on all questions that might concern him, especially the development of the situation in the El Asnam region and the gradual return to normal living.

Actually, the situation in El Asnam is still distressing. So far we have not been able to surmount all the difficulties arising out of the catastrophe, because of our limited means, the nature of the region and the rigors of the climate.

Extremely praiseworthy initiatives have recently been emanating from certain brother Arab countries with regard to our decision to equip the disaster areas with pre-gab-ricated housing. Moreover, people cannot go on living in tents in this cold and snowy weather. Those are the initiatives I spoke of recently to the moudjahidine [freedom fighters].

We have kept you informed of all the aid that has come in. Again I am seizing this opportunity to thank all of the governments that have assisted us with all our rescue and aid operations, especially in the early stages. I also thank the brother countries that are supporting us in the preparation of decent housing.

We are now moving toward rebuilding the disaster areas on appropriate scientific foundations, in the light of similar experiences in other countries.

[Question] A question concerning the Algerian response to the Moroccan message of condolence.

[Answer] We are Arabs, Muslims and neighbors. We nourish feelings of consideration for the Moroccan people. The message from the king of Morocco was for us the expression of the feelings of the brother Moroccan people toward the Algerian people. It is not in our tradition to ignore noble fraternal sentiments. There is a political difference of opinion between us over the Western Sahara question. But this does not prevent us from performing the duty dictated by neighborliness and the profound fraternity of both peoples.

[Question] A long question concerning the Amman Summit, in which Algeria did not take part.

[Answer] I should like to point out that the Algerian decision not to participate occurred after the decisions taken by the PLO and Syria. Moreover, Algeria does not practice the "empty chair" policy, either with respect to Arab meetings or international meetings.

Having made that necessary comment, I will take up Algeria's position as follows:

My first official visit outside of Algeria was to the Arab world, where I talked with Arab leaders about questions of interest to our nation. I had talks with His Majesty King Hussein, when I visited Jordan, on the preparation of a climate favorable to the holding of an Arab Summit likely to produce positive results. We have continually worked in this direction.

Thus, Algeria has participated actively in all operations relative to preparing the Amman Summit, at the level of the committee of seven as well as at the level of the meeting of foreign affairs ministers. All of the brothers who participated in this work are fully aware of Algeria's role in bringing about a summit conference.

It was obvious before the meeting that there was a problem with respect to holding the summit conference. I don't want to go into detail; you already know the details very well. All I can say is that we made every possible effort to bring about an Arab consensus, not only on holding the summit conference, but on guaranteeing its success. As for Algeria's role, I leave it to the brother countries to evaluate it, and I don't want to dwell on it any longer.

The summit conferences were born because of the Palestinian cause. How could I convince the Algerian people that we should participate, at whatever level, in a summit conference to debate the Palestinian cause--in the absence of Palestinians?

We are in favor of Palestine, whether it is wrong or right; also, how can this line of conduct be reconciled with our presence at a summit conference to debate about Palestine--in the absence of Palestinians?

[Question] Do you have any special reservations on holding the summit?

[Answer] The key question is not about special reservations. We have all the courage to express our opinion and we are ready to decree positions in harmony with the principles in which we have faith. We will never hesitate to make our reservations or opposition known, loudly if necessary.

We support the PLO. This means that no meeting could be attended if the greatly-concerned party were absent. That is a question of principle.

You ask me what would happen if it were postponed; many things could occur, at the very least a minimum of unity of conception and work could be maintained. We requested postponement, basing our request on conviction, persuaded that we could do something. Our hope was based on objective data. Arab differences exist and are known to our adversaries. Why hide them from our peoples? We have not opted for the behavior of the one who refuses to have anything to do with us for pointless reasons. We are an integral part of the Arab nation, we share its trials. We also have faith in joint Arab action based on objective study of the Arab reality and the imperatives of the fight against the enemy. Far removed from all violence and with no defeatist spirit, it is in this spirit that we attempted to guarantee unity of decision and it is regrettable that our efforts led nowhere.

Consequently, the Algerian decision not to participate in the Amman Summit was taken in complete serenity. We are convinced that the decision was a logical one, and that it expresses the desire of the Algerian people.

Naturally we cannot touch upon all the questions today. What is certain is that a determined psychological atmosphere prevailed at the Amman Conference. I am not saying, as you do, that this is a question of obstinacy, nevertheless I admit that we were hoping things would not come to that. As the Political Bureau has expressed it, moreover, we will make no effort to arrive at further unity of conception and action.

[Question] A question about Algeria's participation in the Arab Summit.

[Answer] I should like to say that our decisions are Algerian. We make them on the basis of the guiding principles of the Algerian Revolution. They are the expression of the will of our people and they take into account the political facts of the problem in question.

That is not a diplomatic answer, but a reality in which we have faith, and our positions are decided upon in terms of this consideration.

Summit conferences are not only occasions for taking photos, for "exchanging smiles" and publishing communiques that give everyone full marks by letting certain news circulate behind the scenes. Of course there are problems between some states; nevertheless, thanks to the calm dialog we are in a position to ascertain the problems and deal with them.

The Islamic world carries great weight, humanely and materially, in the power struggles that take place on the international level. It is important to use this influence for the benefit of our peoples, to put it at the service of national objectives and to guarantee world peace.

[Question] The journalist is interested in the possibility of Algeria undertaking an initiative calling for a reconciliation summit conference, to include Presidents Hafedh El Assad, Saddam Hussein, Col Mu'ammarr Qadhafi and King Khaled Ibn Abdalaziz.

[Answer] A reconciliation on what basis? For what objective?

Although the problem has actually had to do with bilateral questions, any initiative requires the realization of essential conditions if it is to succeed. Quite frankly, the most important condition consists of not talking about initiative. Personally I have faith in direct contacts between leaders. These contacts are such as to lead to understanding, an indispensable element in the realization of mutual entente. To talk of initiative may antagonize some people and be interpreted as an attempt at propaganda.

[Question] A question concerning the position of the United States after the election of Mr Reagan, and Algerian-American relations.

[Answer] The American President-elect's statements hardly appear to be encouraging. We have to wait and see what happens after next 20 January. In any case, electoral campaigns have their language and reality has its language.

On the bilateral level, relations are normal. We hope to maintain the best of relations with all countries, on the basis of mutual respect for options and interests.

[Question] A question on Algeria's position on the crisis that has exploded between Jordan and Syria.

[Answer] We have followed the progress of relations between the two brother countries with a great deal of anxiety. Fortunately, the crisis is moving toward détente. I cannot say what we would have undertaken to do if things had been aggravated. It is certain, however, that we would not have stood idly by and watched what might have happened to the Arab world, especially the countries involved in the



confrontation. However, we have our own approach, which we employ in dealing with these problems.

[Question] A question concerning the Algerian intervention in the affair of the American hostages and the Iraq-Iran conflict.

[Answer] In reply to the first part of your question, we are not responsible for the extent to which the mass media have dealt with the hostage affair.

The coverage by the communications media does not always accurately reflect the reality of the efforts being undertaken.

Moreover, our role in the hostage affair does not assume any special character.

On the diplomatic level, we are representing the Iranian interests in Washington, and between Iran and the United States there exists a humanitarian problem. Each party is asking us to participate in the outcome of the problem. How could we refuse?

The American deputy secretary of state came to Algiers to bring us the United States' reply to Iran's conditions. We transmitted the reply to the Iranian authorities, who in turn charged us with forwarding their reply to the Americans. It was a purely humanitarian role, accomplished basically by our ambassadors in both countries.

Naturally, I read what is published in some newspapers. Algeria does not need a good conduct certificate. It is fully conscious of its responsibilities on Arab, Islamic and international levels.

Concerning Iraq and Iran, the situation is different. Since the first days of the hostilities between the two countries, I have been in contact with Presidents Saddam Hussein and Bani Sadr, and with a number of Arab and Muslim leaders, in an attempt to delimit events before things get complicated. To my great regret, I have not found in the two parties any disposition to subscribe to the Algerian proposals. It was difficult to go any farther. Since then the situation has unfortunately become worse.

I don't know whether you have had an opportunity to talk with citizens and militants in Algeria, to get a better grasp of the Algerian position.

I will summarize this position for you, with the following points:

1. At the request of our brothers, as you know very well, Algeria fulfilled its duty in 1975 by making it possible for the two parties to meet to resolve their disputes. For the record I will say that Algeria in no way tried to impose any particular point of view on either of the two parties. The dialog was essentially bilateral. For its part, Algeria, represented by the late President Houari Boumediene, participated at the request of both parties in bringing the points of view together.

It was important for both parties to arrive at an accord that would be satisfactory to both of them. The Baghdad Treaty was signed and filed with the United Nations.

2. The relations that unite us with our brothers, Iraq as well as Iran, are relations of mutual respect and consideration. We could never forget the noble attitude of the Iraqi people during our armed struggle. We are persuaded that Iraq is an important strategic component in the line of confrontation against the Zionist enemy. We are likewise convinced that the Iraqi forces are a component of the Arab force.

Whoever protects Iraq participates in protecting the Arab nation.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the situation born of the advent of the Iranian Revolution, which has made Iran--not long ago an enemy of the Arab nation--a sympathizer of the Arab cause.

It doesn't escape me that there are a few contradictions in Iran. I had an occasion to mention this point at the time of our last meeting. However, I could never forget that the Palestinian emblem is fluttering in Tehran instead of and in place of the Israeli flag.

3. We are part of the Arab nation and the Muslim world, and the Arab-Islamic civilization is to us a homogeneous entity, it constitutes an indivisible patrimony.

The Muslim world in Asia and Africa is the natural complement to the Arab world. They constitute a coherent entity in the face of international challenges. It is obvious that the present relations between the two worlds are not yet responsive to our hopes. Continued efforts must be pursued in that direction, to defend common interests.

4. Starting with these facts, no one can encourage the reappearance of discords to which Islam has put an end, nor can anyone revive the hatreds between the peoples united by the Arab-Islamic civilization.

These considerations have led us to measure the gravity of the Iraq-Iran crisis, which may transform the conflict between two countries into a struggle between two nationalisms, not to mention the possibility that the conflict may be internationalized and foreign interventions may occur that would attack the sovereignty of the region's governments.

5. Just as we reject any supervision, so we forbid ourselves any action likely to look like paternalism on our part toward anyone whatsoever.

As Arabs and Muslims, we feel in our own flesh and blood the effects of this fratricidal war.

The search for a solution to any conflict lies in deciding upon political bases likely to lead to a solution satisfactory to the belligerents. Two months after the conflict began, faced with an impasse, Algeria suggested a return to the 1975 accords as a basis for settling the difference between the two countries.

I know there are difficulties there; however, we cannot devise solutions without first being in agreement on the political basis.

In my opinion the accords that were signed in 1975 constitute an adequate framework to resolve the difference. If both parties were to accept it, it would be possible to talk about other measures. Meanwhile we hope these parties will give us a chance to accomplish our duty.

The brothers in Iran are not satisfied with the Algerian position. Some of them believe that we are placing the aggressor and the object of the aggression on the same plane, or that the ceasefire is not acceptable, etc. We have based our position on our own conviction, we are not setting ourselves up in judgment.

What is important is that the Arab-Islamic hemorrhage cease, that it does not expand in the region. The difference between the two countries must be lessened, to avoid having the conflict between the two states degenerate into a confrontation between two nationalisms. That would be much more serious.

[Question] A question concerning President Brezhnev's five-point proposal for the Gulf, which is as follows:

No establishment of foreign military bases in the region of the Gulf and the neighboring islands; no depots for nuclear weapons and other weapons of extermination.

No recourse to the threat of using force against the countries of the Gulf region and no intervention in internal affairs of those countries.

Respect for the nonalignment opted for by the states of the Gulf region and no pressure on these states to come into the military blocs in which the states equipped with nuclear weapons are participating.

Respect for the right of the states of this region to sovereignty over their natural resources.

Elimination of trade barriers and no use of the maritime pathways that connect this region with the other states of the world.

[Answer] The five points you just spoke of are extremely important. It is important that there exists the Arab-Islamic desire to guarantee security in the Gulf, respect for the desire of its countries as well as the establishing of peace in the region.

[Question] A question concerning certain measures (of reprieve) recently taken, the granting of pensions to former politicians, as well as the possibility of new measures.

[Answer] If you have in mind special measures concerning political prisoners, I will say to you that no measure of that kind is in preparation. The reason is simple: in Algeria there are no political prisoners.

As far as retired people are concerned, the pensions, the decrees that regulate them have been published in the OFFICIAL JOURNAL. The state's responsibility is to protect all of its children. This applies to every citizen, to every family.

Moreover, the traditions of the state require us to respect the responsibilities assumed by Algerians at a given moment. We must protect them from want and preserve

their dignity when they leave their positions of responsibility.

[Question] The journalist asks about the meaning of the term "traditions of the state" that Algeria is exerting itself to strengthen.

[Answer] Algeria has undertaken a popular revolution under the aegis of the National Liberation Front and has destroyed the structures put in place by colonialism.

After independence, especially after 1965, we gave priority to building the state.

We all stem from the National Liberation Army School. The principal factor that ruled our action was the reciprocal confidence shared by all the revolutionary officers.

The officers of the Political Directorate enforced a spirit more than it enforced laws. It was the spirit that prevailed during the fight for national liberation.

This method cannot be maintained, especially after the present generation has disappeared.

That is why it was necessary to promulgate laws to regulate the operation of the state and its institutions.

It was also necessary to define the relations between the institutions, to outline the leaders' prerogatives.

Beyond laws there is a practice, customs, a spirit that prevails in the face of events and situations. These elements are inspired by the principles belonging to the dynamics of the society, which have nothing to do with changing persons or leaders.

This entity is one part of the traditions of the state. We will work to perfect it, for it is an element of the most precious heritage, which must be left to future generations.

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## ALGERIA

### ALGERIAN PETROLEUM PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

#### Progress in Energy Development

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Omar Belhouchet]

[Text] For the first time since independence was achieved this problem is submitted to a broad discussion.

Things have really changed since the Fourth FLN [National Liberation Front] Congress. The "energy crisis"<sup>1</sup> is profoundly affecting the contemporary world. There is more and more question of conservation, deposits, and proven and unproven reserves. In short, there has been a general closer study of the situation. In Algeria this development was expressed by the important recommendations adopted at the second Central Committee session.<sup>2</sup>

The decisions of the Central Committee, which emphasize the non-recoverable nature of hydrocarbon resources, emphasize the need to guarantee Algeria a reliable and independent supply of energy in the very long run. This is extremely important, for on the basis of the present rhythm of our petroleum exports and the status of our proven reserves, Algeria runs the risk of turning into a petroleum importer some 20 years hence.

Consequently, we do not have the right to drain our deposits, the more so since petroleum revenues are not always judiciously used. The improvements made in the management of public affairs have shown that not all of our foreign exchange earnings automatically went into development. Furthermore, it was a question of using such revenues to broaden the economic base by importing capital and other goods. What is it that factually happened? Not only is the industrial machinery not performing but foreign exchange is being used to purchase foodstuffs and other consumer goods. In other words, we are "eating" our petroleum.

The recovery of the various national economic sectors is another major imperative. The second Central Committee session also recommended the formulation of an overall energy policy and the undertaking of activities which would consolidate the country's independence through the preservation of its national strategic reserves of hydrocarbons.

This new step will clarify the situation to an even greater extent. It is unnecessary to emphasize the nefarious role of multinational corporations in this particularly important sector. Any consequent national policy, therefore, should be such

as to limit to a maximum the negative effects triggered by these masters of Third World resources. Currently, for example, the international petroleum companies are stockpiling huge quantities of petroleum purchased in the Middle East. In the United States petroleum is injected in old abandoned petroleum wells. A factual transfer of deposits is taking place while African countries are facing ever more urgent supply problems. Algeria, which began to lower its output in 1979, has been steadily insisting within OPEC on limiting the levels of output and has emphasized the nefarious roles of the multinationals. The latter would try to maintain their hegemony over this sector in order to increase their fabulous profits. Furthermore, they are "continuing quite frequently to burn petroleum gas without trying to use it or re-inject it, which would allow them to reduce their investments. In using with impunity Third World deposits, they are able to skim its reserves without trying to conserve or renovate them, thus reducing their investments while steadily raising the production-reserve ratio which has resulted in the present grave situation."<sup>3</sup> The narrowing of the scope of activities of the monopolies remains an essential task to be implemented and the debate which has been opened on this energy item is a reminder for us in this sense. It was clearly reasserted that it would be concerned with our national interest "which conflicts with the interests of imperialism."<sup>4</sup> We must avoid developing a rather broad opening of this sector aimed at the world economy, the more so since the current world occasionally faces us with rather difficult circumstances.<sup>5</sup> In this case, is it not important to pursue the policy of nationalization of hydrocarbons since 20 percent of our output (or 10 million tons per year) are still being extracted by a foreign company?

In terms of technology, this sector has been given excessive foreign help which has not been beneficial in all cases. Massive imports of know-how and technology, with no domestic preparations whatever of conditions which would enable us to use such imports resulted in the creation of entities which are not only uninterested in the other parts of the national economy but are, furthermore, totally integrated with the western economies, the economy of the United States in particular. Two major consequences stem from this fact. The financial cost of foreign technical assistance is exorbitant. The minister of energy and petrochemical industries has estimated that payments for technical cooperation in the petrochemical complex on our coastal area is the same as the turnover of the entire complex. Where is the advantage that such aid should give us? Should we now take over the problems and the difficulties of a western world in the full midst of a crisis? The current re-deployment of capitalist countries toward the Third World strategically leaves the developing countries to pay the cost of this crisis through the development of underhanded and pernicious methods. It is indeed inconceivable for the western countries to be able to meet the needs of one or another Third World country while they reject such needs in the various meetings and discussions on international economic relations.

"The monopolies are most certainly the masters of the techniques they use. However, despite their own difficulties, caused by their underdevelopment and internal contradictions, the Third World countries are not to be blamed alone for an entire number of practices for which they pay a high price, for technical faults of projects formulated by international 'experts,' faulty products, and delays of all sorts. All of these elements are pretexts used by the monopolies for raising their prices."<sup>6</sup> The "strategic retreat" of technical assistance is not synonymous in the least with a halt in development. It enables us to see more clearly in order better to influence economic and social development.

The second consequence of an unlimited recourse to such assistance is seen in the virtually total suppression of national capabilities for conception and implementation. In order to settle the situation in one or another complex we are forced to call upon a foreign study agency. Our technicians and engineers are either poorly used or not at all and end up by offering their services to foreigners. A multinational company even allows itself the luxury of advertising in the national press for young Algerian engineers (therefore, trained by the Algerian state) to participate "in petroleum research and production in Africa."

Such facts and cases are the result of a growing lack of confidence. Need we call upon foreigners to help us to set up gasoline pumping stations? Could it be that this kind of work is repelling and that we should do something else? . . . but, if so, what?

There is a tremendous amount of human waste, the more so since the amount of training provided has been unprecedented. It seems to us that the results of a big project go to others precisely because of the "rising and disproportioned tendency to resort to foreign human, material, and financial resources."

The fact that there has been some de-regulation is certainly the result of the separate development of this sector from the rest of the national economy and the imperatives of national planning. The national policy which will be formulated for this sector will particularly emphasize the rehabilitation of the role of planning both on the level of the sector itself and that of inter-sectorial relations. It will no longer be a question of the endless export of our hydrocarbons with a view to earning foreign exchange. Our production and export levels will be determined by planning and the targets assigned to the national economy. The integration of the national economy will be a tangible reality as much as the utilization of scientific research which deserves greater trust to the extent to which the SONATRACH drilling area is one of the most important in the world. The systematic exploration of our national territory does not apply to this sector alone. All national economic sectors must acquire a centralized structure in order to survey our country most extensively so that we may plan the use of the discovered raw materials. The real potential of our country has not as yet been accurately assessed, even though, according to the specialists, our chances for the discovery of natural gas are greater than of petroleum.

Progressively, therefore, natural gas will replace petroleum. This is a general statement, bearing in mind the size of our gas reserves (compared with those of petroleum). The role played by natural gas is being acknowledged to an ever greater extent by the world's economy, for big contracts have been concluded between exploiters and consumers of natural gas. In the case of Algeria, another factor must be added to the natural gas problem; the price, which was the lowest compared with others. Negotiations with our trading partners have exposed tangible facts. Algeria was refused a readjustment for fear that it may be tagged as anti-imperialist and that other raw material producers may follow its example. How else could we explain the fact that more remunerative prices have been agreed upon with other countries? "Beyond the price of natural gas, what imperialism would like to achieve is a revision of the principles of the energy policy as formulated at the second session of the FLN Central Committee."



The recent interim agreement between SONATRACH and the British Gas Corporation, however, makes it possible to conduct negotiations with French and American companies from a better angle. Nevertheless, "Algeria continues to demand the use of the principle of parity between the price of natural gas and of crude oil, a principle which now has been more or less generally accepted. However, this is a target only and we have never said that we would insist on parity overnight. We favor a gradual realignment of the price of natural gas with that of petroleum in order to protect the consumers from excessively high rises," stated Sadek Boussena, director general of planning and management at the Ministry of Energy in an interview published by the bi-monthly PETROLE ET GAZ ARABES.<sup>10</sup> The agreement we already mentioned makes it precisely possible for the negotiations to be pursued with a view to reaching a lasting agreement.

The advantage of the debate on energy was to bring to mind substitute energies. Algeria has definite natural resources in this area. What is less certain is the type of techniques to be used for the development of our resources. Nuclear and solar energies are still recent substitute attempts. They involve risks which the experience in the area of liquified natural gas greatly emphasized. A very small group of countries have the techniques needed to operate these sectors. In our effort to insure our long-term energy independence, we run the high risk of creating new types of dependence, unless we undertake to prepare ourselves most seriously (proper training and adequate industrial apparatus . . . .) for this new stage.

#### American Gas Bill

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Dec 80 p 5

[Text] Algiers (APS). In a report published on 26 September, the General Accounting Office of the American government, as reported by some news agencies, states that "the Algerian government has asked for a 200 percent increase in the price charged for its natural gas." Still according to the dispatch, this demand "could raise the American bill for imported gas by \$3.5 billion."

Well-informed circles are questioning the significance of this information and the reference on which it is based.

The same circles point out that Algeria has never formulated such a request. Such a presentation of the matter, they emphasize, falsifies the Algerian position which maintains its target of gradual alignment of the price of liquified natural gas (GNL) with crude oil prices, and which has refused the price of \$0.30 per million BTU (British Thermal Units) of GNL at the very time when the United States is paying \$4.47 per million BTU imported from Mexico and Canada.

#### Share of Petroleum in Accumulation

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Dec 80 p 5

[Text] The energy problem justifiably brings to mind to the citizenry the question of its role in the national economy and, particularly, in the area of accumulations.



Therefore, we link mentally the various stages of our struggle for national liberation, followed by the regaining of our national independence and our struggle for economic and social liberation.

Whereas the final years of our struggle for liberation were marked by the attempts of French imperialism to maintain, through its domination of the Sahara, its control over our petroleum resources, following our independence, our firm desire to use petroleum as an instrument of independent economic and social development clashed with new colonialism and ended with the victory of the 1971 nationalizations.

This political independence as the result of which state control was established over hydrocarbon resources led to the creation of the necessary conditions for the hydrocarbons as a source of accumulations and, therefore, as a means for development. However, the mechanisms of a global market dominated by the big western countries saw to it that the recovery of our resources through nationalizations and through prices, through OPEC, was always questioned on the external level through the actions of multi-national corporations and, on the internal level, by the negative aspects which became apparent in the course of our development.

Such is the reason for which the familiar ideas which we describe as "sowing petroleum for the sake of harvesting development," and "purchasing development," refer to and stem, in their totality, from the new power acquired by the Third World petroleum producing and exporting countries, a power which they acquired particularly starting with 1973: namely, the appropriation of the bulk of petroleum profits (the difference between cost price and end utilization price), which was previously almost totally taken by the capitalist world and was used for the development of its economy and expansion of trade on a cheap energy basis.

The idea of petroleum as a source of accumulation for development is, therefore, essentially based on the possibility of mobilizing through petroleum exports financial means unrelated to the accepted production cost.

This mobilization of external financial means could take place directly through exports (petroleum as a source of foreign currency) or through participation in exports (petroleum reserves as collateral for foreign loans).

In this case the National Charter stipulates that "hydrocarbons shall constitute a source of accumulation at the starting point of development."

This idea, added to the possibility offered by hydrocarbons of purchasing from abroad thanks to available foreign currency, equipment for our plants, leads to the rejection of some economic concepts related to the economic situation of developing countries.

In fact, in such countries the low level of productive forces (unskilled manpower, absence of industry, under-productive agriculture, etc.) does not allow them to set aside adequate investment surpluses. Therefore, theoretically, the availability of foreign capital should allow the underdeveloped economies to break something known as the "vicious circle of underdevelopment."

In order to leave their underdevelopment behind, some Third World countries are trying to attract foreign capital by offering it tempting conditions, developing international tourism, and exporting manpower or raw materials, while others rely on possibilities for accumulation through agricultural or light industry exports. As far as Algeria is concerned, starting with 1969, in the period when its planned development was undertaken, it opted for long-term development and mobilization of its income as a source and guarantee for foreign financing.

In 1980 the results of the use of this opportunity of hydrocarbons to finance the beginning of development were analyzed at an extraordinary FLN congress covering the past decade.

The development effort led to the creation of a substantial industrial base whose still poorly integrated nature and dependence on the western market should be emphasized, as well as the structural reforms in depth which were undertaken (cultural and agrarian revolutions).

In terms of the current decade, it was noted that development has been started, i.e., that the factors which hindered development were partially eliminated (shortage of capital and skilled manpower, and obsolete agrarian and social structures).

It was also emphasized that continuing massive investments in the sector of hydrocarbons exports or increasing the level of indebtedness could become a factor for internal imbalance and unbearable and dangerous dependence from abroad, to the extent to which the energy supplies of the country, on a long-term basis, may be endangered through the pursuit of such a policy.

Thus, the study of our foreign trade in 1980 and the projections for the years to come clearly indicate the use of hydrocarbons exports which could be described as follows: for each 100 dinars of exported petroleum about 15 dinars are used to repay debts; 15 dinars go to owed interest on the same debts; 20 dinars are used for the purchase of capital goods; 15 dinars are spent on raw materials and semi-finished goods; 5 dinars go to food products, and 30 dinars are used to purchase services (maritime freight costs, insurance, trips, and technical aid).

#### Ending Inadequacies

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by A. Zouied]

[Text] The fast change which has taken place in the energy sector in recent years (prices, exhaustion of the world reserves, uncertainty concerning substitution sources) has ascribed to hydrocarbons a greater strategic nature which requires, more than ever, a strict exploitation policy if we want to insure a final maximum recovery and a reasonable length of time of their availability, compatible with the perspectives of our development.

In other words, it is a question of protecting ourselves against "anticipations" by guaranteeing to the country long-term, safe, and independent energy supplies.

Strategic stocks must be established to meet the imperatives of national defense and consumption. Their type must be defined on the basis of a conservation and preservation policy which should begin at the wellhead and would imply, in particular, the recycling of used lubricants, the use of liquified petroleum gas for fuel, and the recovery of burned gas.

The scarcity and the non-recoverability of these resources call for the rational exploitation of the deposits, for increasing the effectiveness of drilling equipment, and the recovery of the liquified petroleum gas currently exported as part of the liquified natural gas, and of the lightweight products which are burned.

For the same purpose, it is as indispensable as urgent, to insure the proper utilization of our human resources and to avoid the repercussion of the socio-professional problems they face on the control over our productive potential.

The other aspect of the energy problem, on whose subject we carry an article in this issue, concerns the contribution of the energy sector to the national accumulation, on the scale of the needs based on our development choices and in accordance with weaknesses which could occur in other sectors in the course of the five-year plan. This calls for drawing a critical balance for the sake of putting an end to corrective measures in the future and reducing requests for financing received by this sector.

Furthermore, the strategic importance of the problem of energy in terms of our economic, financial, and even political independence calls for paying particular attention to foreign technical aid which should be closely examined in order to determine its field of activities, duration, and level, bearing in mind our imperatives of exploration for the renewal of our hydrocarbon reserves and our plan for the replacement of foreign cadres by national workers, in accordance with the country's interests and options.

In this respect, cadre and skill improvements will guarantee the strengthening of our national instrumentarium and, consequently, should be considered a permanent concern within the framework of the development plan of all our human resources.

Furthermore, retaining the workers in this sensitive sector is an essential imperative in reducing our dependence on and vulnerability to foreign countries.

The complexity of the technologies we use makes even more urgent the gradual mastery of all activities which require extensive technical aid whose 1980 cost has been estimated at \$1.2 million.

In order to eliminate the obstacle of the inadequacy between required technology and industrial experience, on the one hand, and the factual level of skills and accumulation of workers in this sector, on the other, we must relate it to the planning of jobs and training, the restructuring of training institutions, and to ending the lowering of qualifications.

Considered from this viewpoint, the elimination of foreign technical aid requires the adoption of a broad set of actions which not only open jobs but, above all, bring to light the wealth contained within the Algerian working person and the development of his land.

## Valorization of Hydrocarbons

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26-27 Dec 80 p 4

[Text] The implementation of a conservation policy means the formulation and application of a certain number of effective and reliable rules and technical methods, taking into consideration the progress achieved in the areas of exploration, production, transportation, processing, and refining.

In order to grasp the extent of such activities let us list a certain number of simple "rules" and, if necessary, describe their implications.

### Exploration

We should know that in the field of exploration there are no direct methods which would enable us to know in advance that any specific sedimentary area would contain hydrocarbons before a well has been drilled.

Three conditions must be met for the existence of hydrocarbons:

1. The existence of a "structural or other kind of trap which would prevent shifting with a tight cover."
2. A "reservoir" rock, i. e., a porous, permeable rock which allows the storage and drainage of the hydrocarbons.
3. A "mother lode" which, in the course of its formation has created hydrocarbons (sedimentary origin of hydrocarbons).

The indirect geophysical methods, particularly the seismic ones, make it possible to identify the structural traps.

Bearing all this in mind, the rule is to make a study of risks and consider economic predictions based on information systems, to include prospective drilling within an annual budget, which implies an optimizing choice among different possibilities, and, in the course of the drafting of annual budgets, to display a certain flexibility in the modification of the annual programs on the basis of obtained results.

The long-term exploration policy is generally related to the target of replacing exhausted reserves. Every year the allocated investment should result in the discovery of new reserves in order to meet the planned figures and to rebuild strategic reserves.

### Exploitation of Deposits

The prime objective of the exploitation is to insure the maximum recovery from the deposit at a minimum cost.

Recovery is influenced by natural or artificial factors or their combination. Generally speaking, we try to favor natural draining mechanisms as long as they are effective in the course of the entire duration or part of the life of a deposit.



If the natural mechanisms are deficient, they are either reinforced (by injecting gas in a gas cap or water in a water formation), or else replaced (by injecting water which will yield dissolved gas with the help of this mechanism).

Furthermore, the level of output required of a well or deposit could harm the eventual recovery in some deposits with natural or artificial drainage mechanisms which react to the increase in the level of output: these are deposits whose wells are described as having "limited output."

In the case of other deposits, the output level has no effect on recovery whatever: these are "unlimited production deposits."

Let us give as examples some rules regarding the level of output:

Production wells could be divided into two categories:

1. Wells with unlimited productivity;
2. Wells with limited productivity.

The former category includes wells whose output is not limited by any natural factor. The production norms for such wells are based on the potential output within the limits of the current possibilities of the equipment used. Thus, the output of such wells could be increased by improving the output possibilities of the equipment and by increasing the permeability of the formation around the wells through physical-chemical stimulation.

The following technological factors could limit the output of the second category of wells:

The presence in the deposit of free gas in excess of acceptable amounts;

The creation of water coning;

The disturbance of the system for the regular displacement of the oil-water and oil-gas surfaces;

Disturbance of the average gas-oil ratio;

The extraction of unacceptable amounts of sand;

Substantial variations in the pressure on the production string resulting in its deterioration;

Limiting the norm of output for the overall deposit.

#### Artificial Recovery Method Used in Algeria

In the initial period of exploitation of a deposit, technical and economic studies are undertaken with a view to determining the need for the installation of an artificial recovery system should the natural drainage mechanisms be inoperative.

A certain number of artificial recovery procedures are applied or are under development in Algeria's main fields:

#### Hassi-Messaoud Field

In this field the natural drainage mechanisms consist of the single stage expansion of the fluids, the rock, and the dissolved gas.

According to hydrodynamic computations, applied by themselves, such natural mechanisms would not allow a recovery in excess of 18 percent.

Recently, a pilot project was applied, starting with 1964, consisting of the injection of miscible gas. The process was generalized as of 1972 wherever its application was deemed possible.

This procedure raises the recovery rate to about 40 percent.

A gas re-injection system has been set up which allows the re-injection of 30,106 cubic meters per day (potential) at 400 kilograms per square centimeter.

Furthermore, the organization of a water injection system is nearing completion. It will make it possible to inject approximately 60,000 cubic meters of water daily at 350 kilograms per square centimeter.

#### Gassi Touil Field

Here the drainage mechanisms consist of dissolved gas and a weak gas-cap action.

Gas injection in the gas cap has been practiced since 1972 (2 million cubic meters per day at 140 kilograms per square centimeter.

A plant is under construction which will double injection capacity.

#### Zarzaitine Field

The natural drainage mechanisms consist of dissolved and gas-cap gas. Water injection has been practiced since 1966 at the rate of 25,000 cubic meters per day.

#### El-Agreb Field

Water injection has been used here since 1966 (6,000 cubic meters daily).

#### Hassi R'mel Field

This is the biggest Algerian condensate gas deposit where the partial re-injection of the recycled gas increases the recovery of condensates.

Tin Fouye Tabankort, El-Borma, Hacud Berkacui, Ben Kahla, Guellala, Rhourde El-Baguel Fields

Water injection systems are being installed on these deposits.

Finally, other secondary recovery projects are under study.

Such important secondary recovery activities are governed in the course of the stage of formulation of the projects and in their application by the following:

Methods for maintaining the pressure;

Injected water;

Rate of injection by well and reservoir;

Drilling of injection wells;

Installation of injection wells and injection control.

Let us cite a few rules as an example:

The choice of secondary recovery procedures (water or gas injection) as well as the displacement system and the injection level must be based on the following criteria:

- a. Maximum recovery;
- b. Level of output demanded by the oversight authority;
- c. Economic criteria.

The method used to maintain the pressure and the targets and the time needed for their implementation are determined on the level of the development plan for the deposit.

A pilot test consisting of a minimum of one producing well and an injection well is conducted before the procedure has been definitively accepted.

The physical and chemical properties of the injected water must be such as to insure the stable and durable injection and adequately efficient displacement of the petroleum. Problems related to the compatibility between the waters in the deposit and the injected water must be submitted to laboratory studies.

The maximum admissible content of salted matter in the injected water (iron oxides, microorganisms, bits of rock) is based on the petrophysical characteristics of the productive bed.

The oil-bearing rock must be subjected to a granulometric and petrophysical study with a view to establishing the average diameter of the pores and of the water-containing rock with a view to determining the diameter and nature of eventual filters.

In the case of clay-sandstone reservoirs, laboratory tests must be used to determine the effect of injected water on the swelling of interstitial clays.

No fresh water should be used for injection purposes unless there is no salted water on the surface of a deposit or else economically it is impossible to provide salted water for injection, or else again if water injection offers a better recovery possibility compared with any other method.

Therefore, the corrosive properties of the injected water on the metal and the anti-corrosion methods to be used must be studied in advance in laboratory experiments through a simulation of factual conditions and at the site with a pilot test.

#### Extraction of Petroleum Gas

Until recently, with few exceptions, the gas coming out with the petroleum was burned (low price and high recovery investment).

The change which occurred in the energy sector now prohibits its burning. Rules have been set according to which plans for the development of a petroleum deposit can be approved by the Ministry of Energy and Petrochemical Industries only if the problems of the efficient utilization of petroleum gas have been taken into consideration.

If, in the course of the initial period of the exploitation of deposit or as a result of accelerated output, a certain percentage of the petroleum gas cannot be used, it must be temporarily stored in underground reservoirs or re-injected into one of the strata either exhausted or to be exploited.

Furthermore, it is stipulated that for some new deposits quite distant from consumption centers or gas mains, should it prove to be impossible to meet the required stipulations, on an exceptional basis the ministry may authorize the burning of petroleum gas.

According to current regulations gas metering is mandatory.

Furthermore, an annual report must be submitted to the oversight agency on losses of petroleum gas and on the measures contemplated for its utilization.

#### Conservation of Deposits in The Course of Exploitation of Wells

This means to insure the use of effective and reliable techniques for the placing, spacing, drilling, equipping, locating, and abandoning wells in order to prevent uncontrolled blasts and protect hydrocarbon and water-containing deposits.

#### Surface Installations

This applies to the sum total of installations required for the collecting, treatment, transportation, processing, and refining of hydrocarbons.

Their capacity and characteristics are defined on the basis of plans for the development and utilizations of hydrocarbons. Furthermore, they are subjected to a certain number of standardized technical controls at the plant, in the course of their installation, and in the course of the exploitation period with a view to insuring the protection of industrial capital.



Furthermore, strict security measures are applied to insure the safety of the workers and the protection of the environment.

In conclusion, this means that we must formulate even better pertinent rules which will guarantee the conservation of our hydrocarbon resources and prevent any possible waste.

#### Natural Gas Interim Price

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22 Dec 80 p 1

[Text] Algiers (APS). An interim agreement has been concluded between SONATRACH and the British Gas Corporation on the price of liquified natural gas which the company will recover as of 1981, a source close to the Ministry and Energy and Petrochemical Industries reports.

The interim agreement which will cover a period of nine months should enable the state companies to draft a longer five-year agreement which will extend the 1964 contract which is currently drawing to an end.

It is worth recalling that the liquified natural gas stipulated in this contract is produced by the first liquefaction plant which was once known as "Camel" and which, with an annual output of 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas, has also been supplying since 1964 the French market with one-half billion cubic meters of gas on the basis of a long-term agreement.

The agreement concluded with the British company calls for a quarterly review according to which the average price of the gas sold FOB Algeria will be \$4.60 per million British Thermal Units (BTU) for the interim period and will reach \$4.80 per million BTU by 1 July 1981.

Meanwhile, the two national enterprises will continue their discussions with a view to reaching a definitive agreement similar to those concluded with other SONATRACH natural gas customers since 1970 and since 1975.

#### Investigation Commission Conclusions

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 25 Dec 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] On 22, 23, and 24 December 1980 the People's National Assembly met under the chairmanship of Rabah Bitat, member of the Political Bureau and president of the People's National Assembly, with the attendance of Boualem Benhamouda, member of the Political Bureau and minister of the interior, representing the government, to examine the report of the investigative commission which was set up on 22 January 1980 to consider the contracts of the sale of natural gas by SONATRACH to the American El Paso Company. Following the auditing of the commission's report and the observations submitted by the representative of the government, and following the discussions which took place in the course of the closed-door meetings, in accordance with the law on the exercise of its control function, the People's National Assembly adopted the following results:

"Having audited the report of the Investigative Commission and the observations of the representative of the government,

"and following the debates,

"the People's National Assembly adopts the following results:

"The price contracted with El Paso in 1969 of 30.5 cents-MBTU FOB should have covered, according to the technical-economic study, the cost of investments as assessed at the time and legitimately result in a financial accumulation.

"The resulting purchase power of the expected revenue from this contract proved to be insufficiently protected, bearing in mind the high rate of inflation of the world's economy. Furthermore, the rates used in the indexing formula proved to be ineffective given the inflationary situation in the world today. Nor did the rates parallel the increases in the cost of energy since 1973.

"The length of the delays preceding the enactment of the contract, the delays in the completion of the liquefaction plant, the devaluation of the dollar, the decline of its purchasing power, and the energy crisis had a direct negative impact on the expected profitability of this contract.

"As a result of the worsening of the terms and the profound changes in the context of the contract, by 1973 the 1969 contract had become obsolete. This was unanimously asserted by all involved parties on the enterprise or governmental level and the American partner who, considering that the price of petroleum had quadrupled in 1973, had no choice but to accept the evidence.

"It must be noted that special conditions forced SONATRACH to accept the base price of 30.5 cents.

"The initial estimate of the installations to be built in Algeria was in the vicinity of \$45 million. The sum total of investments having been quadrupled, the contract, therefore, faced SONATRACH with a negative cash flow which excluded both the recovery of capital and the intrinsic value of the gas.

"Finally, the Assembly notes that the representatives of the El Paso Company failed to display the spirit which should prevail in this type of contractual relations whose nature makes it incumbent on the contracting parties to cooperate for the sake of the reciprocal safeguarding of their interests.

"On the basis of the drafted documents and provided explanations, limiting itself to the initial contract and the rider, the Commission notes that Algeria suffered losses and would have continued to suffer losses even despite the revised price had the government not rejected the rider, for the gap would have widened, taking into consideration the indexation formula which was retained, on the one hand, and the increased price of energy on the other.

"The sum total of facts available to the Commission has confirmed the existence of factual losses from the sale of natural gas to the El Paso American Company which, as a result of exaggerated cupidity, sacrificed cooperation for the sake of robbing the wells of our country.

"In accordance with Article 37 of Law No. 80-04, dated 1 March 1980, concerning the implementation of control functions by the People's National Assembly, the People's National Assembly recommends the following:

- "1. The establishment of a specialized organ in charge of:
  - "a. Suggesting, on the basis of the development of the world energy market, adjustments needed for the protection of our interests;
  - b. The undertaking of all types of prospective studies concerning prices, markets, and substitute energy sources;
  - c. Issue opinions on commercial agreements related to sales of liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons.
- "2. The definition and specification of rights and prerogatives with a view to the separation of the power of decision-making, oversight and organs in charge of hydrocarbon marketing.
- "3. The implementation of special regulations governing hydrocarbon exports.
- "4. The implementation of necessary activities for the protection of the legitimate interests of our people based on the principle that if it is to be lasting and mutually advantageous, any type of cooperation must take into consideration reciprocal interests.
- "5. The implementation of an energy policy such as to coordinate the current needs of the national economy with those of the future generations.
- "6. It is the consideration of the Assembly that it is both necessary and urgent, within the framework of the restructuring of enterprises in the energy sector, to take the appropriate measures for increasing their degree of effectiveness and profitability.
- "7. In accordance with the strategy of our revolution, the Assembly considers it necessary to engage in the periodical evaluation of our activities in this area.
- "8. To protect the high interests of the country, the members of the People's National Assembly emphasize the need for a profound scientific study and for the rational consideration of all factors prior to entering any type of negotiation.

"The deputies are pleased by the exercise of the control function and emphasize the need for such control for the sake of protecting the national resources and insuring the economic and social development of the country.

"The People's National Assembly notes with satisfaction the particular constant attention which the Political Directorate pays to this strategic sector of the national economy and the efforts it is making to improve its level of efficiency in promoting the development of our country.

"Bearing in mind the limited and non-recoverable nature of our hydrocarbon resources, the formulation of a policy of energy conservation and of the utilisation of the substitute energy sources becomes mandatory.

"The Assembly considers that the sacrifices accepted by the nation for the recovery and control of national resources imply the waging of a constant struggle against any utilizations by anyone of our resources to the detriment of the progress and well-being of our people.

"The People's National Assembly considers itself mobilized on the side of the live forces of the nation, under the guidance of our FLN vanguard party, in the fight against any maneuvering on the part of multinational corporations aimed at violating legitimate interests of our people.

"The People's National Assembly supports unreservedly the actions of the Political Directorate in raising the price of hydrocarbons, that of gas in particular.

"The People's National Assembly reaffirms its total support of the Political Directorate and of its head, Brother Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and secretary-general of the FLN Party."

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Actually, the capitalist countries alone are responsible for the global energy situation because of their abusive use of petroleum at a very low price until 1973.
2. The second session of the Central Committee was held in December 1979. See EL MOUDJAHID, 6 January 1980.
3. Excerpt from a report on the colloquium organized on the occasion of the fifth world anti-monopoly conference of petroleum workers' trade union (26-30 March 1980, Tripoli).
4. Contribution to a national energy policy (National Federation of Chemical and Mining Energy Workers).
5. The freezing of uranium funds is significant in this respect.
6. Same as Footnote 3.
7. See EL MOUDJAHID, 31 March 1980.
8. Central Committee decisions. EL MOUDJAHID, 6 January 1980.
9. Same as Footnote 3. The stopping of liquified natural gas production had been decided at the session.
10. See EL MOUDJAHID, 8 October 1980.



## AGRICULTURAL, ENTREPRENEURIAL MEASURES DISCUSSED

## Debate by UNPA Council

Algiers EL MOUJDAHID in French 18 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Fodil Ourabah: "The General Debate by the National Council of the UNPA [National Union of Algerian Peasants]

[Text] The National Council of the UNPA has discussed all the topical questions regarding the peasants and the main agricultural problems. Last Sunday evening, the proceedings of the council reached the highest level of interest with a general debate on the progress of implementing the Agrarian Revolution, marketing, and the general prospects in agricultural development. This debate, which was of a remarkably high standard, was between Mr Selim Saadi, minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, and Mohamed Rouighi, secretary of state for forests and reforestation. The various comments raised crucial questions and allowed for a general survey of all the subjects that are currently preoccupying the peasants and which constitute, moreover, stakes that determine the country's future.

First to speak was the representative from Tiaret, who immediately brought up the problem of implementing the agrarian revolution. He noted the serious and worrying delays in the first and second phase operations. In the absence of documents from the Land Register, many state lands have not been turned over to the National Fund for the Agrarian Revolution and continue to be worked by private owners. These illegal appropriations cover large areas. He cited the case of one holding of 700 hectares. To this is added the "great tricks" played by major landowners who have succeeded in circumventing the application of the law by means of false declarations.

Continuing his speech, the speaker disclosed that the implementation of the third phase has been put off indefinitely. However, he said, 70 percent of the livestock is in the hands of shady cattle dealers and merchants. Some major breeders have herds of 8,000 head. These people, totally in control of the meat market, are at the roots of the continual rise in prices.

Expressing the concerns of the producers in the Sersou region, the representative noted that as of now a third of the wheat harvest has not been garnered, since there is a lack of silos. More than a million quintals of grain have been left in the open and, with the last rainfalls, have started to germinate, which makes them unfit for consumption. During this time, our country is importing wheat at a high price.

The speaker moved on to the necessity of waging a battle on production. From this point of view, he said, it is important to combine the favorable conditions.

Firstly, stimulate the efforts of producers: large sums of money originating from the profits of production units are frozen in banks. In addition, the proportion of profits redistributed in the form of grants to producers--which is 25 percent--is deemed to be insufficient. In the second place, he continued, we must use the skills of agricultural experts to modernize our farming methods. The great majority of the cadres are assigned to administrative tasks, which weakens the technical support for production. The consequences arising from this situation are incalculable. One eloquent example: for almost 10 years, no new land has been plowed under.

#### Marketing: What Freedom?

In the third place, thorough research must be carried out to determine what crops are best suited to each region.

The representative from Tiaret ended by bringing up the fact that peasant representatives are kept out of the commissions that distribute loans to the fellaheen, which leaves the door wide open for injustices.

The representative from Tebessa spoke on the question of marketing. The memorandum on the freedom of marketing, he said, requires clarification. "We are in agreement regarding a freedom of marketing that benefits producers, and in agreement for a freedom of marketing that benefits consumers, but we reject any freedom for those who wish to crush producers and consumers."

The middlemen are trying to destroy the national marketing offices in order to become the unrestricted masters of the market. In his final statement on this point, he raised the problem the breeding cooperatives have in marketing wool.

There are no regulations for the sale of this byproduct of sheep farming. This situation benefits some "leaders" who do not hesitate to charge their sheep farming fellow workers commission on the stocks of wool, whereas the destitute farmers are facing the severe cold of the steppes.

The representative then brought up the problem of equipment, especially in the private sector. "Material is promised, and then one just waits for it," he said. He stressed the necessity for strengthening loans for the common purchase of combine harvesters, which could serve to aid a group of peasants within the framework of peasant mutual aid groups.

On the subject of agricultural training, there are, he said, regional schools, institutes, and so on. "But what we also want are structures for elementary training at the commune level where a peasant could learn the rudiments of engineering in order to maintain the farm equipment and improve his knowledge of the utilization of fertilizers and modern farming methods."

On the subject of implementing the agrarian revolution, the representative spoke of "certain leaders being asleep." "When we raise the problem of the first and

second phases, the reply we are given is that there is no secretary." He brought up the need for control: "When an official leaves his position, he is safe from all control, and no form of recourse to call him to account is possible."

On the subject of forests, he raised the need to follow up on the rewooded zones. "We have gone to a great deal of trouble to restore our forest heritage and halt the progress of the desert, but the plants wither after a few months for lack of care."

### Preserve Agricultural Land

The representative from Algiers raised the problem of preserving the agricultural lands. The construction of housing and industrial infrastructures is expanding over the most fertile areas. The peasants are determined to defend these lands, said the speaker, as though they are the only ones concerned by this problem. On this level, we should take into account the decisions of the Central Committee.

On the subject of the agrarian revolution, he said, an instruction was given to conclude the operations of the second phase. But this phase has not been completely carried out. "Before concluding this phase, the operations should be completed."

The governorate's agricultural situation suffers from a lack of interest on the part of the local authorities. As an example, he said that the plowing-sowing commission has not yet met. The construction projects for agricultural villages have sunk into oblivion. In the last 4 or 5 years, one single village has been completed.

All the other building sites are progressing slowly. Some are at a standstill. With regard to the poultry-farming units, he denounced a practice of the ONAB /expansion unknown/ which consists of getting its taxes to producers paid by unilaterally reducing by 10 percent the weight of the production delivered. The speaker raised a series of other problems: the lack of manpower, which requires emergency transfers, the lack of experts, and marketing. In this regard, he said that clarifications must be provided such that the freedom of marketing is not used by private intermediaries for their own profit.

The representative from Saida requested that the authorities raise the ban on plowing in the steppes. He also proposed the granting of a productivity bonus to stimulate the workers in the self-administered areas.

### The Freeze

The representative from Medea centered his speech on the state of implementation of the agrarian revolution, the question of marketing, and reforestation.

On the subject of the agrarian revolution, he said, "we have observed a freeze on activities." More than 1,000 hectares of land have still not been assigned. The local authorities are slowing down the process of forming cooperatives. Furthermore, large areas of nationalized land have been restored to their former owners by the appeals commissions. These restitutions are creating an atmosphere of uncertainty among the peasants. The cooperatives are becoming discouraged. The

speaker asked that an end be put to the restitutions and to the dissolving of cooperatives. In the event of unjustified nationalization, he suggested that the former landowner be compensated by cash benefits or even by the assignment of FNRA /expansion unknown/ lands which have not been redistributed.

The representative from Medea then raised the problem of the CAPRAS /Agricultural Production Cooperative of the Agrarian Revolution/ formed on lands to be developed. The people assigned to them have low incomes and are not receiving the support necessary to encourage them.

Regarding marketing, the speaker spoke of the difficulties encountered in disposing of the harvests of grapes, prunes, and pears. The private middlemen joined together in an organized manner. They were offering low prices while playing for time in such a way as to dictate their law to the producers.

The producers reacted by deciding to sell only to the OFLA /Fruit and Vegetable Office/ and to the COFEL /Fruit and Vegetable Cooperative/. Contracts were signed with these two marketing structures at favorable prices. But a problem arose later on: difficulties in disposing of the harvest because of a lack of crates and means of transportation. The speaker mentioned the specific case of wine grapes, for which the price to the producers is excessively low. The ONCV /National Office for Marketing Wine and Wine Products/ is offering 0.75 Algerian dinars per kilo, whereas the production cost amounts to 1.20 Algerian dinars per kilo.

On the subject of reforestation, the representative from Medea also raised the problem of the lack of follow-up on plantings. There were 5,000 plants put in the ground last year, but without results: scarcely 5 percent of the plants have grown.

He then raised the problem of the inhabitants of the forest areas, who derive most of their income from working the forest: cattle farming, bee keeping, and so on. These people, he said, come up constantly against the forest wardens.

The representative from Batna raised the problem of preserving the agricultural lands. He proposed constructing poultry farming units in the most underprivileged communes. He finished by denouncing the fact that the producers are never consulted on agricultural development projects.

The representative from Adrar raised the problem of water. The peasants suffer from a lack of hydraulic equipment. Equipment loans granted in 1977 are frozen in the bank because pumps are not available. He also raised the problem of the lack of technical staff: this season the tomato crops suffered from a disease and no expert came to give advice as to the appropriate treatment.

#### Reorganization of Companies

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 19 Nov 80 p 1

/Article by A. Zouied: "Structural Reorganization of Companies: The Sign of Success"/

/Text/ The time has definitely come for the structural reorganization of companies: this is felt to be the keystone of our economic efficiency, on pain of compromising our development objectives and of handing over our destiny to the goodwill of others.



Thus, we will deal here with a problem that is not only technical but which is also of definite political and economic significance, the framework of which is the economic and social development strategy as defined by the National Charter.

The serious distortions and the negative aspects recorded in the running of the national economy with all their repercussions on the living conditions of the people and on the solvency and viability of the country are sufficient to form the basis of this reorganization, which cannot accommodate personal convenience nor be a mere patching up, an oiling of the cogs, or some kind of dismantling of existing companies. Still less can it be an end in itself.

All the structural mechanisms to be set up at all levels of the economic machinery will thus not only be established according to the specific nature unique to each sector by the authorities concerned, but also modified and fitted into the overall framework of the plan underlying a balanced, integrated approach to the problems of administering the national economy.

The stakes are thus high enough to have to undergo summary reorganization projects. Thus the importance of establishing last Saturday, at the headquarters of the Ministry of Planning and National Development, the National Committee for Reorganizing Companies, which has the principal task of working out an overall plan of reorganization and examining those plans worked out by the various sectorial committees at the level of the overseeing ministries, in a spirit of harmonization and coordination.

For it is important that, from the very beginning, all the conditions for putting the structural reorganization of companies into practice must be gathered together, so that the reorganization does not incur the risks inherent in the reasoning and points of view expressed in some committee reports that do not allow us to be convinced that all the objectives of this requirement have been taken into consideration.

In fact, although there is reason to be pleased that all the discussions and decisions for reorganizing companies have taken place democratically within the ministerial committees, we must at the same time be aware of the fact that, even with unmatched abilities, the final objectives were not discerned with the same clarity.

Moreover, it would be avoiding a basic reality to lose from sight the diversity of the technical criteria and methods or thematics that were factors in examining this question and subsequently the different nature of the proposals that resulted, not to mention their inconsistency, even their divergence.

Thus, one should stress the lack of vision that characterized certain work groups in which discussion was so limited that no thought emerged that was extensive enough for any valid solutions to emerge.

Aside from the preceding considerations, it goes without saying that the principle behind the structural reorganization of companies needs to be expressed firstly by democratization and decentralization in managing the economy in a way that permits the production units real autonomy and more responsibility for their

respective problems of administration and of assessing their human, material, and technical potential in terms of performance.

But it should in no event mean that it can be prejudicial to the rights of the tutelage or to the coordination of all the units that have in common the implementation of a single level of decision, that of the Plan.

The discipline of the peripheral entities in relationship to the center is increased, on the one hand by a more judicious use of the responsibility of the economic agents and by a clearer distribution of the area of authority of the companies and their units in order to achieve their economic and social objectives effectively. Thus, this analysis would be more a rationalization of the machinery than a breaking up of the links of a single chain of integrated activities, each of which is essential to the running of the whole in a consistent and achieving framework.

It thus proves necessary to clarify these principles both as to their range and as to their limits, so as to remove any ambiguity that could spoil the restructuring process and thus the viability of entities established or to be established, while clearly stating the fact that progress and productivity reside above all in human factors and that they thus rest on a better utilization of energy prospects of the creativity and intelligence of the management, and in a general way, of the workers.

Finally, the entrepreneurial reorganization combines not only giving responsibility to the work forces for defined, planned objectives, but also the correct, precise implementation of the General Workers Code.

In this regard, the tasks entrusted to the National Structural Reorganization Committee seem to us to thus assume all their meaning in assuring the Committee the role of acting as a level with regard to the sectorial committees, even of illuminating their work, while presidential guidance forms the conceptual framework for it.

The fact that it joins together high officials of the Party, the Ministries of Finance, Labor and Vocational Training, of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] and of the UNPA is in itself a sign of success with regard to the results that the country may expect.

#### Program Adopted by Ministers

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Nov 80 p 1

[Article: "The Council of Ministers Adopts an Action Program for the Short-Term Enforcement of the Central Committee's Decisions"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers met on Sunday, 23 November 1980, at the offices of the Presidency of the Republic, under the chairmanship of President Chadli Bendjedid, President of the Republic and secretary of the FLN Party.

On the basis of a report by the minister of agriculture and the agrarian revolution, the Council of Ministers adopted an action program regarding the short-term enforcement of the Central Committee's decisions regarding the agricultural sector.

This action program is based on the following main points:

Structural reorganization and reallocation of self-managed estates with a view to improving production;

Supporting the small peasant communities;

Redevelopment of support and supply structures.

The Council of Ministers decided upon the following accompanying measures:

1) With regard to the structural reorganization of self-managed estates:

Training and assignment, within the production units, of engineers, technicians, and administrators;

Revision of the legal statute regarding administrators, who must be members of the collectives;

Launching of a vast self-construction program;

Reorganization of the retirement program for old land workers;

Launching of an appropriate training and popularization program for agricultural techniques.

2) With regard to small peasant communities:

Access to agricultural credit;

Equipping them with agricultural machinery;

Implementation of a self-construction program to benefit the small fellaheen;

Launching of a program to popularize agricultural techniques;

Relaxation of administrative procedures with regard to marketing agricultural products.

3) With regard to support and supply structures:

Establishment of a specialized financial institution;

Reorganization of current offices on the basis of Decree No 80-242 regarding structural reorganization of enterprises.

In addition, on the basis of a report by the minister of planning and land development and president of the National Committee for the Structural Reorganization of Companies, the Council of Ministers examined and adopted a number of measures regarding the implementation of the structural reorganization, which is based on the following points:

Determining the general framework of the structural reorganization with a view to strengthening the economy and developing the country;

Defining the principles of reorganization based on ideas of globalization, harmony, progressiveness, specialization, separation of production functions, and achievement of both production and marketing;

Fixing the order of priorities, stages, and terms of implementation.

The objectives pursued within this framework, in accordance with the decisions of the Central Committee, aim for clarity in management, autonomy of decision, responsibility, productivity, decentralization, and the lifting of bureaucratic restraints and rigidity.

The general effect of the decisions of the Council of Ministers is aimed at combining rigorous thinking with pragmatic action.

Finally, the Council of Ministers listened to a communication from the minister of planning and national development on the official visit he had just made to the United Kingdom of Great Britain.

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CS0: 4400



TUDEH PARTY DEFENSE AGAINST BANI-SADR'S 'ACCUSATION'

Tehran MANDOM in Persian 21 Dec 80 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Slander against the Tudeh Party of Iran — and in the President's Progress Report, What Is More!"]

[Text] In the president's progress report, we read the following:

"Two government officials were implicated in this activity (demonstrations in Mashhad), it was they who created these fraudulent, artificial demonstrations after the speeches, and they also were in favor of and against themselves. Of course, we also have good specialists in these areas, the Tudeh party people, former members of the royal court also played the same game in the era of Mosaddeq and contrived to be in favor of and against themselves and fabricated events and climates. That is one of the subjects on which an investigation is being made. The publication of the results of this resistance will not reach a conclusion very quickly — indeed may perhaps never reach a conclusion."

(The newspaper ENJELAB-E ESLAMI, Monday 15 December 1980.)

These statements by the president regarding the "Tudeh party people" (which were also repeated with respect to the counterrevolutionary demonstrations in Esfahan elsewhere in the progress report) are nothing but slander.

Slandering the Tudeh Party of Iran as a means for acquiring political capital has become "stylish." We, as a rule, do not respond to the slander and accusations which are written or stated in one newspaper or another or one speech or another against the Tudeh Party of Iran, because we do not consider them worthy of a response. However, when an official of the level of the office of the presidency slanders the Tudeh Party of Iran, we cannot refrain from showing dismay and amazement nor opt for silence. In our opinion, an official of the level of the office of president is not just a biased speaker or one who does not know his responsibility, he is not just a reporter with no individual quality or a parrot who gives tongue and pen to lies and accusations recklessly — rather, his words must be weighed, must be weighty, truthful and based on reality.

From the text of the quote of the statement we have reproduced by the president, it becomes very obvious that he has unfortunately not shown attention to these qualities in his statements and has made the "Tudeh party people" the target of the arrow of slander in interpreting the counterrevolutionary demonstrations which suspect elements held in Mashhad and Esfahan.

With a little diligence, one can observe, in the text of the quotation of the same statement, that the president himself does not believe this slander and therefore considers that it will require an "investigation." His disbelief is so great that he is "certain" that this investigation "indeed may never reach a conclusion."

We contend that an official of the level of the office of the president, who is responsible and must feel responsibility, does not have the right to talk about matters prior to "investigation" and consequently prior to fully ascertaining their validity — to say nothing of the fact that this matter is grave slander, and, what is more, slander against a political party with a brilliant 40-year record of ruthless, implacable struggle against imperialism and its satellite court in Iran.

Since the president has slandered the Tudeh Party of Iran without basis or "investigation," one can consider it likely, and of a likelihood close to certainty, that he has repeated the statements of a few of the people close to him; however, even the repetition "without investigation," without attribution to the biased statement of partisans, is unseemly and inappropriate for an official of the level of the office of the president.

In the quotation of the statement which we have reproduced, the "Tudeh party people and former members of the royal court" have been made synonymous. One would have expected the president not to repeat such indecent insults regarding the "people of the Tudeh," because such scurrility is tantamount to a weapon for fighting against the Tudeh Party of Iran in the arsenal of these very collusive "former members of the royal court."

We do not expect the president or any personality, official, group, party, organization or newspaper to support the Tudeh Party of Iran — although one would expect this of the faithful supporters of the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran, which our party is defending not only in statements and in writing but even in action, with all its power and with the utmost fidelity, to the point of self sacrifice, and responsible officials, including the president, are sufficiently aware of this. Rather, it is our expectation that disputes with the Tudeh Party of Iran on the part of persons who consider themselves to be the supporters of the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran should be at the level of ideological and political disputes and not at the level of fabricating lies and making accusations which delight and gladden the counterrevolution. The president himself has repeated numerous times that he considers fighting against other forces in the revolutionary front to be permissible only within the ideological-political context, and we are dismayed and astonished that the president, in his dispute with the Tudeh Party of Iran, should have deviated from the line which he himself has repeatedly addressed and slandered our party with a false arrow.

The Tudeh Party of Iran also has a "progress report;" this progress report is clean and unafraid of being the target of accusations and slander. The entire 40-year life of the Tudeh Party of Iran has been unstintingly and unsparingly devoted to fighting hegemonist imperialism under the leadership of the criminal America on behalf of the independence of Iran and has been devoted to fighting

against imperial satellite tyranny and for the individual and social rights of the people of Iran. In this struggle, our party has been the target of the savage hostility and ferocity of imperialists and their Iranian agents. It has yielded thousands of victims and endured innumerable suffering, but it has always held the flag of struggle aloft.

After the glorious 12 February revolution which triumphed under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, the Tudeh Party of Iran naturally has engaged in continuous, unwavering and obstinate efforts and endeavors, in the ranks of the other revolutionary forces, to implant and strengthen the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran and to ensure its categoric and final victory, and its fruits in the history of Iran will be appreciated if they are served by unbiased persons. For this reason, our party has been the subject of savage ambush by counter-revolution and for this reason as well an unforgivable sin has been perpetrated, in the eyes of the liberal bourgeoisie of Iran and compromising representatives who favor the return of American imperialism through the "window" are attacking our party with the aid of lies, accusations and slander, since they cannot openly attack the positions of the Tudeh Party of Iran, which are in support of the "path of the imam." However, the Tudeh Party of Iran will never be drawn into this "marginal fire" and will never deviate from the line of struggle against imperialism in order to create an independent, free, developed Iran in favor of the toilers and the downtrodden.

Such is a summary of the 40-year "progress report" of the Tudeh Party of Iran, whose reality cannot be denied not only by any aware, informed revolutionary but also by an unbiased opponent. We would have expected the president at least not to view the acts of the Tudeh Party of Iran through the eyes of such opponents; for this reason unfortunately we are most amazed by the words of the president, whose statement we have quoted.

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CSO: 4906

# TUDEH PARTY PLEDGES TO DEFEND ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 29 Dec 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] In a conversation with KEYHAN newspaper 6/10/59 [27 Dec 1980]  
Mr Abolgasem Sadeq, press deputy minister of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, ventured to express his views regarding the new Press Bill.

Undoubtedly the codification of the Press Bill, which has also been ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and entails the experiences of Iran's great revolution during the past 2 years, is an important, essential matter. In the course of the past 2 years, many publications have appeared in the arena of our society, and each one has addressed itself to the revolution of Iran in its own style of thinking. Some of them have striven to warn the people about the conspiracies of American imperialism, have exposed the treasonous plots of the great satan and its domestic mercenaries, and have supported the Islamic republic and revolution of Iran with all their power; they have proceeded and have been on their guard against pitfalls. However, conversely, some of these publications, a group of which are directly guided by CIA spies, have, as far as they have been able, spread dissension among the ranks of the people and by publishing false news have striven to make the people distrustful of the friends of the Iranian revolution, to divert attention from the danger of the conspiracies of the great satan and to help advance its evil plots. Some of these publications do not now exist and the revolution has removed them from their road; however, others of them still are engaged in their destructive activity against the revolution.

Therefore, for a responsible official who speaks about the new Press Law and who must express an opinion in accordance with the bitter but fruitful experience of the last 2 years regarding the platform of the press during the third year of the revolution, in accordance with the interests of the revolution, these experiences ought to have become the object of serious attention, especially at a time when the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran are on the threshold of the formation of a seventh conspiracy by American imperialism and some publications still are not only not speaking about the conspiracies of American imperialism, the means for confronting them, and the need for the people and revolutionary forces to unite against the counterrevolutionary efforts, but are also throwing dirt in people's eyes and engaging in a search for diversion.



However, with the utmost dismay and amazement, Mr Sadeq did not say so much as one word regarding the conspiracies of American imperialism, which have not ceased for one moment since the triumph of the Iranian revolution, each of which is being implemented in a fashion more dangerous and astonishing than the previous one, he should also well know. He does not even broach so much as a word regarding the role of the counterrevolutionary press which, through its silence on the conspiracies of American imperialism, by turning people's thoughts away from the serious danger of American imperialism, have given assistance to American imperialism and are even now working to that end. He does not mention the need for the committed, revolutionary press to unite in exposing the conspiracies of American imperialism and the domestic counterrevolution and warning the people. He says only that "a commission to investigate franchises" must be "able to abrogate the franchises of publications which take steps contrary to their original claims." He then mentions the "Tudeh Party of Iran" and its central organ NAME-YE MARDOM, for example, which have supposedly "acted against their claims!"

What evidence does the press deputy minister of national guidance have for abrogating the franchise of NAME-YE MARDOM? None!

It is astounding and disconcerting, but true, that Mr Sadeq, without being able by law (by the law that still exists) to raise any objection against the work of the Tudeh Party of Iran and its publications, which are consistently being published in accordance with the Press Law and by permission of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, should so aggressively attack the Tudeh Party of Iran, which has proved its sincerity and truthfulness in defending the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran, and once again, without any proof, repeat the surreptitious change of 40 years of "dependent" which was manufactured by the Pahlavi regime.

What is the reason for this irresponsible encounter? Exactly in conditions when American imperialism is bringing its seventh plot to destroy the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran to the stage of implementation and suspicious persons in all areas of the country are sowing dissension, in whose interest is it to talk about "abrogating" the franchise of the central organ of the Tudeh Party of Iran, which has always bared the conspiracies of American imperialism and its domestic hirelings?

Undoubtedly, the words of Mr Sadeq are not in the interest of the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran, or in the interest of the revolutionary forces against the enemies of the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran, headed by American imperialism and its domestic dependents. Such words do not befit an official of the Islamic Republic of Iran either.

A high official like the press deputy minister of Islamic guidance ought to take steps to strengthen and protect revolutionary, committed publications and take steps against publications which sow dissension, are counterrevolutionary and speak words and commit acts in such a way that the counterrevolution cannot exploit them.

We hope that Mr Sadeq, in his judgment on the Tudeh Party of Iran and its publications, will revise his opinion, because the publications of the Tudeh Party of Iran, as their pages testify, have defended and will defend the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran steadfastly and obstinately. Therefore the protection of these publications is only in the interest of the Islamic revolution and republic of Iran.

## EDITORIAL RIDICULES QADHDHAFI'S PLAN FOR UNION WITH CHAD

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 10 Jan 81 p 2

[Editorial by Faysal: 'What's New With the Colonel?']

[Text] People have become accustomed to hearing, seeing or anticipating new things every year. New fads are not restricted to clothing, publicity, appearances and colors, but extend to the world of politics and the manipulation of human sentiments, fates, destinies and futures. Whoever does not believe that should listen to the new acrobatic contortions with which the madman of Libya is opening his season in 1981.

The news agencies have carried very urgent cables originating from Tripoli saying that the unity-minded colonel has succeeded in obtaining prompt Chadean agreement to the realization of a complete merger between the two friendly, neighboring countries, according to the conditions and specifications demanded by the producer and financier of the most famous unity films in modern history. The cables also say that the Chad-Libya unity will attract everyone's attention because it will represent the first living experiment, in applying to the realm of reality the Libyan madman's ideas about the power in the new-born modern state, as well as the supreme authority, belonging to and coming from the people.

But the urgent cables also say that this time the crazy colonel seriously believes that he will gain some actual value from what he is doing--i.e. that he will reap, for the first time, the fruits of his Third Theory and his Green Book, and that this time the fruits will be cash in advance and not deferred delusions as before, when he would release the balloons of the pasteboard union one day and the next day they would be overturned. Is the colonel's conviction as to his position true? Has the complicated, enigmatic colonel started turning towards Africa, after having failed in his turning towards the Arabs--that is, after his mergers with Tunisia, Egypt, the Sudan, Syria and the Western Sahara failed? Then too, what about his private plan to infiltrate Iran under the cloak of the charlatan Khomeyni, after seeking his blessings for applying a system of governing his followers and country through omnipresent committees?

The rapid, urgent cables also give us satisfactory, adequate answers. Let us listen to what they say.

After the madman of Libya interfered in Chad's internal affairs, using all kinds of modern weapons and millions of dollars, he found that he had to immediately and promptly exploit the results, before something happened which might not have produced the results, and before the enigmatic colonel lost what he had gained and worked so hard for over long months and years. So there was this amazing announcement of a colorless, tasteless, odorless union. Here one wonders in astonishment where Hafiz al-Asad, who merged with al-Qadhafi, stands. Will future news bring the announcement of a federal, unified, joint Libyan-Syrian-Chadean state? Can we consider that there is now a single federation comprising N'Djamena and Damascus, both united by the Tripoli connection?

There is a popular proverb which says, "Live and learn." As long as the Libyan madman lives off Libyan oil wells at the expense of the Libyan people's progress, and as long as this colonel keeps his exaggerated acumen and all his ingenious powers, we will have to hear many things from him and about him. In general, what we will be listening for will definitely be the story of the ending of an over-extended, putrid farce—the farce called Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi.

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CSO: 4802

## RAHAH SEEKS TO BECOME SPOKESMAN FOR ARABS OF ISRAEL

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Nov 80, 1, 2 Dec 80

[Article by 'Atallah Mansur: "RAKAH Seeks to Replace the PLO"]

[30 Nov 80 p 9]

[Text] The RAKAH and their partners of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality are about to celebrate the fifth anniversary of their first success in which they captured Nazerat in early December 1975 with the announcement of a new offensive in which they will try to receive de facto recognition that they are the authorized representatives of the entire Arab community in Israel. They are organizing in Nazerat a national conference of representatives of the "Arab population" as they express it in Hebrew (in Arabic, on the other hand, they use "revolutionary" more often, and they call the conference a "conference of the Arab masses").

Dr Emil Tuma, the veteran RAKAH activist and secretary of the executive committee of the conference says that the body which is to emerge in accordance with the program of the Nazerat convention will apparently serve as the representative of the Palestinians in the territories and those areas outside of Israel's borders. However, while the PLO constitutes, in his opinion, the sole representative of the Palestinians in all areas, various elements represent the Arabs in Israel today. These are the Committee of the Heads of the Local Arab Authorities, the Land Defense Committee, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, RAKAH, and other organizations. Will these organizations cease representing the Arabs after the convention? No. They will continue to represent them in their special areas.

The new organization will unite the entire Arab population as a community on three issues: democracy, equality, and peace. In the area of democracy, the organization will aspire to participation in every general Israeli struggle for the preservation of liberal democracy. In the area of peace, Dr Tuma states, the organization will adhere to the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel after the establishment of a true peace between Israel and the Palestinians at the conclusion of the negotiations between Israel and the PLO.

"The Camp David Agreements are a disgrace, and the Jordanian option is no better," says Dr Tuma. The Palestinian Covenant also disturbs him, however Herut also still advocates the "two banks of the Jordan." In general, he does not deceive himself that the discussions will begin and end so quickly. It is necessary to bridge the abyss with a simultaneous declaration of the Israeli recognition of the PLO in exchange for the nullification of the Palestinian Covenant.



Nevertheless, Dr Tuma has no doubt that the PLO represents all the Palestinians and that the Arabs in Israel are a part of the Palestinian people. Does the PLO represent the Arab citizens of Israel? No. It represents only those who have not attained the realization of their right to self-determination. The Arabs in Israel are represented by their elected representatives in the Knesset, the heads of the local authorities, and organizations who are working for the realization of their right to equality as citizens of Israel (and this is the third area for which the designated organization intends to represent the Arab citizens).

Does the preparatory committee represent the entire spectrum of activities and opinions among the Israeli Arabs? Dr Tuma is convinced that it does although he is ready to acknowledge that it is already clear to the organizers of the convention that it will not represent the "extremists" in the form of the "Villagers." Dr Tuma also agrees that there are moderate circles of Israeli Arabs who are not represented in the preparatory committee of the convention, and he also does not expect them to participate in it. He dismisses the "Villagers" as a small group and the "Israeli Arab Conscience" as an insignificant ephemeral organization.

RAKAH is actually organizing the convention as an instrument for its objectives. Party members sat down and drafted the "national covenant," and its style indicates that it was written by Dr Tuma himself. The views expressed therein do not differ at all from his own, his party's position, and the line adopted recently (and since the Yom Kippur War) by the Soviet Union.

RAKAH has not requested political or social organizations to join its initiative. After the draft covenant was finalized, they approached all kinds of activists who are not members of the party and asked them to sign it. For months they conducted a signing campaign during which it is doubtful if they skipped a single member of RAKAH or a family member of anyone in need of it. Even when they sat down to choose members of the "preparatory committee" they did not need partners. They selected for themselves a committee which consists of most of the party activists, editors of its publications and 18 heads of local councils (and their deputies).

This committee includes, for example, the secretary of the Academicians League of Nazerat, the chairman of the Association for the Prisoner Lawyer Muhammad Miya'ari of Haifa, and about six public figures who are not party members. However, these represent only an insignificant minority among the 70 members of the preparatory committee.

The same situation exists among the members of the executive committee. The RAKAH people, the organizers of the convention, made themselves the dominant majority in it.

This stirred up bitter opposition among the opponents of RAKAH in the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality. The secretariat of the Academicians League decided to exploit the opportunity and arrange a conference on "the Arabs in Israel within the political trend." Participants included the League Secretary Mr Fawzi 'Abdallah, Harwarand Ri'ah Abu al-'Asal, Dr Rashid Salim, lawyer Kamal Dahr, engineer Walid al-Haj, and the poet Salim Jubran, the secretary of the RAKAH branch in Nazerat. All the conference participants agreed that a front in the form of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality is the preferred structure in terms of the Arab citizen and in both organizational and ideological terms.

While the League secretary maintained neutrality as the moderator, the five participants argued among themselves. The first three said that RAKAH, being the only solid organization in the "Front", actually controlled the Front, and in weak and cautious language, they tried to hint that perhaps the time has come for the nonparty members in the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality to organize a political movement the main objective of which would be to attempt to bargain when RAKAH would come to the point of establishing a list of candidates for the election platform. The RAKAH representative rejected the suggestion, and he did this in civil and friendly language, as befits a friendly debate.

Persons who happened to be at the conference, without knowing the background of the proceedings, found it difficult to understand the language of the hints. Only a reporter of RAKAH's Arabic-language newspaper AL-ITTIHAD understood the proceedings and published them selectively, which revealed the party's sensitivity in light of the attempt to attack its position of seniority. He attributed to the secretary of the party branch biting remarks against his conference associates. For example, that an Arab party in Israel can be only one of two things: "Either an extreme nationalist party or one that straggles after a Zionist party" and that those who advocate the organization of the non-party members within the Front structure are "leaders who disparage the masses and are contemptuous of the people."

Dr Rashid Malim, a former Communist and one of the founders of the Nazerat Democratic Front, tried to respond to the comments, but the editorial board of AL-ITTIHAD refused to publish his response. The secretary of the Academicians League succeeded in publishing his reaction in AL-ITTIHAD, however the editorial board's note on his response reemphasized that it has full confidence in the reporter and that it is surprised that the letter writer does not dissociate himself from those academicians who criticize RAKAH.

And so the cat was let out of the bag, say the opponents of the Communists. RAKAH is trying to establish an overall organization for the Arabs of Israel, however it is capable of doing this because its activists have been guarding their positions zealously and successfully since the establishment of the state and are not prepared to tolerate even an iota of a differing view. They can collaborate only with those who specialize in applause and in repetition of the words of the Communist leaders, say their opponents.

The Communists have a clear and unequivocal response to this: Every party by its very essence is designed to attract, lead, and compete with other parties for positions of power and influence. The Communists have attained key positions (in the Arab sector) by virtue of their extensive and consistent activity, and they do not need competitors. In general, says the editor of the RAKAH publication, Mr Emil Habibi, the Arabs of Israel do not constitute a complete people but rather an abandoned, despairing, and idealess remnant (as was the situation in the early fifties). Mr Habibi contends that the class separation has become relevant for the Arabs of Israel, and he regards the opponents of his party as "petite bourgeoisie and privileged dignitaries who look down on the masses and call them a rabble." Mr Habibi, of course, concludes that the opponents of his party do not merit positions of leadership.

[Text] RAKAH's most public and vocal opponent today is Mr Binyamin Gur-Aryeh, the prime minister's advisor on Arab affairs, who is going around the country on a royal campaign which reminds the Arabs of the Caliphate of the Abbasids in Baghdad. With one hand he is disbursing promises and grants, and with the other, threats as a reaction to the results likely to stem from the RAKAH-planned Nazerat conference. Last year, he says, the Office of the Advisor divided IL4 million from the exchange funds of the Moslem wakf [funds set apart for religious or charitable purposes] (most of which is managed by the state) among the Moslem villages. The Ministry of Finance this year approved a sum of IL20 million, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs added IL18 million for the construction and renovation of mosques, the fencing of cemeteries, and the establishment of sports facilities for the Moslem youth. The Office of the Advisor also decided to allocate IL1 million of these funds to outstanding students. The prime minister's advisor for Arab affairs does not forget to mention to his listeners that he persuaded the government to redeem the Moslem cemetery in Yafo and also the Hassan Baq Mosque after the Moslem Committee sold them for commercial purposes. Mr Gur-Aryeh explains to the Arab community in Israel that he is not asking them to identify with all the objectives of the Jewish state ("such as the law of return and secure and recognized borders") but instead he wants them to be loyal citizens of the state and explains the inequality that prevails between Jews and Arabs in the state as a difference which has existed from the time of the establishment of the state. In reviewing the achievements of the Arabs in Israel, he provides the following details: Instead of 14 high school students at the time of the establishment of the state, there are now about 18,000; while then there were no students in the universities, today over 3,000 Arab students are studying in post-high school institutions, including universities and teachers academies. In order to refute every claim of discrimination against the Arab students, he says that of the 45 students who were accepted this year for medical studies in the Technion in Haifa, 15 are Arabs. Mr Gur-Aryeh promises that in the next decade 27 percent of the development budget of the Ministry of Education and Culture will be designated for the solution of the overcrowding problem of the Arab schools. He reveals that Deputy Prime Minister Professor Yiga'el Yadin has agreed to include four Arab residential areas in his residential area reconstruction plan. He adds and promises that the government will solve the problem of young Arab couples in the "build your own house" system by the allocation of lots and the granting of mortgages. In order to overcome the problem of the contour plans, an effort will be made to prepare such plans next year while permitting high-rise construction in the Arab villages which are no longer villages.

#### The Jews are not Angels

After these pleasantries, Mr Gur-Aryeh comes to the actual message which he wants to transmit to his Arab listeners at the conference of the Association for Arab-Israeli Consciousness in Haifa or to the Good Neighbor Society of the Histadrut in Western Galilee: "The Arabs in Israel find themselves today at a crossroads. The attempt of certain circles to establish a 'front' and to adopt a 'national covenant' (concepts borrowed from the PLO) will lead to the creation of two camps of Jews and Arabs in Israel with each one thinking how it can damage the other." Mr Gur-Aryeh tries to correct the impression of his comments and hastens to put a restraint on his words by adding "of course, the government will continue to work in accordance with the law, however I want to warn my Arab friends that the Jews are not angels and if the violence has reached the university as a result of the



extremism of the students, there is a danger that it will also reach the markets and work places."

The comments of the prime minister's advisor in the kibbutz of Kabri brought reactions from seven Arabs and two Jews, however nowhere was there a positive reaction. Mr Ahmad Khi'al, the head of the council of the village of Judeida, complained of the harsh treatment which, according to him, those returning from pilgrimages encountered at the customs station at the Allenby Bridge. Hassan 'Awad from Tamra complained of discrimination in the granting of child allocations from the National Insurance to Arab children on the grounds that their fathers have not served in the army. Messrs Salman 'Atallah, lawyer Nasib Shanan, Dr Fadil Mansur, and three Druzes, Mirkha, Hurfi and 'Ussafyah raised the question of the lands arrangement and reduction of faraf in the villages. Dr Mansur, the agronomist, disputed the claims of Gur-Aryeh regarding extremism in the Arab sector, stating that it was similar to the extremism in the Jewish sector and cited the example of Meir Kahane. Mr Zaki Di'ab, for a head of the council of the village of Tamra, gave a fiery talk against the "robbers of the mosques' property" without mentioning names. He related that several days before he was present at a conference of Moslem activists who were called to save the Al-Ghazr Mosque ("Great One") in 'Akko from the danger of collapse. He opposed the idea of collecting contributions and his reason for this opposition was that the mosque has a large amount of property and it is the obligation of those who robbed the mosque's property to take care of its construction.

The comment of Sheikh Zaki Di'ab disturbed Mr Gur-Aryeh. Di'ab has always been considered an anti-communist and close to the government (and especially to Mr Yigal Allon, of blessed memory). On Land Day he was the object of the anger of the RAKAH and its sympathizers. His car was set afire. Now he is attacking the government with especially rough language. The prime minister's advisor on Arab affairs explains that the Moslem representatives in 'Akko asked him for IL2 million for renovation of the mosque and he approved their request. It was only after the appropriation of the entire amount that they revealed that the renovation of the mosque requires IL5 million. He committed himself just as he had found money to compensate Zaki Di'ab on the burning of his car.

In the parking lot of the kibbutz of Kabri I heard persons who had come to attend the meeting say: "The person who needs Gur-Aryeh is unfortunate. Until his dying day he will remind him that he compensated him for the burning of his car as if Zaki Di'ab had not been damaged because of the advice of the advisor."

Similar comments were also heard at the Carmelia Court conference in Haifa where a significant number of Arab spokesmen participated in the two conferences. Kamil Hatib of Sha'ab said candidly that at every such meeting he continues to hear the same complaints from Arabs and the same promises from government spokesmen. The failure of the government to cope with the problems only increases them. "Afu Pa'ur, the head of the Sha'ab Council, suggests that the government adopt for itself the "carrot and stick" policy which it had adopted toward him--to encourage the positive and to allocate funds for the development of his village on the one hand and to openly and clearly discriminate against the extremists on the other hand.

Zaki Jubran, the head of the local council in Gush Halav, claims that the Arabs of Israel are not born extremists, "there are factors which push them to this." He suggests that the academicians be viewed as the latent force in the Arab sector and



an effort be made to improve relations between the Arabs and the Jews on campuses as a possible example of coexistence. He also shares the view that the government has no clear plan for coping with the roots of the problems of the Arab sector. Elias Lius, the head of the local council of Mi'ilya, was one of the attendees at both conferences in Haifa and the kibbutz of Kabri while also serving as a member of the preparatory committee of the Nazerat conference. In Haifa he said that he is not in favor of any special policy for the Arab population in Israel but rather for full integration and equality among the citizens. 'Abdallah Drawsha of 'Araba complained about the absence of any education for coexistence in the Jewish schools. He would want to see many Jewish students visiting the Arab villages and believes that the unreadiness of the Israeli establishment to accept Arab academicians creates a problem.

However, while the attendees of the Kabri conference were satisfied with listening to speeches and expressing a number of opinions ("We must vacate the hall at 7:00, and therefore we must conclude," apologized Hassan Asadi), the attendees of the Haifa conference decided to adopt a declaration which rejects the right of the Nazerat conference to represent them and warns that the intention of the organizers is to serve narrow party objectives "and probably also other objectives in which there is undoubtedly a hidden danger for all the Arab citizens of Israel." The attendees of the Haifa conference (including MK Amnon Linn of the Likud) do not share Mr Gur-Aryeh's enthusiasm about the government's functioning. They state that "the government has not yet seen fit to state its policy toward the Arab citizens, has not laid the strong foundation for dealing with all the problems, and has not found the appropriate solutions. We are all certain that the government, if it wanted to do so, would be able to solve all the problems and to block those groups who are sustaining themselves from our troubles."

They subsequently assure us solemnly that they intend to continue to work for the advancement of mutual understanding between Jews and Arabs and warn the Arab public not to be dragged into the unfortunate Nazerat conference. They conclude their public statement with a solemn wish for the welfare of the State of Israel, for peace, and for understanding between the Arabs and the Jews, and they do this in the spirit of their slogan--loyalty to the state, equality, peace.

When Dr Emil Tuma, the secretary of the preparatory committee of the Nazerat conference, was asked for his opinion of the Haifa conference, he said that it is a "marginal and narrow group," and there is a kernel of truth in this claim. Even the head of the group, Mr Salim Jubran of the Haifa Workers Council (and the Labor Party) and MK Amnon Linn acknowledge that they have not been successful in getting the government to adopt their views regarding the conduct of an activist policy toward the Arab citizens, both by punishment of the inciters and extremists and the encouragement and integration of the moderates.

Nevertheless, this group is not causing the RAKAH activists to lose any sleep. The experience of the Popular Arab Front in 1958 taught them that the danger lurks elsewhere.

[2 Dec 80 p 9]

[Text] About one-fourth of the Jewish population in Israel (to be exact, 26.6 percent) are prepared to come out in favor of a policy of granting equal opportunity in

the acceptance of Israeli Arabs in positions in public institutions without preference to Jewish candidates. There are 28.9 percent who are prepared to favor the same principle in regard to the acceptance of Arab students into universities. About 15 percent are prepared to support the same principle in the assigning of senior positions in government offices to Arab citizens qualified, on the basis of the principle of equality of opportunity for all citizens, for these positions.

This is only one of the many findings of a survey conducted by the Van Leer Institute on the positions of the Jewish majority in Israel toward the Arab minority. In the survey, conducted by Dr Mina Tzemah, a representative sample of 1,223 Jews were asked about their attitudes. The field work was conducted in January 1980. For me, as an Arab journalist who has been living and active in Israel for 25 years, there was nothing significantly new in the findings of Ms Tzemah. However, nevertheless, it seems to me that I found considerable thought-provoking material in the findings of the survey which conclude that 36 percent of the Jewish community in Israel are convinced that the Arabs are filthy (while the Moslem Arab must wash five times a day, the stench of the American beatniks did not cause more than 8.5 percent of the Jewish community in the sample to attribute this disgusting characteristic to Americans!) Of the total number of Jews, 40.7 percent believe that the Israeli Arab is a violent creature (the Israeli Jew is violent in the eyes of only 22.2 percent). However, the great surprise really came from abroad: Even the television films did not damage the American's image, and only 12 percent of the Israeli Jews are prepared to consider him violent.

In order to examine the roots of these prejudices, it is useful to cite another statistic from the same survey. In early 1980, 20.7 percent of the sample group believed that the Egyptian is a violent type (less than those who attributed the same negative characteristic to the Israeli Jew). In contrast 57.6 percent attributed that characteristic to the Syrian Arabs. This shows that a seed of trust by the average Israeli Jew in the Egyptian people was planted at Camp David. Also in their attitude toward the Egyptians in contrast with the Syrians in regard to the attachment of value to human life, the interviewees displayed a conspicuous and significant sympathy, and even a degree of positive evaluation, toward the Egyptians: 14 percent believe that the Syrians attach importance to human life, 47.1 percent attribute the same characteristic to the Egyptians. (To the Israelis, as was expected, they give a higher mark--85.4 percent are convinced that the Jews in Israel attach importance to human life!)

#### RAKAI: Collected All the Medals

The first optimistic conclusion which can be drawn, in my opinion, from these findings encourages me to believe that the prejudice of the Israelis against the Arab citizens is largely responsible for the political-security situation. The second optimistic conclusion can be found in the fact that in every case and in every question of the attitude to the Arabs, the study found that the residents of Haifa and the north are more enlightened and free of prejudice than the rest of the population of the country (and at the other extreme are generally found the youths of military service age). The explanation for this phenomenon is simple: Haifa was and remains a mixed city where the Arab population (mostly Christian) is capable of surrounding Jewish society. Among the Haifa Arabs are wealthy merchants, entrepreneurs, men of property and status, lawyers, doctors, and government and municipal officials who serve a varied and mixed public. The situation is different in other mixed cities such as

'Akko, Lod, Ramle, and Yafo where the Arab minority is generally a part of the group with large families and modest income and means.

It is evident from the findings of Dr Tzemah that the expression "Israeli Arab" arouses negative feelings in 60 percent of the population sample (and only 26 percent from the expression "goy"). When the average Arab citizen encounters "negative feelings" which he arouses in his contacts with the Jewish community (and there is no doubt that most of the Israeli Arabs come into such daily contact with the Jews) on a daily basis, it is difficult for him not to be pushed toward the sources of his own "negative feelings." Today in Israel there is not one party which is working daily in an effort to gain influence among the Arab citizens. The Labor Party published a single edition of a shameful pamphlet during the 3 years of its sitting in the opposition (and its content consisted mainly of expressions of sorrow over the death of Yigal Allon, of blessed memory). MAPAM publishes a ludicrous monthly bulletin which apparently is distributed to many Arab members of the party who have stopped working openly, at least, since MAPAM joined the Alignment. MK Amnon Linn of the Likud, who displays consistency in his views on the Arabs of Israel, has been unsuccessful in converting them into a heritage of his party. Even when he was a member of MAPAI, he advocated, as he does today, a carrot and stick policy. However, for his "carrot", he offers the image of a "Committee for Economic Planning in Arab Villages," and it has not been established. As of recent days, the Likud government has not held not even one session for the purpose of setting a policy on the Arab citizens.

The exception is RAKAH. This binational party in recent years has become a generally Arab party in terms of members and leadership. It employs many people in one task: To feed the feelings of discrimination and estrangement and to stimulate feelings of identity with the Soviet Union and those it likes whether they are Arabs or others (the PLO, Iran, Libya, Cuba, and so forth). It is clear that in these conditions, the RAKAH has managed to collect all the medals, and it is running alone on the track.

However, the RAKAH leadership itself has not been satisfied with this success. They have heard the hollow echo of the voices of protest and censure heard throughout the world. They have limited the use of their name, the Communist Party. They have therefore decided to give this voice a more authentic sound by establishing an organization called the "Representative of the Arab National Minority in Israel," which will actually function as their puppet theatre. The fact that they openly dominate about one-half of the Arab local authorities (or by supporting a non-party candidate who needs their votes) has given them the license for the new start. This time they hope to learn from the experience of the Popular Front of the fall 1958 which failed after a split between the Communists and the Nasirist-Nationalists who established the Al Ard movement. This time they have tried to select for themselves members of the preparatory committee from among the members of RAKAH and non-party persons who are not known to be identified with independent or extremist-nationalist circles--and it is over this background that there has hovered the danger of a split over the Conference of the Arab Population before it is arranged. However, here is where the sleeping government awoke and came to the aid of the RAKAH. The Shefaram Conference, which did not attract more than 150 people from the entire country (including about 50 Communists from Shefaram itself!) was arranged 3 months after RAKAH launched the new initiative with much fanfare but which did not elicit a public response. Since the Shefaram Conference, where there was not a single sentence which had not been published in the RAKAH newspapers hundreds of times in the

last 5 years, the "spokesman" [and] the official "circles" have disclosed the "dangerous plot" and have hinted that the government intends to take action to prevent the conference.

This reaction has created pressures for "closing the Arab ranks" against the "government's attempt to erode their political rights," as stated by Dr Emil Tuma, the secretary of the preparatory committee. An extremely simple equation has thus been created: The "heroes" will come to the Nazerat Conference and the "fearful ones" will find excuses not to come. On this there is an Arab saying: (the government) remained silent for a long time, and when it spoke, it uttered heresy! The government and the main opposition who remained silent for an entire generation awoke in order to give reason to the RAKAH's achievements and justification and resonance to the planned congress. Since the circulation of the reports about the government's intention to prohibit the arranging of the congress, Nazerat has been filled with foreign reporters who want background material. Three international press institutions have appealed to me personally and requested details.

5830

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## POSSIBILITY OF WEIZMAN-DAYAN LIST IN COMING ELECTIONS ANALYZED

Tel Aviv YEDIOT AHARONOT in Hebrew 28 Nov 80, Supplement pp 1, 18

[Article by Yeshayahu Ben-Porat: "A New Political Map: Prospects and Limitations"]

[Text] Syria puts on a show of force and deploys a 20,000-man armored division with several hundred tanks along its border with Jordan. In 'Amman King Husayn hosts a summit conference of 15 Arab countries. In the Persian Gulf the war still continues, and Iraq, contrary to projections, has not yet managed to defeat Iran. Oil prices are rising, and the severe energy crisis threatens the economic and social stability of the West. A new president-elect, whose political objectives in general and intentions in the Middle East in particular are still unknown, has been thrust to the threshold of the White House.

As for us, however, upon reading the headlines and hearing the news, all this is happening not on Earth or in our immediate vicinity but on another planet. In the fool's paradise in which we are living, a conspicuous precedence has been given to two internal events which have occupied us all of this week, that is: The ejection of Ezer Weizman from the ranks of Herut and the question of his political future and the election of delegates to the Labor convention against the background of an intensification of the personal struggle between Messrs Rabin and Peres while 22 lines of print in a popular French weekly cause a kind of frenzy of alignments in the party before the opening of the polls.

However, let there be no mistake here. The presentation of the internal events, which in themselves are not lacking in color and tension, against the background of an arbitrary cross section of events occurring simultaneously in the general arena, is not designed to detract from their importance or to denigrate the personalities and subjects which so occupy us. The purpose of this presentation is only to give our events an appropriate proportion within the framework of the more general, and immeasurably more serious, political reality. This presentation is required also and mainly because ultimately we have no alternative precisely this weekend but to consider the significance of the aforementioned events and their possible implications for the near future.

### The Righteous and Sincere "Fighter"

In which of the two aforementioned events--the ejection of Weizman from Herut and the struggle between Rabin and Peres--can be found the bud which is likely, as the days go on, to tear up the existing political statistics and plant a new political map?

Only one who is able to assume that Yitzhaq Rabin, if he is defeated at the convention, is likely to leave the Labor camp in order to establish a new list or to join another political structure, will open the discussion of the prospects and limitations of a new map in the Rabin-Peres struggle. However, the assumption of Rabin's departure, even if he is defeated at the convention by a larger percentage than his loss in the elections conducted this week, is unreasonable. In any case, and certainly if he wins, as can be estimated now, about one-third of the votes of the convention delegates, Yitzhaq Rabin will remain loyal to his camp which is firmly implanted in the Labor landscape. It is fitting, therefore, to consider as a first priority the prospects and limitations of Ezer Weizman in whom can be found the key, if at all, to a possible change in our political map.

This week there were those who conjectured that Ezer's actions were planned from the beginning and that his no-confidence vote one week ago was purposely designed to mark the beginning of a process which would bring about his ejection from Herut in order to facilitate his implementation of the option to set up an independent list in the coming elections.

As one who has had conversations with Mr Weizman several times, both for background purposes and for publication, I cannot avoid the impression that this time also, as at previous times, Ezer was relying on intuition alone and had not planned his actions as one block. Those who mock and criticize him frequently speak about "shooting from the hip," and there is some truth to this. However, there is no need to mention that more professional shooters than he, such as Ronald Reagan, have shown that they are able to go far. It is sufficient if we translate "shooting" in its more simple and human terms and say that the outstanding characteristic which significantly distinguishes him from most of the politicians is his impulsive sincerity--in order to indicate that Ezer Weizman remains, despite his weaknesses, one of the most popular personalities, especially among the youth. With the image of the rough and righteous sabra "fighter" who has no trace of the traditional cunning politician, and because of the fact that he has struggled for peace no less than he fought the enemy in his time, it seems that Weizman surpasses both Shimon Peres and Yitzhaq Rabin in the minds of the youth.

#### Bet on the Entire Pot

Moreover, in a cautious and enlightening analysis, Prof Shevah Weiss already indicated this week (See YEDIOT AHARONOT, 25 November 1980) that "in Israel there still exists a very large number of potential voters who at the time of test and on the day of judgment of the ballot box are likely to channel their frustration from the existing party establishment and from its leadership to the support of a new political force headed by a different leadership." This refers, of course, to the group of those who have abstained from picking a position, which comprises between 30 and 40 percent of the total number of interviewees in most of the public opinion polls, including the polls conducted on behalf of YEDIOT AHARONOT. One can assume, although it is an arbitrary assumption which is not supported by a statistical study in an area, that the group of abstentions includes a number of former DMC voters and perhaps also some of the youth who are falling in behind Peace Now and who have not yet found a party haven responsive to their aspirations.

However, It is not only the votes of the DMC voters in 1977 and some of the Peace Now votes which are now in the category of "floating" or "mobile" votes. In light of the

deficiencies of the government in the political and economic areas and the disappointment with the shaky leadership of Menahem Begin, many Likud voters are searching for a new voting channel. It is almost certain that they will not go so far as to give their votes to the Alignment. However, a list established on the initiative of Ezer Weizman is likely to gain their sympathy in certain conditions.

No one besides Ezer Weizman knows if he really intends to exploit the aforementioned electoral conjuncture in order to establish a new list. Moreover, I believe that Ezer himself has not yet made a decision. One thing is already clear: Ezer's sincerity and impulsiveness, although they are positive characteristics, are insufficient in themselves to serve as a basis for a new list when even those who appreciate Ezer because of these characteristics are well aware of the vexing fact that he is too eager to bet time after time on the "entire pot." There are times, and who is unaware of this in light of Carter's defeat and Reagan's victory, that Ezer stands before the public, "with his pants down." In politics this is no longer called a bet but rather irresponsibility.

#### Respectable Access

The political conclusion is clear, and I have the impression that Ezer himself agrees: his list will rise and fall to the extent that he will succeed or fail in the attempt to enlist to his side a large group of "sure" names whether they be names of men of integrity, with a clean public record and a wealth of experience in doing or creating or names of "new" men, young men to the extent possible. Even this is not enough. If and when Ezer forms such a list, he will have to obtain the agreement of Moshe Dayan to head it. This was not absolutely necessary as long as Ezer himself did not publicly mention Dayan's name. However, since he cast this name into the arena, as one whom he considers to be a candidate for prime minister, Ezer is likely to find himself in a situation of one who has torpedoed his plan with his own hands if he does not obtain Dayan's agreement. The fact is that Weizman spoke about Dayan before he had finalized the matter with Dayan. This does not mean that Dayan is determined not to join such a list under any circumstances if and when it is established. It can be said, however, with a great degree of certainty that Dayan is still far from saying "yes" to Weizman. The political community in Israel has its own "polls" which are not based on studies of public opinion institutes. In the "polls" of this community which meets two or three times a week in the Knesset cafeteria and on the weekend in a well-known restaurant in Tel Aviv, they "give" a list headed by Dayan and Weizman between 12 and 15 seats. This projection is also accepted by astute observers in Labor. It is an estimate which does not give Dayan and Ezer the prospect for forming the next government, however it does assure them more than respectable access to the next government headed by the Alignment. Ezer, in these conditions, can demand for himself the defense portfolio, advisor on Palestinian affairs. The Alignment, however, will be able to free itself from its historical dependence on the NRP. It does not say that the NRP will not be invited to participate in the government in which, according to this projection, both Weizman and Dayan will be serving alongside Peres and his leadership team.

Is this a castle in the air for one who has become disgusted with the Likud and who hesitates to give the Alignment an absolute majority? However, public opinion and feeling indicate that this can absolutely be the dream of many who would willingly give their vote on the day of judgment to the aforementioned political entity, which has the prospect of changing the existing political map. It is still too early,

however, to bet if such an entity will indeed be established. Who knows better than Ezer Weizman that it is a hazardous bet?

#### To Persuade the Abstainers

In contrast to all this, in Labor there is nothing new. Whether he won 70 percent as his supporters maintain or whether he won "only" 60 percent as the Rabin camp maintains, Party Chairman Shimon Peres won in the elections to the convention, and Yitzhaq Rabin's candidacy no longer jeopardizes his position. We will henceforth almost certainly witness two opposite processes. On the one hand, there will be a process which is customary in every political battle after a clearcut decision between a majority and a minority. A certain percentage of the minority camp's supporters of yesterday will try to ensure the continuation of its political existence and its acquisition of any key positions by joining the majority. This is a natural process which is likely to reduce even more the percentage of votes which were given this week to Rabin and to strengthen the majority which was given to Peres. On the other hand, the two camps will make a vigorous effort, which will continue until the final and conclusive decision at the convention, to influence and attract to their side the group of abstainers who have not yet made a decision as to whom to support. The percentage of abstainers is unknown. It possibly fluctuates between 10 and 20 percent, however it certainly exists contrary to the statements of spokesmen of both sides who, in their enthusiasm, collected in the overall summation more than 100 percent of the votes. In contrast to what has occurred in recent weeks, we will then be witness to a struggle no longer in all the branches throughout the country but rather among the "uncommitted" segment of the convention delegates. The moment of truth is still to come. The crucial time is the day after the opening of the convention on 18 December when the convention with its 3,001 delegates seeks to finally choose between Peres and Rabin.

In light of the results of the elections in the branches, it is again impossible to accuse of sympathetic tendentiousness anyone who has been claiming for months that the party will select as its candidate for prime minister not former Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin but rather Party Chairman Shimon Peres. Indeed, today in light of the results of the elections, no one, including Yitzhaq Rabin, is disputing the fact that Peres won, to speak conservatively, by more than 50 percent of the votes. This means that a majority of the party sees him and wants him as the next prime minister. The convention in 3 weeks will certainly complete the process.

The Rabin camp's objective in the struggle which will now be conducted and which will focus, as was stated, on the group of convention delegates will be to ensure the highest possible minority while the Peres camp will do everything possible to reduce the size of the opposing camp to an absolute minimum. In this regard there is considerable importance to every percent above or below the "break threshold" of 25 percent. The closer the Rabin camp comes to one-third or surpasses it, the stronger will be its demand for full integration in the future political leadership. The more it is below this threshold, the easier it will be for Peres and his supporters to disregard the demands of the minority.

The struggle will continue to be bitter, and perhaps even vicious. No one knows where and when these 22 lines or others will appear, in this weekly or another, in Israel or abroad. The L'EXPRESS case which so clouded the atmosphere this week is definitely likely to be repeated in another edition. The confrontation between Rabin



and Peres since the appearance of the former prime minister's book has taken on a personal form which is no different than a political-ideological struggle. The hostility between these two men cannot be bridged in spite of all the efforts which have already been made and which will surely continue to be made before the convention. Those who are involved in these efforts have apparently not reconciled themselves to the known fact that politics is the art of the possible. Mending the personal tear between Rabin and Peres is in the category of the impossible, even if wisdom whispers to us that wise men have already said that in politics one never says "never." Therefore, just as it is premature, as has been said, to bet on the establishment of a Dayan-Ezer list, it is also inappropriate to bet on the end of the political career of Yitzhaq Rabin, even if and when Shimon Peres is elected, as is expected, as Labor's candidate for prime minister.

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SA'IB SALAM SPEAKS OUT ON INTERESTS OF LEBANON

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 27 Dec 80 pp 8-12

[Interview with Sa'ib Salam by Ghassan Bayram: "Sa'ib Salam Tells AL-MUSTAQBAL, 'We, Not Those Who Are Carrying Weapons, Are the Ones Who Represent the Wishes of the Lebanese' "]

[Text] The leaders produced by the war are spurious leaders who will not last.

The future formula for Lebanon cannot come to light under current Arab and international circumstances, but preparations must be made for it.

We are prepared to discuss the federal formula and any other formula as well.

Ilyas Sarkis assumes the responsibility for the deterioration of the Lebanese situation.

He failed to acquaint the world with the Lebanese question.

Pierre al-Jumayyil and the likes of his party who carry weapons are not qualified to solve the Lebanese question.

Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam is one of the prominent Islamic political leaders whose political and patriotic role, or a major portion of it, was hampered by the Lebanese events which broke out early in 1975.

Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, along with a few of these Lebanese leaders, is still insisting on trying to hang on to his role. He is refusing to accept some of the variables produced by the Lebanese war which led to the emergence of new active leaders by virtue of the military role they did play and are still playing in the Lebanese crisis.

It may be that the fact that the power of this political class, to which Prime Minister Salam belongs, to assume the initiative was taken away and the fact that their political role, which lacks the force of weapons, was demolished were due to the refusal of this class from the outset to take part in the war game and to be dragged into carrying weapons and forming militias. If a special place is being kept on the Lebanese scene for those leaders whose names have been tied with the name of Lebanon for

half or a quarter of a century, this is due to the fact that those leaders are still deriving their presence from a political history [they forged] and from the popular base they used to represent, notwithstanding the present loyalty of this popular base. In addition, there are sectarian Lebanese equations that are still lending some glow to these leaders. It is this that is making them persist in the belief that they will survive politically when Lebanon regains its health and its natural circumstances. This is because the leaders that were produced by the Lebanese war are circumstantial or spurious leaders, according to Prime Minister Salam in his interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL here.

It is a fact that different political currents are still fighting over the future of Lebanon--between restoring Lebanon to the course of Islamic-Christian coexistence that existed before the war and pushing this future towards different new horizons. The fact that this crucial dispute has not come to an end is keeping the future political role of these leaders uncertain, sometimes waning and sometimes waxing. The future of these leaders is thus tied to the future of Lebanon: [heading the list] are Sa'ib Salam, Kamil al-As'ad, Rashid Karami, Camille Sham'un, Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh; and [ending the list] are the lowest ranking commanders of Lebanese policy.

When the state decided to introduce the method of having Lebanese leaders debate each other on television for the purpose of making preparations for an official dialogue around the future formula of Lebanon, the first one chosen was the Muslim leader, Sa'ib Salam. He was to debate on television the Maronite leader and chairman of the Phalangist party al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. Sa'ib Salam was chosen not because he could convey in practical terms the wishes of the Muslims at this stage, but rather because he was an Islamic symbol of Lebanon's formula and coexistence since independence and until the eve of 1975.

When al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil told Prime Minister Salam during their television debate, "You do not represent the Islamic mainstream now," he intended to provoke the Islamic leader who has been known for his firm positions, opinions and for the fact that he represents the "Islamic mainstream" and especially the "Beirut mainstream." Al-Jumayyil made that statement to embarrass and distract Salam and to force him to proclaim a position opposed to those currents that are currently active in the Islamic mainstream. At present these currents are being rejected by the Christians.

In the profusion of this mystery that is still surrounding the future of Lebanon, the limelight is being focused now on serious attempts to achieve an inter-Lebanese understanding quite apart from all the outside movements that are tampering with the future of Lebanon.

At the outset of this interview with Prime Minister Salam we asked him the following question.

[Question] It is now known that with regard to a coexistence formula and selecting the appropriate system the future of Lebanon is now tied to specific international, Arab and Lebanese conditions and climates of opinion. Have these circumstances become fully developed and prepared so as to permit an inquiry into a future formula for Lebanon? If not, what is the reason for the different political activities which are assuming a serious nature this time more than any other time in the past?

[Answer] Proposing something is one thing, and having a new formula for Lebanon confirmed is another.

However, Sa'ib Bey soon deliberately digressed from the question for the purpose of explaining the ambiguity between what is called the National Pact and what is called the formula of the Lebanese system. He said [the following]:

Certain things that have been generated seem to say that what is called the National Pact has been eliminated and brought to an end because of this war, this crisis. This situation makes it necessary to make a distinction between what is called the National Pact and what is called the formula. In my view the National Pact is synonymous with the free and independent state of Lebanon with its sovereignty and unity--no more and no less. This means that in 1943 matters had reached the point when the Muslim, who used to deny [the existence] of Lebanon and to consider it a part of Syria, agreed to become part of the independent, sovereign state of Lebanon. Likewise, the Christian faction, which used to ask for foreign protection and insist on the mandate, agreed to give up all that and to accept the sovereign, independent state of Lebanon.

The flaws that have been attributed to the National Pact, either in the original existing formula or in later practice, have nothing to do with the National Pact. The National Pact then is the survival or the dissolution of the sovereign, free, independent state of Lebanon. I am convinced and I do believe that based on this realistic understanding, the painful events that occurred, whose complications we are still experiencing, have furthered and firmly established among all the Lebanese a faith in the National Pact. This is because whether he is a Christian or a Muslim the Lebanese citizen has never felt as strongly as he feels today about a sovereign and an independent state of Lebanon. This is the opposite of what is being said that this war has brought down the pact.

With regard to the formula, the National Pact did not invent the 1943 formula as some people think who believe that the distribution of the leadership positions in Lebanon with the president being a Maronite; the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'ite Muslim is part of the pact. This is a mistake because this distribution did exist almost before independence and before the National Pact; it existed during the days of the French mandate. This mandate began with the first president who was an orthodox Christian. He



was succeeded by Maronite presidents. After Maronites held the position of prime minister early in the age of the mandate, they were succeeded by six [Muslim] prime ministers, the first of whom was Khayri al-Ahdab (1936) during the days of the mandate. They included 'Abdallah al-Yafi, al-Amir Khalid Shihab, Ahmad al-Da'uq, Sami al-Sulh and 'Abdallah Bayham. This [division] then is not part of the pact, and the present constitution was not written by the men of the pact. We did not draft a constitution in 1943, and we did not write a new constitution. All that we did in 1943 after the two factions agreed that Lebanon was to be independent and sovereign was that we removed from the constitution the articles of the mandate. Everything else remained as it was.

An accurate explanation then is necessary. The National Pact will either exist, and Lebanon will thereby become a sovereign, independent state, or it will cease to exist. Today, I most certainly feel that the vast majority of the Lebanese--Muslims and Christians--are determined and have no reservations about staying on in the sovereign, free [and] independent state of Lebanon, and, accordingly, they are determined about the survival of the pact.

I wanted to make this clear so I can say, after this they keep harping on the formula! What constitutional formula in the world remains permanently without change?

In none of the countries does a political constitutional formula remain unchanged. All these formulas change according to circumstances and in the light of experiences. I have been advocating the replacement of the formula for a long time. I began doing this in lectures I gave in 1954. I would sometimes suggest the establishment of a constituent body to draft a new constitution that would be consistent with the spirit and the requirements of the age. Sometimes I would propose a specific formula such as the one I proposed in 1970--the text of that formula is elsewhere. Today, I am still proposing this formula to show people that there is a formula. Although I do not insist upon it, it is because I too refuse to have anyone force a formula on us.

There are those, for example, who are calling for a federation or a confederation. I said that I am not like others rejecting this formula in advance. Instead, I advocated that it be presented so that we can look into it and discuss it to see whether or not it was in our interest and whether or not it was beneficial. A person must be receptive to every formula that is presented. Ultimately, the objective of those formulas is to avert danger or to realize a request that is being made in present-day Lebanon.

Present-day Lebanon will either exist on the understanding between a large Islamic faction and a large Christian faction or it will not exist. This is contingent on each one of the factions understanding the other. The Muslim is to understand that the Christian suffers from an old paranoia that developed through an ancient history; he is to try to

understand its reasons and to treat it. The Christian is to understand that the Muslim developed a psychological complex during the stage that followed independence. This complex is sometimes called deprivation and other times, the control of one faction by another and the futile loss of dignity and advantage.

Our first and foremost objective is to come to an understanding about the survival and continuation of Lebanon. It is here that the responsibility of the leadership comes [into play]. Unfortunately, we have been plagued with leaders from here and there who lean towards aggravating the Christians' complex to achieve a foolhardy gain and to frighten the Muslims further. The Muslims have similar leaders who prod them to achieve a cheap gain. Honest leaders have to understand all this, and they have to view this painful reality clearly and to bring about the understanding that is being sought and that will disregard all the spurious leaders and commanders who rely today on a gun or on a weapon from here or from there.

And here we come to the question that you referred to at the beginning of our interview--the question about the international, Arab and Lebanese circumstances that have to be available so that an understanding on a future formula for Lebanon can be achieved. I am saying that this is true because an understanding requires Arab, international and Lebanese circumstances and climates of opinion other than those that prevail today. No future formula can see the light [of day] under those conditions that are prevailing today.

[Question] What I want to get to here is the fact that there are Arab and international conditions that are still hampering some national wishes that are relied upon to. . . .

[Answer] Yes, yes! these conditions are rather hampering the vast majority of the national wishes.

[Question] When you say that the vast majority of Christians and Muslims are clinging to the pact, others respond by saying that it is no longer possible to rely on that statement because the people do not have the means for making such a selection or decision through elections [or other methods]. This led us to conclude that as long as these means are unavailable, new factors have emerged, and these must be relied upon. Hence, foreign conditions are playing their role in determining the future of Lebanon.

[Answer] This is true. And hence unfortunately, it may be said that today what the vast majority of the Lebanese people are asking for cannot be achieved.

[Question] Then how can we in the midst of this turmoil reach the point of proposing a new formula or a new system for Lebanon?

[Answer] This is not turmoil; this is preparing the environment. One prepares the environment these days so that one can achieve what one desires later. But we may not forbear declaring our opinion openly in front of people about the possibility of achieving formulas so that obstacles may not be placed in front of people stating that no formula can save Lebanon from its fall. The National Pact is dead and buried, and we are now looking forward to something else. To what?

People must believe that there is an answer to that question.

[Question] This means that it is not possible for me and other people like me to separate the spirit of the pact from the formula of the system on the basis of the fact that the pact, which is that understanding, led to the continuation, or rather the crystallization, of what used to be the formula. Today, there are those who believe that Lebanon's future is uncertain, whereas others believe that Lebanon is facing its destiny.

[Answer] Exactly! This is true. Lebanon is facing its destiny in the sense that Lebanon will either exist or cease to exist.

[Question] Is the pact then threatened by storms?

[Answer] This is true. But who is being threatened by the storms? It is Lebanon that is being threatened by storms. Let us then be specific, and I am always inclined to be specific. You agree with me then that Lebanon is being threatened by storms; but [are we talking about] Lebanon with its mountains, its valleys and its rocks, or are we talking about the people of Lebanon?

[Question] [We are talking about] the people of Lebanon and about the political and geographic status of Lebanon.

[Answer] The people of Lebanon--the community of Lebanon--are comprised in this geography. This political Lebanese substance which I call the National Pact, or the National Pact which I call Lebanon, is in my book the desire of the vast majority of the Lebanese. I will never change my opinion until I have other evidence. I live with the people: I live with the Muslims just as I live with the Christians, and I know the feelings of the two factions. The vast majority of the two factions want Lebanon to continue. Then the fact that "Lebanon is being threatened by storms" is something that is against the wishes of all of them.

[Question] Unfortunately, however, and with all due respect to your efforts and your positions, no national leaders have emerged to give shape to this inclination that the majority have, to express this faith that people have and [to convey] those wishes of the majority.

[Answer] The reason for this is very obvious. Lebanon today is a fallen [state], and it is the object of various conflicting currents from numerous directions. The will of the vast majority [of the people] is

paralyzed. The person who is taking action on the scene is the person who is carrying weapons and who is forcing himself [on the scene] with his weapons. No deterrent has been found for him to date. This does not mean that this night is endless. This is a dark night which we are experiencing, but I will never concede that it is interminable. This [dark] night must come to an end. You did speak at the outset about changes in the Lebanese, Arab and international climates of opinion; turn this statement around and say [this night will end] when the international, Arab and Lebanese climates of opinion change.

[Question] But the time factor is on the side of those commands and leaderships that you said were founded on the gun!

[Answer] Sometimes time is on their side, and sometimes it is not. Take me, for example. Ever since the onset of the crisis I have been saying that violence will not settle a case in Lebanon. I used to say this and to proclaim it out of conviction and an accurate appreciation of reality. Perhaps many people did not believe that; after carrying weapons many people believed that they would settle the difficulties and solve the problems in Lebanon with weapons. Violence does not settle a case in Lebanon. It may do so in other places, but in Lebanon violence does not settle a case.

Do you realize that today more and more Lebanese are becoming more and more aware of the fact that violence does not settle a case? It is true that the price [for that realization] has been very high: innocent lives were lost; there was devastation and destruction; institutions were paralyzed; and there is the existing chaos. But today isn't the conviction stronger and growing that weapons will not settle a case in Lebanon? The armed men then are not the ones who are qualified to settle the case. You ask me how they can be removed! The consciousness of the people will have a major effect on this matter. Has the unarmed man become conscious of the fact that he can confront the armed man regardless of his objective? Ultimately, he will. But it is true that under the present circumstances this has not happened because the environment has not been prepared for that. How can the environment be prepared? Above all else, there are Arab factors and then there are international factors.

[Question] Unfortunately, reliance on Arab conditions is a losing proposition!

[Answer] It is a losing proposition under these conditions, and it will be a losing proposition under every condition.

[Question] In every period we see the Arab situation deteriorating and proceeding towards further fragmentation.

[Answer] Would it then be proper to say that Lebanon has been annihilated and that all the Arabs have been annihilated?



[Question] If there are international plans that seek to tear down Arab wishes, everything becomes reasonable as long as the results appear in front of us successively.

[Answer] The Lebanese [citizen] who is a true believer and whose patriotism is genuine can never accept that. I claim to be one of those.

[Question] This means that we see faith as one thing and what is actually happening on the land another.

[Answer] Is the answer to that [situation] to turn our hands to the heavens and to say we give up?

[Question] Of course not. But we should rather resist to a certain extent with the same vehemence the plans and the conspiracies to which we are subjected.

[Answer] I am claiming that after the recent television interview between me and al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil I felt that many people, if not a vast majority of the Lebanese, shared my feeling that there was still hope for making Lebanon [the country] for which we are aspiring. Today, this majority is helpless.

[Question] Speaking of the television debate between you and al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, we noticed that al-Shaykh Pierre addressed you in a defiant tone when he told you that you, "Sa'ib Salam did not represent anything in the Islamic mainstream today." I believe that he was not only referring to Sa'ib Salam, but that he was also referring to you and to other political leaders who have been representing Muslims for 30 years. Does this mean that you no longer have the power to make an Islamic decision and that that power has shifted to those leaders who became leaders through the war?

[Answer] He means--and I always like to be specific--he and others like him mean that an unarmed person does not represent [anyone] today. The person who represents [someone] is one who is armed like him and his party. I simply deny this, and I say: In my opinion the person who represents the major popular wishes in Lebanon today and expresses what the broad masses of the people of Lebanon hope for must not give up and die. In my book, the person who has no constituency today is the armed man. If he did have a constituency in the past, he is now an anachronism because now the people are finding out that the vast majority--if not all of those who did or are now carrying arms--carried those weapons and are carrying them for personal objectives [that vary] from establishing a political position to material and financial theft.

[Question] But this leads us to conclude that the day may come when the armed man, if the present situation continues, may finally soon be able to steal your role from you, the politicians, and to make a decisive statement on Lebanon's new formula!

[Answer] I do not accept that. I am saying that no matter how [forcefully] the armed man imposes his wishes [on others], he cannot take away from the Lebanese people the faith they have in their hearts. I truly believe that the faith the Lebanese people have in their country today manifests itself in the devotion they have for it now more than any time in the past; [this includes] the vast majority of Muslims and Christians. If the armed man is capable of taking away from the Lebanese the faith they have--and nothing in this world is impossible--I am saying, however, that I do not believe it [could happen]. I would like you to go back to the draft formula that I proposed 10 years ago because it has all the details.

[Question] Do you believe that your plan can be implemented and that it could constitute a solution at the present stage?

[Answer] I definitely believe that. I am not forcing it on anybody. Today, no one has the right to come up with a formula and to say that he alone is adhering to it. Thus, when I proposed this formula, I found considerable agreement with it: our fellow Christians agreed with it just as much as Muslims agreed with it.

[Question] That was in 1970!

[Answer] This is today, today among those who are unarmed. You would be surprised at the large number representing a majority of Christians and a majority of Muslims who are in agreement with this formula.

Nevertheless, I am not saying that it should be imposed. The time for putting this formula into application is not today. There is a difference between proposing a formula and putting it into application. I am saying that today is not the time for putting it into application. I proposed it to see how it will be received by people and to give people an idea that there is considerable room for reasonable formulas. The positive climates that came were cathartic and soothing. This will be of some importance if an inquiry into reasonable formulas becomes possible one of these days.

[Question] Do you then believe that any formula that is produced by the armed leaders will not thrive and will not live long?

[Answer] I definitely believe that, because weapons do not solve anything. That is, when we say that violence does not settle the question of Lebanon, and violence relies on weapons, this means that weapons use violence to force their wishes [on others]. When we reject this, our rejection means that the opinion would belong to those other than the armed men who utilize violent means.

[Question] But, Sa'ib Rey, the gun has changed many regimes; it has overthrown many thrones; and it has imposed new rulers and regimes that are still existing and surviving!

[Answer] I admit that; and I would be the first one to admit it. This happens everywhere, but not in Lebanon. This has been my standing for a long time--ever since the days of President Fu'ad Shihab who used to say that if there were a staff sergeant who wanted to carry out a coup, "Why don't I, the army commander, carry it out?" I used to tell him, "Not you, not the staff sergeant and not anyone in Lebanon can carry out a military coup." The makeup and the status of Lebanon will not yield to a military, non-military or any other dictatorship. Weapons may for a period of time be effective and play a role, but in Lebanon this will not last. Why did Lebanon come into existence? Lebanon came into existence to appease two factions. I reject [the notion] that there could some day be a dictatorship in Lebanon because dictatorship means imposing [something] by force. As long as violence does not settle a question, neither will a dictatorship.

I also reject [the notion] that Lebanon will be occupied. The French occupied Lebanon for 25 years. Who used to say that the French would leave? Some people used to come to us when we were fighting against the French, and we were unarmed; reasonable people used to tell us, "What are you doing? A hole cannot resist an awl! Look at the barracks! Look at the armies! Look at the tanks! Look at the airplanes! Look at this might upon which the French occupation is based!" Despite that, the French occupation did go away. I do not believe that any of the armed men today is stronger than France was during the days of its glory.

[Question] Then, Your Excellency, Mr Prime Minister, we come to the fact that there are many justifications for the fact that the president did not initiate dialogue and agreement and did not impose solutions. As long as you are saying that international, Arab and Lebanese circumstances are not yet fully developed while here we have armed men trying to impose their wishes, the president then is also incapable of taking action under these circumstances. Nor is he capable of taking action under the auspices of the illegal gun that wants to impose its wishes!

[Answer] No. Please allow me to make a complete distinction between my position and that of the president. The president is saying that he cannot bring about agreement, and I too am saying that I cannot make an agreement today or tomorrow. But I am saying that it is necessary to make preparations for an agreement. The president is procrastinating in reaching an agreement: he does not take a position. His prime minister had proposed a slogan in which he said that the government had a weapon that was more powerful than any other. That weapon is a firm position. The president has never taken a firm position.

No, I beg your pardon. There is a big difference between the position I am advocating and the position of the president. I and people like me who advocate having a good outcome in Lebanon are saying that we are working constantly [for this outcome] regardless of the strength of the currents that oppose it. But the president takes no action: he does not feel that he has a Lebanese cause on his hands, nor does he feel that he

has the duty to take action on this cause. Look at our brothers who have causes [to champion] and how they travel from one country to another: from the United Nations to Moscow, Washington, Europe and to the European community and other countries. Look at Abu 'Ammar, for example, and how he travels from one place to another, championing his cause. It is true that the Palestinian question is our question; but it is primarily that of Abu 'Ammar. He is the one who is responsible for it; he carries it on his shoulders; he carries it in his heart; he carries it night and day and travels around the world championing it.

All that we were asking of the president was first, to feel that he had a cause and, second, to feel that he had the primary responsibility for it. Third, we were asking that he feel the necessity of taking action for that cause. Unfortunately, he had none of those feelings. This is the president's responsibility. I, therefore, beg you not to confuse what I am advocating with the president's position.

[Question] Your excellency, Mr Prime Minister, we cannot but say that the president did make an effort with Arab leaders, collectively and separately. Each one of them told him glowing statements and gave him promises, then he forgot [what he had said] and did the opposite of what he had promised. Some of those leaders completely ignored [the situation]. We cannot say that the president did not strive to reach an agreement, either through his conciliatory deliberations or through crystallizing and proclaiming a few uncontested conciliatory points about which we all agree. We cannot say that the president did not exert pressure in more than one direction to organize a national conciliation government. You know the circumstances that made him unsuccessful in that effort. It was because of these circumstances that the president reached the stage of trying with difficulty to form an ordinary government, and it was difficult to get it going.

[Answer] Of course, of course because he had reached such a stage of weak resolve that made it impossible for him to take any action. There are many reasons for that. Let me give you the details of those reasons now and tell you [a little] about their background, which I do not wish to delve into now. Despite that, he has not yet acted properly. But you are telling me how he wanted to take action! This is posturing. He has not taken a single position to implement the Shatturah agreement ever since he signed it with our Palestinian brothers. Then came the meetings at Riyadh and Cairo. The Arabs then met and decided unanimously to support him. Never has the Arab League--not for 30 years--taken a unanimous position such as the one it took to support Ilyas Sarkis and to place the deterrent forces at his disposal.

[Question] But when he gave the order for implementation, no one responded to him!

[Answer] Did he say that? When? He would whisper things like that to you in a room. President al-Asad stood up repeatedly and said in his official



capacity and responsibility that the Syrian army in Lebanon was an Arab force under the command of President Ilyas Sarkis. Did President Sarkis ever stand up and say that these forces were not under his command?

Second, when the Arabs got together after lengthy rounds and met at the Bayt al-Din Conference, they endorsed the Lebanese working paper for which Ilyas Sarkis and his government were responsible, and President Sarkis came out of the conference saying that what the conference had endorsed were recommendations and not resolutions. Why did he not implement these resolutions? With whom did he come into conflict? He may not have a conflict with someone and not tell people about it because if he had proclaimed such a conflict, people would have supported him and he would have been stronger. We asked him to go to the United Nations. There is a big difference between having an ambassador at the United Nations like Mr Ghassan al-Tawini, whom we appreciate and whose efficiency we respect, and having the head of a state carry out this activity of presenting his country's cause and telling [the international forum], "I have a cause; come and find out about it." Why doesn't he go to Moscow? King Husayn goes to Moscow repeatedly just as he goes to Washington, Geneva, London and Paris to champion his cause. King Husayn's cause is not more important than that of Lebanon. President Sarkis went to the Tunisia Conference. His foreign minister then took a [certain] position in Tunisia, and then President Sarkis went to the summit conference that followed the conference for ministers of foreign affairs and changed that position. Why did he not stick to his basic position which his minister Fu'ad Butrus took? The excuse that our fellow Arabs are not in agreement with that position is unacceptable. His position is to be based on the facts in his country and should be related to the innermost substance of Lebanon for which he is responsible and where he must stand. Whether our fellow Arabs stand with him or not is their business. For too long some Arab officials have told us, "Let your president take a position so we can stand with him. Why do you ask us to stand with him at summit conferences and at other conferences when he does not take a firm position? First, let the interested party, the one with the cause, take a position and then the others will stand with him." How can we ask the Arabs to do something for Lebanon when we are doing nothing for it? This is not logical.

[Question] But this method in political action would antagonize all Arabs and non-Arabs and will ultimately turn everyone into an enemy!

[Answer] No. He was being asked to ask for the friendship of all people and to ask for the support of all people on the basis of that friendship. He is being asked to see the interests of Lebanon above everything else.

8592

CSO: 4802

NEW GOVERNMENT SYSTEM PROPOSED BY SALAM

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 27 Dec 80 p 12

[Article: "The Presidential Council System Proposed by Salam: a Presidential Council of Six Members Representing Six Sects; Members Take Turns at 1-Year Term To Chair the Council"]

[Text] On 22 May 1970 Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam delivered a lecture at the Institute of Law of Jesuit University in which he proposed a new formula for a system of government in Lebanon that would be based in principle on forming a six-member presidential council that would be elected every 6 years. The new formula is also based on a new elections system that would strengthen the parliamentary democratic system in Lebanon.

Along with what is being said these days about a new formula for the system of government in Lebanon that would achieve coexistence among the Lebanese, Prime Minister Salam has proposed this formula again, advocating that it be discussed along with the remaining new formulas that are being proposed or that will be proposed.

With regard to the desired reform in the base of the pyramid of our political system, which is related to parliamentary representation and the elections law, Prime Minister Salam proposed the following changes to the elections system in his formula:

First, Lebanon is to be divided into individual districts, each one of which is to have an individual deputy.

Second, there are to be 125 deputies, and membership is not to be limited by sectarian quotas.

Third, every candidate is to have the right to declare his candidacy for any district he wishes [to represent] without consideration to the sect to which he belongs.

Fourth, anyone who is 18 years of age is to have the right to be a parliamentary representative.

Fifth, the courts are to be made the proper authority for deciding on the validity or the invalidity of representation.

Sixth, the penalty for bribery is to be made harsher.

Seventh, elections rosters are to be printed and distributed at the end of each year regardless of cost.

Prime Minister Salam thinks that the new system will achieve the following goals:

First, the candidate will be liberated from political commitments to other candidates whose only ties to him are those of comradeship on the elections roster.

Second, the opportunity will be made available for any individual candidate and any other candidate to have party commitments in which neither one would feel restrained by anything but what is dictated to him by the wishes of those who voted for him, by his national conscience and by the policy he is pursuing.

Third, popular representation will be liberated from sectarian restrictions. This would be a major step towards eliminating the political sectarianism from which we have been complaining.

Fourth, ties between a deputy and his constituents will be stronger, and ambivalence in representation will be eliminated. This ambivalence is caused by a deputy's feeling that others share the responsibility for his constituents and by the voter's feeling that the responsibility for representing him is shared by several people, as is the case today in the rules system.

Fifth, the voter will be kept at arm's length from the experience of bribery when the election is confined to one candidate, and the relationship between him and the voters is personal, continuous and cordial. It would thus become difficult for a stranger who is not close to the people to buy votes no matter how high the price.

Sixth, new youthful blood will be gained by reducing the age limit to 18 and having this group of young people which entered public life in today's world represented. They entered public life a prominent force in the political arena and, consequently, it is our duty to make them share the responsibility.

Seventh, the court guarantee of settling the legality of an election is undoubtedly a source of reassurance, more so than leaving the matter to politicians who are checked by a weak prosecution.

Regarding the top of the pyramid Prime Minister Salam says in his plan, "in the light of experience and to avoid many of the reasons that thwart

a parliamentary democratic system, I am proposing the following as a first step towards the destruction of political sectarianism whose removal we are wishing for. This is a way of hiding sectarian sensitivities whose existence we must not yet deny and which we must treat with force.

"First, a presidential council is to be established to replace the presidency.

"Second, the presidential council is to be made up of six members, and it is to include a Maronite, an orthodox, a Catholic, a Sunni, a Shi'ite and a Druze.

"Third, the term of the presidential council is to be 6 years.

"Fourth, each one of the members of the presidential council is to serve 1 year in presiding over the council.

"Fifth, the functions of the presidential council are confined to the same constitutional functions [of the president] that are stipulated in Lebanon's present constitution. The presidential council is not to be held accountable.

"Sixth, the deputies are to have the freedom to select a prime minister without having to be restricted to a certain sect.

"Seventh, the prime minister who has the support of a parliamentary majority is to pursue all the powers of government and to have full responsibility for it. He is to have the same powers that the prime minister had in the third republic."

In Prime Minister Salam's view this organization has numerous benefits among which are [the following]:

First, it is a preliminary step towards abolishing political sectarianism which has become the demand of the rising generations. We have not been able to abolish political sectarianism at once.

Second, this organization would prevent powers from overlapping or one authority from tyrannizing another, leaving us feeling lost in applying the imaginary principle of participation.

Third, it would prevent the concentration of power in the presidency which is not subject to the supervision of the Chamber of Deputies nor is accountable to it.

Fourth, it would prevent the control of power by means of controlling one person, who is the president.



Fifth, political action would be the sole responsibility of parliamentary interaction.

Sixth, in addition to the aforementioned reform in the elections law strengthening the law will help the effectiveness of the parliamentary body in the creation of valid parties. The opportunity will thus become available to parties to play their parliamentary role in monitoring the government and assuming responsibility in it.

Seventh, this organization would do away with many psychological complexes that Lebanese citizens have. These complexes are the result of the feeling that none of them can become president or prime minister of his country unless he belonged to a certain sect--the Maronite for the presidency and the Sunni for the position of prime minister.

Eighth, this organization would reinforce in all citizens their loyalty to their homeland, Lebanon. They would feel that they were all equal partners in government and that there was no discrimination or differentiation in citizenship classification.

Ninth, it would liberate Lebanese policy and its turbulent environment from the consequences of the continuous fighting between Maronite undeclared candidates. In addition, such fighting leads to the continued destruction of prominent personalities over the years during which they are candidates, and this is detrimental to the interests of Lebanon in all fields because of the attempts that are made to destroy people.

8592

CSO: 4802

## IRAN-IRAQ WAR DRIVING WEDGE BETWEEN REGIME'S FACTIONS

London 8 DAYS in English 31 Jan 81 p 21

[Text]

MAURITANIA'S ruling team has once again been shaken by internal feuds which might jeopardise its attempts to bring back political normality and restore the country's economy.

A multiracial and fragile state, Mauritania painfully managed to disengage itself from the Western Sahara conflict in 1979. Now it again has a serious crisis at a time when elections and a referendum to make it an Islamic republic are being prepared.

The crisis has its origins in the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Both these countries are thousands of kilometres away from Mauritania, but some of their respective allies are battling to impose their influence in this unstable state.

The coalition of forces backing President Khouna Ould Haidala is composed of Arab nationalists on the one hand and progressive elements known to favour the Polisario Front and/or Libya on the other. This coalition remained united until the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq. At this time Mauritania was given a difficult choice, and the ruling regime split between those who backed Iraq and those who were clearly pro-Iranian. A majority of high-ranking officers within the Military Committee are known to be pro-Iraqi, a faction led by Lieutenant-Commander Dahane. Most religious dignitaries also lean towards Baghdad, especially because the Imam of Nouakchott's mosque has been receiving financial aid from Saudi Arabia, a strong supporter of Iraq in the Gulf war.

In fact, Mauritania has been enjoying good relations with Iraq. Last May, President Haidala visited Baghdad and President Saddam Hussein offered to finance Mauritanian development projects to the tune of \$100m. Three months later Iraq offered \$3m to Mauritania for the setting up of a colour-television station.

However, some members of the Mauritanian regime have expressed concern at the reinforcement of ties with Baghdad. They believe this would be at the expense of Libya: Saddam Hussein and Colonel Moammar Qaddafi are both vying for the leadership of the Arab world and are trying to attract Mauritania and other African Islamic countries within their spheres of influence.

While the two factions are involved in a tense struggle, conservative and progressive elements within the regime are also at odds. The conservatives have a marked preference for Baghdad while their rivals, who managed to secure Mauritania's withdrawal from the Western Sahara war, are very much on the side of the Libya-backed Polisario Front. Ahmed Baba Miske, 50, founder of the independent and nationalist Mahda party and a former diplomat, has been one of them. Miske joined the Polisario Front in 1975 and is known to have engineered the peace agreement signed between Mauritania and the Front in August 1979. Miske is considered an important figure by progressive elements, though he holds no official position.

Religious dignitaries claim Mauritania does not need a constitution since it has the Quran, but progressive elements have been actively campaigning for civilian rule, and for a democratic and parliamentary system. The conservatives have scored some successes — for example the application of Islamic laws, with sentences being carried out as in Saudi Arabia — but they waited for a good opportunity to get rid of the pro-Libyan group. It came with a students' strike in Nouakchott last month, during which students demanded the dismissal of three Iraqi professors whom they accused of being incompetent. The military members of the government claimed the Libyans were behind the move. As a result several people were arrested, including Baba Miske who it's said would have been named head of state.

Mauritania is now in the process of changing sides and if it becomes aligned with Iraq it will inevitably draw closer to Morocco. Such a move will not be without heavy consequences in light of the Western Sahara conflict.

CSO: 4420

## MOROCCO

### RHARB GAS FIND MAY LEAD TO PRE-RIP OIL DISCOVERY

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 26 Dec 80 pp 1,9

[Text] Last we mentioned briefly the successful outcome of new drilling in Rharb by Elf Aquitaine--SCP and the BRPM.

At a depth of 1,060 meters the well struck a methane deposit, 15 km west of Souk El Arba. This drilling undertaken in Ouled Ben Dech confirms the preceding findings, which were equally successful, of the drilling undertaken near Mechra Bel Ksiri in Ouled Youssef in August and in Allag in September.

It is an extensive deposit.

In July, it will be recalled, drilling under an APEX-BRPM permit had shown a methane deposit, 4 km south of Mechra Bel Ksiri, lying in a layer 13 meters thick between 604 meters and 817 meters deep. That might be part of the same deposit discovered by Elf Aquitaine. The group Elf, SCP and BRPM will begin a fourth drilling operation in the same zone in Ennasba. Then the whole area will be placed in production so that the size of the deposit can be determined.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these discoveries:

- 1) The new methods perfected by Elf Aquitaine for studies and exploration have yielded remarkable results since all the drilling sites have produced positive results.

It is true that the French company was able to take advantage of the work carried out earlier by SCP and BRPM, but it can be said that the drilling operations of the current program have been carried out with a sense of certainty which is very rare in the area of oil exploration.

- 2) One cannot exaggerate the importance of technical and financial support to be obtained through an agreement with a major petroleum company. Petroleum exploration requires, certainly, considerable means and enormous capital, which are sometimes used without any success.



Modern means of exploration permit, we can see, the discovery, without much danger of making a mistake, of favorable oil zones. But, in spite of this technology, it was estimated that, until now, it took 20 drilling sites before coming up with positive results.

It can be seen that, under these conditions of exploration, as it has been carried out until now, Morocco had little chance of success.

3) The group Elf Aquitaine, SCP and BRPM will launch next April deep drilling operations in Pre-Rif. We have already pointed out the real possibilities of that zone. If, over the ages, shallow deposits have been broken up, tectonic movements have been less severe at great depths and that is where--at 4,500/5,000 meters--that oil must be sought.

Drilling operations require considerable means and, for this operation, the consortium holding the permit has decided to team up with an Arab oil company: Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.

The discovery of the new gas deposits in Rharrb is the most important that independent Morocco has made, along with the oil and gas deposits in Essacouira. It should be noted that despite the shallow depth at which methane in Souk El Arba is found, in spite of the campaigns undertaken by the BRPM-Apex association, which had already resulted in the discovery of gas which serves as a supply for industries in the region (40 million cubic meters per year), this new discovery has only now been made. That emphasizes the importance of the means required and the density of the drillings to be carried out.

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CSO: 4400

## MOROCCO

### BRIEFS

**YOUSSEOUFIA PHOSPHATE OPERATIONS**--The loan of \$170 which an international banking consortium has just granted the OCP [Moroccan Phosphates Office] will permit our first national company to take another step in the direction of the growth and development of its phosphates operations. Yousseoufia, actually, has large deposits of high grade phosphate (one of the best in the world, with a content of 75 percent), but these deposits were drowned and their extraction posed difficult problems. These problems were able to be resolved by the technicians of the Phosphates Office and a calcination plant was able to carry out tests successfully. Better still, the fact that these phosphates contain combustible organic particules has allowed a considerable reduction in fuel needs, thanks to a self-combustion phenomenon. The exploitation of these deposits, whose known reserves are on the order of several billion tons, are therefore especially profitable and six calcination plants are going to be built in Yousseoufia, which will raise production levels, as we have pointed out, from 40,000 to 4 million tons per year. [Text] [Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 19 Dec 80 p 1]

**NADOR STEEL-ROLLING MILL**--The Nador steel-rolling mill will be equipped over 3 years by English steel. Just as we reported, a British company, Davy Loewy Ltd, of the Davy group, has just been awarded the key in hand contract for the Societe Nationale de Siderurgie Company (SONASID), which will be constructed in the framework of the Nador steel complex. The rolling mill will produce pieces of steel 5.5 meters long and 25 millimeters in diameter. The contract was won against strong German, Japanese and American competition. Work will begin immediately and the rolling mill, which will be placed in service in 1983, is planned to produce 420,000 tons per year. It represents a contract of 75 million pounds, or about 850 million dirhams. In addition, a contract for supplying 1.5 million tons of steel lingots to the rolling mill over at least 3 years was made with Davy Loewy Ltd. This supply will permit the completion of the second stage in the complex: the construction of a smelting furnace. It is worth pointing out on this subject the interest that Great Britain has in Morocco. In order to support this contract, the British government granted Morocco important conditions. An initial loan of 75 million dirhams was recently granted to Morocco and for the rolling mill there was to be either a grant of 13 million pounds (150 million dirhams) or an interest free loan of 18.5 million pounds (200 million dirhams). [Text] [Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 19 Dec 80 p 14]

## GOVERNOR DISCUSSES SOUTHERN KORDOFAN'S AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 19 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Zayn-al-'Abidin Abu-Hajj: "Governor of Southern Kordofan Tells Al-Sahafah: Our Position Emanates From Our Abidance by Revolution Charters; Oil Will not Be Alternative to Agriculture; Student Food Programs Save 2 Million Pounds After Application of Self-Management System and Exclusion of Contractors"]

[Text] The Kordofan Province development conference which was held in Kaduqli last October laid down fundamental principles for the province's development plans. The most distinguishing characteristic of that conference's studies and research is that these studies and research subjected the province's capabilities and resources to scientific analysis and that the visualizations have come equal in dimensions to these capabilities and resources and free of the ambitions characterizing the plans of some development conferences--plans which remained in the folds of dossiers because they were out of touch with the reality and because they were impossible to implement due to their enormous costs.

On the other hand, the Kordofan conference has determined the dimensions of the main components in these capabilities and resources and has focused on the importance of exploiting the available opportunities in agriculture and livestock, considering that the province possesses cultivable lands and livestock that can upturn the balances if exploited well.

So that the conclusions reached by the conference may not turn into mere memorandums forgotten in the folds of files, the conference has formed a followup and control committee to move step by step with the authorities that make the executive decision.

If the Kordofan Province development conference is tantamount to a fundamental turning point on the path of a development for which the means of success are available, considering that the province has been distinguished as a pioneer and promising province, then the oil discoveries have added a new hope fraught with bright optimism to the hopes attached to the riches of this province's lands.

## Kordofan Conference

Within the light of this framework, we have conducted our interview with 'Abd-al-Rahman Idris 'Abd-al-Rahman, the Socialist Union secretary and the governor of

Southern Kordofan Province. The interview started with the Kordofan development conference and with the governor's visualization regarding the hopes attached to the conference and to the possibility of implementing its recommendations and resolutions.

[The governor said:] We hope that the Kaduqli conference for the development of Kordofan province will constitute a positive turning point on the path of prosperity and growth. This conference has been distinguished by the fact that it has been a practical scientific conference in which Kordofan's experts and scientists exerted appreciated efforts to translate their ideas into plans that are not shrouded by the difficulty of implementation because the scientists and the experts subjected the available resources to their studies which have come as realistic studies compatible with the available natural and human capabilities and resources.

The governor added: This is why I can say that the conference recommendations and resolutions have reflected the province's real capabilities and not its ambitions. I can also say that the resolutions and recommendations reflect the minimum to which the province aspires, considering that it is a province rich with its natural, agricultural and livestock resources and with the wealth it treasures in its bowels.

The governor also said: In view of the fact that Kordofan Province generally, and its southern part in particular, is considered an agricultural area primarily, that its territories cover vast areas of land and that the part of the land exploited in conventional and mechanized agriculture has not yet exceeded 10 percent of the total cultivable area, most of the studies presented to the conference dealt with the agricultural aspects and aimed at the exploitation of these lands in cultivation and livestock breeding.

Regarding the development plans that are currently under implementation, 'Abd-al-Rahman Idris said:

Local development projects are currently in progress to survey and grade the cultivable lands and to determine the kinds of crops for which their soil is suitable. This work is being carried out by the (Hunting) Establishment. The plan also aims at action in the spheres of agriculture and of livestock. Basically, the plan seeks to set up modern mechanized agricultural projects and to develop corn, peanut, sesame and (karkadi) farms, in addition to setting up large fruit orchards and vegetable farms in preparation for establishing fruit processing industries.

On whether Southern Kordofan suffers from the shortage of potable water for both man and livestock, especially in the summer season when the heat becomes intense, the governor said:

Southern Kordofan is characterized by the abundance of water in all parts of the province. Underground water is not far from the surface. This is why the province has been well known for its orchards and its vegetable farms that meet not only the province's needs but also those of the adjacent provinces and of the country's capital.

Despite this, a major project is currently under implementation by the UN's UNICEF in cooperation with the Sudanese government. The project seeks to drill shallow



and underground water wells in numerous parts of the province and to build dams on the waterbeds in which, it is estimated, millions of cubic meters of water rush during the fall. This water is swallowed by the valleys without its being put to any use. With the construction of these dams, it will become possible to benefit from the stored water in agriculture and for man's and livestock's drinking needs throughout the months of the year. The water will be stored in nearby areas that save livestock herders the trouble of having to travel long distances in search of drinking water for their livestock.

#### What Is Behind Oil

The talk about the discovery of oil in Southern Kordofan leads to thinking of the economic and social effects and to the changes that may develop in the people's life--changes that may lead the people away from a situation under which they have been living and through which they have been contributing to the national economy with the revenues of their cash crops on which they have been relying to a different life in which the imagination runs wild and which is dominated by day-dreaming as a result of the transformation from agricultural society to industrial society and as a result of the subsequent developments in society and in the environment.

What are the guarantees which you think are capable of preserving the basic and inherited characteristics of the pastoral and agricultural society?

The governor said: Oil should not be an alternative to agriculture. As the brother president and leader said while declaring a new oil discovery in the oil prospecting sites, Sudan is an agricultural country and its economy depends on agriculture. Therefore, the discovery of oil will not be the sole goal but an addition to the efforts exerted to utilize the land and an element to develop and expand the cultivated area.

The governor added: On the other hand, we have put the instructions of the brother leader president into implementation and we have begun to conduct studies on the social and economic consequences that will result from the discovery of oil, as well as studies on the phenomena of migration from the countryside to the city, of construction development and of the major social transformation generally.

Our interview with 'Abd-al-Rahman Idris 'Abd-al-Rahman, the Socialist Union secretary and the governor of Southern Kordofan Province, then turned to the supply situation concerning the essential commodities, such as sugar, flour and corn.

#### Food Supplies

This province has not experienced a crisis in consumer supplies. The province did actually suffer from the lack of control and from the failure of the supplies to reach the actual beneficiaries. This situation led to the rise of a black market at the expense of the consumers' rights. However, the situation has now changed because the method according to which the consumer supplies were distributed has been reexamined, because control regulations have been imposed on this distribution and because the path has been blocked in the face of the manipulators with their numerous and varied methods.

The governor goes on to add: We started our action in this sphere by examining the quota allocated for the province and then by checking the distribution sites and the authorities in charge of distribution. All this was done in cooperation with the Ministry of Cooperation, Trade and Supply and the Ministry of Energy and Mining. Cooperation with the latter concerned the province's share of fuels, considering that these supplies were not subjected to a strict control.

The governor added: We used to suffer from a shortage in the means of transportation, especially in the sphere of transporting petroleum products by railroad. These supplies used to reach the province by way of al-Abyad from where they were transported by truck to the consumption sites in the province. Perhaps this is due to the lack of storage facilities and of oil tanks in Dubaybat station. In this regard, the Executive People's Council has issued a resolution to build storage facilities for consumer goods, as well as oil reservoirs. The construction of these facilities and reservoirs is the only solution to the inconveniences from which we suffer, especially during the fall when the means of transportation and communication, even by railroad, are interrupted due to sudden rainfall and floods.

The governor added: In all this, we have been trying to focus on serious planning and on laying down approved controls to insure justice, looking forward to the future and seeking guidance from the principles of the gigantic May revolution and from the instructions of the leader president in all that is connected with enhancing the wheel of development and prosperity. As a result of the formulation of a clear supply policy in which all the means of justice are present and which has eliminated the ghost of exploiting and tampering with the people's fates, the black market has disappeared, as I have already pointed out, and exists no more whereas this market used to control important and essential commodities, such as sugar, benzene and kerosene. Every citizen can now find his share without hardship and without losing this guaranteed right in the fog of tampering and of the crooked ways.

The governor further added: While following the policy of clarity, of applying justice and of tightening the noose around the tamperers, we have also had to exert efforts to broaden the sphere of cooperative action in order to enable the citizen to support this socialist system. We have crowned this action with the establishment of a consumer cooperative complex which will have branches in the various parts of the province and which will make available previously unavailable supplies, such as rice, lentils, tomato paste [salsah], fats and soap.

The governor then went on to talk about a new experiment implemented in the province recently and aimed at imposing regulations on the various aspects of spending in order to safeguard the public monies. He said:

Our experiment in exploring new spheres has been embodied in imposing controls on spending for food programs in schools, hospitals and jails. This plan [experiment] will save the province treasury over 2 million pounds annually--a sum which used to go to the pockets of contractors in the form of profits.

To give you an idea about the actual experiment, this year's food program budget amounts to 2.7 million pounds. The bids offered by contractors this year set a minimum cost of over 5 million pounds for the program. This has motivated us to apply the principle of self-management under the supervision of the cooperation

[department] of Southern Kordofan Province and with the assistance of the various departments. The idea has proven its success from the outset and has been distinguished by serving new and good food varieties and by serving meals to students at regular times.

The governor added: As a result of all of this and of other policies, we have begun to feel that the circle harmed by the application of this policy have begun to move in order to restore the method of work to what it was in the past by resorting to various methods. However, these methods have been exposed, thanks to the vigilance of the masses and to the leadership's commitment to defending its policy which is derived from the revolution's charters and from the instructions of the leader president on the need to safeguard the masses' gains and to put their interest above every personal interest seeking to serve only its own ends at the expense of the collective interest, especially since we always keep in our sight, and with utter sincerity and commitment, the leader's instructions regarding constant efforts to protect the revolution from those who try to slight the efforts exerted for development and for protecting the masses' interest. There are those who are trying to undermine the revolution's goals with the various means and methods of sabotage and with their various ways of spreading rumors and lies that seek to create confusion and to eliminate confidence in the political leadership. The communists and others resort to this kind of thinking. However, the caravan will march on and we will continue to score one victory after another on the path of realizing gains for the masses.

#### Supplying Corn

Regarding the corn situation, the reasons for the rise in corn prices and the indications that large quantities of corn are smuggled across the borders to neighboring countries, the governor said:

Southern Kordofan's corn production is considered quite large. In a good fall season, this production amounts to more than 5 million sacks. This fact confirms that the corn crop is enough for local consumption and that a surplus can be exported to the other provinces which have [to import] to cover their need of this essential supply.

As for insuring the abundant availability of corn, the governor said: We have taken our precautions and have laid down controls to obstruct smuggling corn outside the country. We have even issued regulations banning the transportation of corn even inside the country without a special permit out of our desire to establish effective control.

Regarding the plans for expanded corn cultivation and for the introduction of mechanized agriculture, the governor said:

As I have already pointed out at the outset of this interview, cultivable lands in this province cover vast areas amounting to hundreds of millions of feddans that have not been exploited. The part of the cultivable lands exploited so far has not exceeded 10 percent.

Here, I want to point out that a study is being carried out by local and foreign

expertise houses. Moreover, the (Hunting) Establishment is currently conducting surveys to determine the cultivable lands and the kinds of crops that can be cultivated.

The governor added: On the other hand, the province [government] does not stand in the face of those who wish to acquire cultivable lands and who can reclaim and cultivate such lands. The only condition we set is that they employ mechanization in agriculture.

Thus ended the interview with 'Abd-al-Rahman Idris, the Socialist Union Secretary and the governor of Southern Kordofan Province.

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## NORTH KORDOFAN URGED TO CULTIVATE JOJOBA

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 19 Nov 80 p 3

[Article: "Future Visualization for Jojoba Cultivation in Northern Kordofan; Jojoba Oil Used in Clothing, Wax, Disinfectant and Drug Industries"]

[Text] Introduction:

The past 10 years have been characterized by serious natural and social changes which will have their ill effects on man for generations to come. The drought which has hit numerous parts of the world has caused the cultivable area to recede, thus causing a severe shortage of food supply. Streams of victims have been flowing into the cities, production centers have been scattered and new societies and values have been formed. As a result of this, there have emerged strong currents to intensify and bolster scientific research in order to save mankind and to provide the right solutions for the catastrophes from which it is suffering.

The first question that occurs to the mind in this respect is:

Are we exploiting the available natural resources in an ideal manner and what is the potential of exploiting new resources?

In the plant kingdom alone, there are nearly 350,000 varieties. We have learned the economic value of about 2,000 varieties only. What is worse, the world's food supply depends at present on only 15 of these varieties.

Therefore, our situation requires that this number and capacity be increased to deal with the population explosion that has been accompanied by natural catastrophes. Sudan is a country rich with its plant life which has not been exploited yet, such as (al-hajlayj, al-'ishar and al-haraz). The (al-hajlay) oil, (al-'ishar) milk and (al-haraz) wood are a wealth that must be developed. Sudan is also rich with vast cultivable areas. It has also failed to use its surface and underground water ideally and is threatened with the encroachment of the desert. This requires ceaseless efforts to exploit all these resources and to block the path in the face of this [encroachment].

Through this paper, I want to review the facts concerning the jojoba plant which we hope will be the elixir of life for our lands. It pleases me to present these facts to the people of Kordofan because it is our belief that this province will

be of great importance in the sphere of cultivating and producing jojoba seeds and of stemming the desert encroachment. I will begin from this starting point.

### Qualities of Jojoba Plant

This plant grown naturally in the (Sonora) desert in North America. Like palm trees, this plant is bisexual, meaning that there are male and female plants. Pollination is carried out by the wind. Even though the knowledge concerning this plant and its oil is recent, active efforts are being exerted to adapt it to various parts of the world, such as the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Australia and Israel. And what good news for Kordofan people, considering that this plant has displayed the ability to adapt quickly to the province soil and climate, especially in al-Abyad and Bara! Some fruits have been produced by the plants cultivated in al-Abyad. Moreover, the plant's growth in Bara is another indication of its adaptation to this region.

The jojoba is characterized by its ability to withstand thirst and heat. Moreover, it grows in poor lands and this gives it the ability to fight desert encroachment. Scientific research has proven that jojoba plant has the ability to grow even in the case of drought. It has also been discovered that this plant performs the light assimilation process with superior efficiency under such conditions. This enables it to process the nutrients that it needs to grow and to produce fruit.

The jojoba has characteristics that enable it to survive in dry and hot climates. One of these characteristics is the presence of a large quantity of waxy substances in the leaves that reduce exudation (loss of water through the leaves). Tests have also proven that the jojoba plant has the ability to close the pores on the surface of its leaves without any noteworthy effect on its ability to take in the carbon dioxide necessary for processing the food that plants need for their growth by transforming the light energy into chemical energy. One of the important observations concerning this plant is its ability to change the shape of its leaves according to the environment. In plants never irrigated, we find that the leaves are short, spear-shaped and close to each other to reduce the speed of exudation.

One of the characteristics of the jojoba plant that enables it to survive drought is the speed with which its roots penetrate the soil. At the age of 14 months, the plant's roots may penetrate to a depth of 2 or more meters, depending on the quality of the soil.

All these qualities have enabled the jojoba plant in its native environment to spread throughout various terrains and climatic conditions. The plant grows at various altitudes between sea level and 4,000 feet above sea level and under temperatures ranging from -4 degrees centigrade to 50 degrees centigrade.

The jojoba is found in areas with a rainfall range of 102-450 millimeters. This is a clear indication of the possibility of its successful cultivation throughout North Kordofan Province, if we can supply it with irrigation water in the first years of its life.

The jojoba is a plant that resists many pests and insects and that does not need fertilization. These are factors that reduce the cost of its cultivation.

## Economic Value of Jojoba

This plant grows in poor marginal lands, survives drought and salinity and grows where no economically worthwhile crop grows. The jojoba thus enjoys unique qualities that make it an important fighter of desert encroachment. Moreover, this plant may live more than 100 years if it receives the necessary care in the first 3 years of its life. The jojoba seeds contain 40-50 percent of an extremely thick oil that can withstand high pressure and heat. It is thus the only vegetable oil that can replace the oil of extinct whales [presumably meaning whales that are about to become extinct]. This oil is used in lubricating heavy machines.

The markets using the jojoba oil most extensively at present are cosmetics markets which use it for creams, powders, soap and perfumes. This oil is also used in the clothing, wax, disinfectant and drug industries. The leftovers after the seeds are pressed also contain 30 percent protein, thus making it possible to use them as animal fodder.

According to estimates made on plants cultivated in their native environment, the jojoba plant production may amount to (3,000) pounds per feddan at the age of 9-10 years. The productivity then increases. Moreover, the price of a pound of jojoba seeds ranges from \$2-4.

Here, I should not forget to point out that we have purchased seeds which will be used for cultivation for \$16 per pound. This will make us produce our seeds locally and in the shortest time possible because the market is expanding day after day.

As for the oil, 2.5 pounds of the seed produce one pound of oil. The price of a gallon of this oil amounts to \$50 at present.

## Future Visualization for Jojoba Cultivation in North Kordofan

This province can be divided into four climatic zones ranging from the desert climate to the semi-dry climate, with a rainfall ranging from 100 to 650 millimeters annually and with maximum temperatures of 40-44 degrees and minimum temperatures of 8-13 degrees centigrade.

Sandy soil is most predominant in the province, with varying depths. Moreover, the province contains reasonable quantities of underground and surface waters.

All these factors combine to make the North Kordofan Province in its entirety fit for the cultivation of the jojoba plant. In this regard, this crop must be placed within a framework that guarantees soil preservation and the introduction of a cash crop that helps to resettle the nomadic Arabs.

According to the climatic divisions of this province, it is expected that jojoba cultivation will succeed, with a little irrigation in the first 3 years, in the central and southern parts. We must take into account that jojoba cultivation in this area must be founded on an economic basis centered on the production of seeds. Consideration must also be given to the other aspect, namely that of stopping

desertification. Therefore, we assume basically that this province's population will welcome the introduction of this crop because it is compatible with their economic and social situation. This, upon my life, is the basis of success in such projects.

With a little enlightenment and guidance, the jojoba will take its place as a major crop in this province. There are firm scientific bases that can be adopted in this regard:

First, expansion of concentrated scientific research.

Second, collection of rainwater so that we may use it in certain areas.

Third, adoption of the irrigation systems that help reduce water loss, such as drip irrigation.

Fourth, adoption of the best means for protecting recently cultivated plants until they reach the right age to fight desertification.

In this respect, grazing areas must be outlined and the (jojoba seeds must be planted in deep furrows). Moreover, the seedlings must be covered with the remains of other plants so that they may not be buried by the sands and so that water evaporation may be reduced.

Fifth, protection of the jojoba plant from insects and pests, especially (al-ardah).

In these five points lies the secret of the successful cultivation of the jojoba in desert and semi-desert areas. We must observe them.

I implore God for success.

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# TRADE, COOPERATION WITH ETHIOPIA ON THE RISE

Khartoum AL-SAHAPAH in Arabic 26 Nov 80 p 1

[Article: "Seventeen Commodities Exchanged Between Sudan and Ethiopia; Trade Exchange Volume Is 7 Million Dollars"]

[Text] Ahmad Salim Ahmad, the minister of state for cooperation, trade and supply, has told AL-SAHAPAH that 17 commodities have been designated for exchange between Sudan and Ethiopia within the 1981 trade protocol between the two countries concluded during his excellency the president's visit to Ethiopia.

The minister further said: The Sudanese commodities to be exported to Ethiopia include edible oil, (al-umbaz), processed fodder, yarn and textiles, food salt, dates, medicines, onions and tires.

The Ethiopian goods that can be exported to Sudan include coffee, lentils, Egyptian [broad] beans, spices, natural honey, winter clothing and sugar.

The minister also announced that the volume of trade exchange between the two countries from last February and until the present amounted to 7 million dollars.

His excellency the minister also pointed out that in light of the agreement, the possibilities available and the transactions concluded between the two countries since conclusion of the trade exchange protocol last May have been reviewed.

Discussions have also been held on the general form of cooperation between business men in the two countries and between the Sudanese and Ethiopian chambers of commerce. The Ethiopian side will submit a joint plan in this regard before the end of the current year. Discussions have also been held on the progress made in the joint regional project for the control of livestock diseases on the common borders between the two countries which is financed by the EEC. The two sides are also discussing the possibility of expanding the base of cooperation to control livestock diseases so that this cooperation may include Kenya, in addition to Sudan and Ethiopia. The situation has also been reviewed in regard to implementing the joint project to link the two countries by a highway and a microwave network between al-Matammah, al-Qallabat and al-Qadarif. The joint application submitted by the two countries to the European Economic Group has already been signed.

Discussions have also been held on the possibility of setting up a joint institute for control of the Nile plants in (Subat) River.

## BRIEFS

NEW REFUGEE AREAS--Kassala--Kamal 'Umar al-Amin, the Socialist Union secretary and the governor of Kassala Province, received yesterday morning a delegation from the office of the high commissioner for refugee affairs in Geneva. AL-SAHAFAH has learned that the meeting reviewed the studies concerning setting up the new refugee housing and living areas in Qal' al-Nahl, al-Rahad agricultural project, (al-Mafazah), Qawz Rajab and al-Adruqari. The meeting also discussed the economic and social studies concerning the projects included in the 1981 program for the absorption of refugees which was approved by the Khartoum international conference on refugee affairs. The program calls for resettling 67,000 refugees living in the province's border towns and villages in permanent camps. The cost of constructing the new projects amounts to 23 million dollars. On the other hand, Hasan Muhammad 'Uthman, the director of refugee affairs in the province, has told AL-SAHAFAH that the Swedish government has agreed to finance the Qal' al-Nahl water project to supply the various refugee areas with water through waterlines connected to the main waterline on the 'Atbarah River. This project will cost 3 million dollars. 'Uthman added that the 1980 program has been carried out and that 67,000 refugees have been resettled in permanent housing camps so far. [Text] [Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 26 Nov 80 p 1] 8494

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## TUNISIA

### ECONOMIC MINISTER ADDRESSES ASSEMBLY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Dec 80 p 4

[Speech by Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy: "Let Us Establish Industrial Relations With Countries on Tunisia's Development Level"]

[Text] Revise the Compensation Fund to ensure its planned effectiveness.

Organization of aid to the commercial sector.

On Friday afternoon Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy, delivered a speech to the National Assembly in which he answered the questions raised by the deputies in the course of the debate on the draft budget of the Ministry of National Economy.

In the first part of his speech Lasram discussed foreign trade which is one of the main foundations upon which the development of Tunisian society rests.

After indicating that the solution of the problems which face our trade lies in the promotion of exports, the minister pointed out that the other solution is to reduce imports. Today such a solution appears difficult, the more so since we are forced to meet the requirements of our development plans whose implementation calls for the purchasing of equipment and other indispensable products. "However," he added, "we could revise our annual import programs by reducing the amount of imports and adopting new formulas which could reduce our trade deficit." The minister cited the example of some industrial promoters who import goods and equipment and who could reinvest some of their profits or export some of their output.

The government will take other measures as well. Among others, it is a question of avoiding key in-hand operations so that Tunisian enterprises could participate in the implementation of projects and, as a corollary, reduce imports of some goods which could be manufactured in Tunisia.

In discussing the development of exports, the minister pointed out that our activities in this area do not consist merely of the study of markets or the launching of an information campaign, but also of establishing industrial relations with countries which have reached Tunisia's level of development. "This applies to Algeria and Morocco, where new encouraging opportunities have been opened to us."

The minister emphasized the important role which the tourist sector will play in the course of the next plan. He pointed out that the plan calls for another 40,000 beds for tourists in Jerba, Sousse, Monastir, Hammamet, Nabeul and Tunis. The choice of these sites is dictated by our concern to exploit the existing infrastructure to the maximum. Abdelaziz Lasram further stated that this program will be implemented partially thanks to Arab investments within the framework of a policy aimed at increasing our handling capacity and of reacting to market circumstances. Furthermore, the slowness of the growth of this sector is explained by the spectacular development experienced by Tunisian tourism in the past few years and, above all, the decline of tourism in some Mediterranean countries. Today these countries are on the way to resuming their positions on the international market. Consequently, we must double our efforts to avoid a decline in this development.

Abdelaziz Lasram then spoke of domestic trade. Answering the question of a deputy, he stated that the Ministry of National Economy is coordinating its activities in this area with the Ministry of Agriculture. "We are always in favor of the formula which allows us to draft a joint platform for the organization of the market."

Speaking of prices, the minister pointed out that price increases of some products, as pointed out by the deputies, are dictated by our concern for insuring a profit to the small merchants in order to improve their material situation.

After reviewing the list of increased prices and their minimum effect on the purchasing power of the citizens, Lasram pointed out that it is up to the consumers to participate in the formulation of an effective strategy aimed at reducing price increases by fighting speculation.

In this connection, he emphasized that in 1980 5,200 violations were recorded, 1,780 of which in the month of Ramadan.

The minister also reported that the government is currently formulating a set of rules on refrigeration facilities, real estate agents, and the import-export sector in order to make them responsive to the requirements of the market.

On the subject of the General Compensation Fund, Lasram pointed out that the existence of this agency encourages the increase of output and, at the same time, stabilizes the price index. Nevertheless, the government is planning an overall revision of its operations with a view to insuring the planned effectiveness of the fund, the more so since 1981 will be a difficult year in terms of prices. Producers should make an additional effort to increase their output and consumers should assist them in order to diminish predictable hardships.

Furthermore, Abdelaziz Lasram expressed the wish of the authorities to reorganize distribution circuits, the wholesale market in particular, the access to which will be regulated. "Furthermore, we are planning to aid the commercial sector in ways similar to the boosting of the agricultural and industrial sectors."

Addressing himself to the subject of mines and energy, Abdelaziz Lasram emphasized Tunisia's encouragement of the search for petroleum, as confirmed by the number of permits granted and the amount of allocated investments.



Production in 1981 is scheduled to reach 5.2 million tons or a drop of 0.4 million tons compared with 1980.

Furthermore, an additional output of 600,000 tons is planned as of 1982. The petroleum will come from five new areas and will represent a considerable sum as a result of higher world petroleum prices.

The minister said that in addition to the extraction of natural gas from the El-Borma field and the amounts of Algerian gas received as a fee for piping it to Skhirn and, subsequently, to Italy, Tunisia is increasing its offshore prospecting, its main purpose being to become independent in the field of energy.

Furthermore, extensive research is underway to develop the effective extraction of available lignite. Again with a view to the diversification of energy resources, in the next ten years the exploitation of bituminous schists and solar energy will be undertaken. The minister described the project which will be completed no later than 1982 in the village of Hamman-Biadha (Siliana). This is a pilot project which will be expanded should it prove to be effective.

Similar projects will be carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture in the areas of Kairouan and Cap-Bon, the minister reported. He emphasized the need to readjust energy prices in order to direct the consumers to the use of new and recoverable power sources.

Furthermore, a profound study will be made for the purpose of informing all departments on the impact which energy consumption has on the Tunisian economy. In the light of this study a clear view will be obtained of Tunisia's future in the field of energy.

Lasram extensively discussed the question of the production of various minerals (phosphates, iron, potassium, etc.). He cited figures in reviewing the development already underway in this sector or the one planned for the future. The indicators are promising, the minister said, recalling that funds spent for such studies between 1972 and 1980 totalled 9 million dinars.

The development of cooperation on the North African level or with other Arab partners is desirable in undertaking huge projects such as the production of enriched uranium.

Speaking of the same sector, the minister pointed out that investments in surveys and research, as stipulated in the next plan, will be 20 million dinars. Lasram announced that the output of the Gafsa Phosphate Company will reach 5.6 million tons as against 4 million tons in 1975.

He emphasized that industry needs customs and license protection particularly in the case of the highly profitable sectors. In the manufacturing of heating equipment, however, we have preferred to authorize imports, considering the unprofitable nature of the local industry and its non-competitiveness due to its lower quality output.

The minister of national economy emphasized the need to build plants outside the big urban agglomerations, the capital in particular, and to be concerned, above all, with the opening of jobs and reaching the level of the planned added value. He

emphasized the need for studies and research which must precede the building of industrial projects. Specialized institutions and Tunisian-Arab development banks could undertake such studies by opening study offices, considering the size of their capital investments. He reported that a crafts office is being organized. It will employ 14,000 workers and provide 45,000 artisans with work.

Abdelaziz Lasram emphasized that the Industrial Real Estate Agency needs substantial funds. However, it was able to obtain loans totalling no more than 8.5 million dinars at a 14 percent interest rate. The agency must find all the funds it needs if it is to carry out its land development projects for industrial purposes in all gouvernorates and all interested settlements.

In the concluding part of his speech the minister of national economy discussed public enterprises. He pointed out that they total 150 and that their overall contribution to economic development totalled 157 million dinars. This proves the role which the public sector is assuming in national economic life. However, 14 of these enterprises had to be assisted, for which purpose the state spent 114 million dinars.

The minister noted that the social climate within such enterprises is improving. However, an effort must be made by both sides rather than by the enterprise managers themselves in order for a just balance to be reached. Finally, he emphasized that the situation in the public sector is satisfactory contrary to the prevailing view, that losing enterprises may be found throughout the world and that they are supported by their governments.

The draft budget of the Ministry of National Economy was unanimously adopted.

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## TUNISIA

### FOREIGN MINISTER ADDRESSES ASSEMBLY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 19 Dec 80 p 4

[Speech by Hassan Belkhoja: "The EEC Has Pledged to Respect The 1976 Agreement in Both Spirit And Letter"]

[Text] Yesterday afternoon Hassan Belkhoja, minister of foreign affairs, delivered a speech at the National Assembly in which he answered the questions raised by the deputies in the course of the debate on the 1981 budget of his department.

He mentioned, first of all, the activities of the ministry and the effort it is making within the framework of its diplomatic activities and in the light of the new international developments which took place in 1980.

After emphasizing Tunisia's concern with strengthening its diplomatic presence among other nations, in accordance with the aspirations of the people and the directives of the Supreme Combatant, the minister recalled the foundations of our foreign policy, which are the preservation of national independence, mutual respect, establishment of loyal cooperation, defense of just causes and strengthening the peace throughout the world. "These are foundations on which our diplomatic action rests and which enabled Tunisia to play an international vanguard role."

The minister then sketched the picture of the current world situation, which led to several upheavals in 1980, some of them severely threatening security and stability.

"In addition to the chronic conflicts which break out here and there," he specified, "during 1980 we witnessed a number of events which could hardly be described as optimistic but are quite the opposite."

"In Asia, Africa and elsewhere a number of hotbeds of tension broke out and worsened as the result of the strained relations among the great powers."

Then Belkhoja proceeded to analyse the repercussions of these clashes on world peace and the balance of forces. He emphasized the risks which such conflicts entail not only for those who provoke them but for the developing countries as well.

On the economic level the minister pointed out that the international community had failed to formulate a proper framework for the establishment of a new world economic order and recalled the difficulties which have been hindering this process to the present.

Nevertheless, he emphasized the determination of the developing countries to eliminate such difficulties with a view to obtaining their objectives in the area of international trade.

#### Establishment of Good Neighborly Relations With Fraternal Countries

Furthermore, Hassan Belkhoja described the major axes around which Tunisian diplomacy turns. He began with North Africa where a definite improvement has been noted in our relations with fraternal countries. In this respect, the minister recalled the results of the visits which Algerian President Chedli Bendjedid paid to Tunis and of Mohamed Mzali to Rabat and Algiers. These visits, he said, enabled us to improve our relations and, consequently, give a new impetus to inter-North African cooperation.

"Nevertheless," he specified, "whereas our relations with Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania took a positive course of development in 1980, our relations with Libya, conversely, had a different fate."

In this connection, the minister emphasized Tunisia's desire to establish good neighborly relations with all fraternal countries governed by reciprocal respect.

On the Arab level, Hassan Belkhoja emphasized the interest displayed by our country in strengthening its relations with Arab countries on a bilateral level and within the framework of joint Arab actions.

In this connection he recalled the rather encouraging results achieved in the field of cooperation. He emphasized Tunisia's desire actively and effectively to participate in all meetings of the Arab league. In this context he referred to Tunisia's participation in the last Arab summit and to the conclusive results of the meeting.

#### Enhanced Cooperation With Africa

In terms of Africa, Tunisia has chosen the way of strengthening political relations inspired by the policy it has pursued so far toward Third World countries.

Nevertheless, economic relations are still below both expectations and level of political relations. Nevertheless, Tunisia has already formulated the political framework for eventual extensive cooperation with African countries.

Still on the subject of Africa, let us emphasize that Tunisia's participation in inter-African meetings, with a view to helping to resolve problems such as that of the Sahara or the Chad, has been effective.

On the international level, traditional relations between Tunisia and western Europe have been developing satisfactorily. This enables Tunisia to share with its European partners its concerns regarding the further expansion of the European Economic Community. The latter, however, has pledged to respect both the spirit



and the letter of the 1976 agreement. Tunisia has always been concerned with improving its relations with eastern Europe. In 1980 these relations were affected by the intervention of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Technical and cultural cooperation has developed with these countries, particularly with the USSR and the GDR. Contacts were established with the other eastern countries with a view to determining possibilities for cooperation and exchanges in the fields of transportation, phosphates, and textiles.

#### Tunisia-U.S.: Close Relations

Relations between Tunisia and the countries in the Asian continent are based on mutual respect. Steady contacts have been established with different countries with a view to developing economic cooperation and trade. In this area the only noteworthy relations were those established with Japan and China.

As to Tunisian-American relations, they have always been good by virtue of the support which the United States has given Tunisia. Actually, such relations as well as bilateral cooperation will be in no case affected by events which break out from time to time throughout the world.

Numerous contacts were established with Latin American countries with a view to intensifying consultations on the subject of the organization of world information and economic order.

The minister then spoke of relations between Tunisia and international organizations.

Tunisian diplomacy has always been represented in the meetings held by organizations such as the Islamic Conference and the United Nations.

Actually, the harmony which has always characterized Tunisia's relations with Arab, African, unaligned or Third World countries, have allowed our country to play positive and effective roles, the more so since it has been a question of contributing to the solution of crises threatening the peace throughout the world (Afghanistan, Middle East, etc.).

The final subject discussed by Belkhoja was that of the living conditions of Tunisian workers abroad.

Tunisia, he said, is very solicitous of Tunisian workers abroad. These workers are not exploited in the least in the host countries where the network of consulates and social and cultural centers has been widened for the purpose of protecting their rights and strengthening their attachment to the country. On a different level, permanent contacts have been established with the host countries for the purpose of insuring for Tunisian workers better living conditions and protecting their dignity.

In the evening, after the draft budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was approved, the National Assembly opened debates on the Ministry of the Interior. A report on the debates will be published in our next issue.

## TUNISIA

### FREEDOM OF PRESS IN COUNTRY DISCUSSED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 26 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Youssef Seddik: "Information: Desire For Openness"]

[Text] Some 20 deputies have formulated their concept of changes in the style and practices of journalistic activity and of the responsibility of the state and of the informations institutions in this change. This took place in the course of a debate eagerly awaited by the Tunisians on budget appropriations.

As we listened to the representatives of the people discuss with such lucidity our job, we, the journalists, feel something like a double malaise: first of all, we have done nothing to deserve such consideration on the part of the legislative branch to warrant its defense of our cause with the executive branch, for had we been an independent body we would have long influenced the events leading to an improvement of our status and situation; furthermore, we are embarrassed by being given both a tutor and a defender who is the source of all laws which, in a way far better than discussions in the course of a seasonal debate, change the structures which prevent us from doing our jobs properly.

From these discussions, however, we retain a single point which we consider to be extremely important: our relation to openness and truth. On this point, both the deputies and the minister who answered their statements, seem to consider that we alone must face our responsibilities . . . .

First of all, before we undertake the study of our responsibilities we must try to clarify our position as "members of a craft"--concretely and without self-serving purposes.

The Tunisian journalists belong to two distinct and frequently opposed categories: those who put their pens, voices, or presences on the service of a governmental institution, whether belonging to the only party or directly related to the executive branch, whoever its promoters may be, against a salary or a monetary reward; and those who contribute to an independent newspaper or a newspaper considered as belonging to the opposition . . . . The latter, since they do not "benefit" from the trade union protection of collective agreements, occasionally depict themselves as "militants" of liberal journalism or even free journalism, as they conceive it.

In the case of the former category everything is clear and it is legitimate for an organ supporting a policy based on external political criteria to adopt the system

of centralized responsibility, the responsibility which turns the journalist into an "official" according to his adaptability to the doctrine and ideology served by his newspaper.

In the case of the latter category the difference is only apparent, and any information organ is submitted to such centralization of responsibility provided by its initial sponsor who, for doctrinal, strategic, or simply personal reasons, could find himself in a state of insurmountable contradiction with "his own" journalists.

Therefore, where could we place our contribution to the truth and the attitude of the true journalist who must face his own conscience without the intrusion of any outside influence or the dictates of any kind of bias?

Faced with this simple logic the pessimists will end up by considering objectivity and independence of information hopeless. This pessimism, however, will be caused by laziness . . . .

The magic word of objectivity has been long considered in its static sense and never as a process which involves, in the case of the journalist, elements of sensitivity, choice, or exposure to error which disappear only when facing the facts or a plurality of other viewpoints which may appear. To believe that a journalist could "lay" even a single objective article is to believe in the goose laying golden eggs . . . . It is only in the course of a long career that the provider of information could acquire a guaranteed audience and credibility through his sense of nuances and his mastery of hypotheses and of their possible conclusions. This sense and mastery are the result of listening to others and a consideration of events.

If this facility is finally acquired, based on the professional criteria which become apparent even in the views of his employers, what to do to go beyond the contradiction we mentioned between doctrinal requirements or simply the mood of the employer, as required by the centralization of responsibility, and the personal ethics of the journalist?

In our view, the contradiction can be positively surmounted only as a result of a deontological reform of the participation of the journalists in the overall national debate.

In many European and American countries, and even in some Arab countries (Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon), the journalist who has acquired a skill and a relatively broad audience may submit his article, commentary, or viewpoint on a priority basis to the newspaper for which he works on a regular basis. In the case of disagreement, however, he may submit to other newspapers the rejected copy. This does not exist in Tunisia and the press code calls for the written authorization of the director of the newspaper whenever a journalist would like to participate in other discussions in another periodical. This restriction is not normal in a democratic country and should be abandoned . . . .

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